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Consumer-Citizens of China
This book presents a comprehensive examination of Chinese consumer behaviour 
and challenges the previously dichotomous interpretation of the consumption of 
Western and non-Western brands in China. The dominant position is that Chinese 
consumers are driven by a desire to imitate the lifestyles of Westerners and thereby 
advance their social standing locally. The alternative is that consumers reject 
Western brands as a symbolic gesture of loyalty to their nation-state.  
Drawing from survey responses and in-depth interviews with Chinese consum-
ers in both rural and urban areas, Kelly Tian and Lily Dong find that consumers situ-
ate Western brands within select historical moments. This embellishment attaches 
historical meanings to Western brands in ways that render them useful in assert-
ing preferred visions of the future China. By highlighting how Western brands are 
used in contests for national identity, Consumer-Citizens of China  challenges the 
notion of the “patriot’s paradox” and answers scholars’ questions as to whether 
Chinese nationalists today allow for a Sino-Western space where the Chinese can 
love China without hating the West. 
Consumer-Citizens of China will be of interest to students and scholars of 
Business Studies, Chinese and Asian Studies, and Political Science.
Kelly Tian is Professor of Marketing and holds the Anderson Chair of Business 
at New Mexico State University.
Lily Dong is Associate Professor of Marketing at the University of Alaska 
Fairbanks.
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Foreword
Kevin Lane Keller
E.B. Osborn Professor of Marketing
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
Perhaps no other topic is more at the intersection of important marketing trends 
and developments than globalization. Globalization is driven by a wide range of 
technological, cultural, economic, and environmental forces. The reality is that 
marketers all over the world are increasingly crossing international borders with 
their marketing, and the ability of a consumer in virtually any country to purchase 
branded products and services from companies in virtually any other country has 
never been greater.
Globalization offers huge opportunities for marketers, but at the same time cre-
ates enormous challenges. All these different forces have to be understood and 
properly accounted for. For example, technology shrinks the world, but creates 
much complexity at the same time because of the different standards and levels 
of adoption found in different countries. Cultural differences in particular are pro-
foundly important and can often be the most difficult for marketers to grasp.
Marketing managers and consumer researchers are keenly interested in how 
brands will develop in this new global landscape. As brands cross more and more 
international boundaries, they often encounter new consumers with dramatically 
different needs and wants, as well as competition from brands that may very well 
have been a part of a country’s history and heritage literally for decades. Managers 
and researchers have to know how brands are built in this kind of environment and 
how global forces will affect that. 
Understanding how any brand develops in any market is challenging enough. 
Consumers form their impressions of brands based on potentially thousands of 
touch points. The image of a brand is made up of anything that becomes linked 
to it in the minds of consumers – all the thoughts, feelings, images, experiences, 
perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, judgments and so on that might occur as consumers 
go about their daily lives and one way or another come into contact with a brand.
Some of those contact points are influenced by marketers, through the design 
of the product or service, how it performs, where and how it is sold, how it is 
priced, all the communications that are sent about it, and so on. Many of these 
contact points, however, are out of the control of the marketer, in terms of what 
a consumer sees, hears, or reads from others. Online and offline word-of-mouth 
and media exposures have become increasingly important determinants of what 
consumers learn and experience with brands.
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Regardless of the source of the contact – marketer controlled or otherwise – 
the information contained in it and the rational and emotional responses that it 
evokes are a function of the psychological make-up of consumers. Brand meaning 
is shaped by what consumers think, feel and act towards life in general, as well 
as brands and products in particular. A consumer’s life experiences create a per-
ceptual filter that shapes brand meaning in profound ways. The same brand and 
how it is marketed can be interpreted very differently, depending on the type of 
consumer involved. 
A fundamental determinant of these life experiences is the culture in which 
the consumer lives. Consumers learn about and make decisions about brands in a 
social context of friends, family, and other significant people whose opinions mat-
ter. Interpersonal forces can be hard to pin down, but invariably play an important 
role in the success of a brand. Cultural relevance is often a key success factor for a 
brand. But brands don’t just live in the “here and now” – there is always an aspira-
tional aspect in terms of what they will also do for consumers in the future. One of 
the most fundamental tenets of branding is that the power of a strong brand is its 
ability to set expectations with consumers: consumers often buy brands as much 
for who they want to be as who they actually are. 
One of the fascinating issues with regard to globalization is how consumers 
in different countries choose between the old and the new in their brand choices 
– the history, heritage, and cultural experiences from domestic brands with which 
they grew up versus all the new, exciting, foreign brands that have only recently 
become available. A whole host of factors will affect which brands consumers 
choose, such as: How important is nostalgia to them? Family ties? How do they 
feel about their own country? Other countries? 
With respect to globalization, perhaps no country offers more contrasts than 
China. With a long, rich, and unique history, China is moving quickly to the top of 
21st-century marketing priorities as companies all over the world target the biggest 
market around. But how will consumers in China respond to these international 
forays? How will the meanings of domestic and foreign brands be shaped in China 
over time? What types of brands will be successful in China, and why? This is the 
multibillion dollar question. And besides the obvious applied interest in branding 
in China, there are intriguing theoretical issues about how Chinese consumers – or 
any type of consumer for that matter – incorporate Eastern and Western values in 
their brand images and meaning and the types of behaviors that result.
Clearly these questions are challenging, and fully understanding brands and 
branding in China will require time and significant scholarly analysis. A variety 
of theoretical perspectives and conceptual approaches will be necessary to capture 
the richness and complexity involved. Fortunately, an important first step in that 
journey has been made by Tian and Dong with Consumer-Citizens of China. In 
this book they offer a careful cultural analysis of how and why Chinese consumers 
choose foreign versus domestic brands. In particular, they identify the underlying 
processes by which Western brands become linked to various assertions of nation-
alism and visions of the future China. They carefully deconstruct the concept of 
“foreign brands,” finding that a “foreign brand” simply means a global brand 
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possessing particular traits. Japanese brands, for example, are “Western” brands 
– not on the basis of geography, but on their global achievements of being high 
quality, technologically advanced and “world famous.”
At the heart of their analysis is the discovery of four cultural narratives that exist 
with Chinese consumers. These narratives piece together themes from the past 
and present political and social realities in China, and are found to be employed 
to enliven imaginings of Western brands. These four perspectives address diverse 
concepts such as freedom, dominance, competition, political and economic power 
and achievement, imperialism, expansionism, progress and quality of life, har-
mony, heritage, and national identity. They offer provocative and sometimes 
challenging observations that add to our understanding of consumer behavior 
and brand development in China. If consumers “own brands,” as many branding 
pundits astutely assert, then understanding the manner by which these narratives 
affect how Chinese consumers choose to define and embrace brands is at the very 
heart of branding in China.
The authors have made a significant contribution to the field of consumer 
research in marketing with their work, successfully shining a light on a murky 
area of branding. Anyone interested in the future of branding in China should 
read, study, and learn from Consumer-Citizens of China. It offers invaluable 
insights that are critical to our understanding. The authors should be applauded 
and thanked for what they have accomplished, and I hope all readers reap the 
rewards of their efforts.
Kevin Lane Keller
Hanover, NH
April 2010
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1 Imagining China, imagining 
brands
Presiding over the central square in Chengdu, the capital of China’s Sichuan 
province, is a 30-meter white-marble statue of late Chairman Mao Zedong, built 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Chengdu is one of the few cities 
where such statues of Mao, which were once visible throughout the country, 
remain. A China Daily reporter offers a rich description of the central square 
and surrounding area that implicitly renders remarkable the preservation of this 
historical icon in the face of dramatic cultural change. 
Instead of political slogans, the white-marble statue of Mao is now surrounded 
by huge billboards of advertisements that had been cited as something 
“capitalist” against Mao’s planned economy, in which production and sale 
of goods were controlled by government plans. Now the venue where Mao’s 
statue stands, at the heart of Chengdu, has become the hot spot for both 
domestic and foreign investors to show off their corporate images and brand-
name products. Around Mao’s statue, posters or boards with advertisements 
of home-made products are competing with those of foreign or foreign-funded 
companies such as Kodak of the United States . . . Right behind Mao’s statue, 
a banner streamer [announcing] . . . a large-scale shopping fair for traditional 
Spring Festival goods is in sight. [Contrasting food rationing during Mao’s 
era, people now] can buy whatever they like . . . for the imminent New Year 
and the ensuing Spring Festival, or the Chinese lunar new year, at this fair. 
. . . The decades old Chengdu Department Store is a listed one [on the stock 
market] whose building, just opposite to Mao’s huge statue across the city’s 
main street, was festooned with varied ad banners atop its roof and buildings. 
A lottery business ad . . . was especially eye-catching . . . In the past two 
years, the business made nearly 100 local residents . . . millionaires through 
lottery buying, which was however, unimaginable and banned during Mao’s 
era. . . . Around the square are also vivid shops of McDonalds and KFC, 
whose globally known logos were the best identity for publicity . . . On the 
left of Mao’s statue three major Chinese insurance companies, China Life, 
China Pacifi c and Ping An, were touting their services in huge enchanting 
advertisements. [This was something foreign in Mao’s planned economy 
where people] could enjoy housing, medical, and pension benefi ts from the 
2  Imagining China, imagining brands
government . . . On the Remin (People’s) Road . . . South of Mao’s statue, 
advertisements of a dozen real estate developers were competing . . . [as] 
Chengdu witnessed a booming housing market like other cities around China . 
. . To make way for the construction of a central business district, the Chengdu 
municipal government, once adjacent to Mao’s statue, moved to the brisk and 
fast-expanding business center three years ago.
(China Daily 2003) 
In this imagery of a prospering Chinese city, aspects of the past are retained (such 
as Mao’s statue) and nourished (for example the Spring Festival) in China’s new 
market economy, and coexist in harmony with commercial brands, both domestic 
and foreign, that together alter consumption experiences and practices from 
China’s past. Past and present are not always blended so seamlessly. 
During the 60th anniversary of National Day the Japanese popular press reported 
that the Beijing City Offi ce of Publicity had requested that television stations not 
broadcast the scene of Chairman Hu reviewing troops with the Toshiba poster 
in the background (http://forum.kaiyuan.de/viewthread.php?tid=364558; http://
txbbs.cc/viewthread.php?tid=3095).
The press reports suggested that this was prompted by Chinese viewers who had 
written to express their anger at seeing the Japanese brand while they were watching 
the National Day celebrations. After three decades of promotional presence in 
China, it would be easy to think that global brands have become commonplace to 
the point of seeming natural. Global brands often try to avoid appearing alien by 
engaging with local culture and insinuating that they are Chinese (Zhao and Belk 
2008b). As this incident reveals, global brands remain foreign in the eyes of many 
Chinese. Such foreign-ness is also seen as inappropriate to or even contaminating 
celebrations of Chinese cultural heritage or China as a nation. 
It also prompts a number of questions about the presence of foreign brands in 
China. Why did some viewers react with such strong negative emotions about the 
Toshiba poster? Why would viewers’ complaints carry enough weight to allegedly 
prompt Beijing City Offi cials to take action to stop the broadcast of the fi lm-clip? 
Whereas China scholars might link these reactions to China’s history involving 
civilian victimization during the locally labeled “Japanese War of Aggression,” 
we are left to wonder how such history becomes embodied by the Toshiba brand, 
and why it is of relevance to Chinese people today. Many were born after this 
Second World War event, and now live under an administration that apparently 
does not attach such negative meanings to global brands.
The National Day anniversary is of course not the only incident in which a 
global brand has been deemed by the Chinese as inappropriately linked to China’s 
celebration of its nation and historical past. In contrast to this unintended linkage 
are attempts of global brand producers to ground their presence in China’s 
national history. Take, for example, an advertisement we accessed online in 2007 
reportedly created by KFC. The fi lmed advertisement depicted a host of hungry 
Chinese soldiers who receive and then devour the contents of Kentucky Fried 
Chicken boxes. With patriotic background music and soldiers clad in World War 
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II uniforms, the advertisement’s voiceover and text suggest that “Chinese people 
are passionate about and willing to die for three things: the national fl ag, the great 
(socialist) dream, and KFC Fried Chicken wings.” Although the exuberance with 
which the soldiers devour the box of wings perhaps was intended as camp or comic, 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not see the humor 
nor feel the promotional pull. The advertising campaign was never broadcast, as 
the PRC deemed its content inappropriate (The fi lm, posted at http://www.56.com/
u79/r_MTMxNDQ3MTY.html and accessed in 2007, has since been removed). 
With an infi nite number of creative choices, why would brand producers opt for 
this type of appeal? Although at fi rst this promotion struck us as thoughtless, we 
would answer “for many reasons.” 
First, this foreign brand advertisement pursues a strategy of “sinocizing” the 
brand (Zhou and Belk 2004, 71) by imposing a specifi c favorable historical context 
that fosters a sense of the United States and China as allies. That the KFC brand 
is represented as a gift to an ally might be read as this brand producer’s attempt to 
counter an imagined oppositional meaning – a foreign brand as the Trojan-horse gift 
of an enemy. Second, the ad rhetoric mimics the structural format of well-known 
political guidelines proposed by cultural political icon Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866–
1925). Dr. Sun is known for promoting the selective adoption of management 
systems from foreign countries as a path toward China’s empowerment during 
early confrontations with foreign countries. The guidelines are called “san min 
zhuyi” or the three-min system (Three Principles of the People), namely minzu 
(nationalism), minquan zhuyi (democracy), and minsheng zhuyi (socialism or 
populism). Third, in playing off of Dr. Sun’s rhetoric, the ad references the founder 
of the Guomindang party, which is the ruling party of Taiwan today. Dr. Sun is one 
of the few historical political leaders honored in both Taiwan and China. Thus, this 
selection sidesteps the controversies that have erupted between China and Taiwan 
over Taiwan’s claims for independence.
The unaired KFC ad suggests several fundamental premises: that Chinese 
nationalism is important to consumers; that some consumers imagine East–West 
confl icts rather than alliances; that consuming foreign brands from the West is 
potentially at odds with Chinese nationalism; and that this confl ict can be navigated 
through selective invocations of history. All in all, this brand producer seems 
attuned to cultural anthropologists’ assertions that in the age of globalization, 
nationality and cultural history are all the more relevant in the lives of individuals 
and shape the meanings they attach to consumer goods (Friedman 1996, 1997). 
Yet the global brand icon KFC, for all its well-intentioned efforts to localize its 
appeal, was viewed as shui tu bu fu (not acclimatized to the water and soil) in 
China (Zhou and Belk 2004). Although the promotion of the foreign brand may 
have attempted to capitalize on the local cultural system, it nonetheless appeared 
alien and offensive (Zhao and Belk 2008b). Among other aspects of the ad, in 
China expressing hunger leads to a loss of face. After all, prior to the economic 
reforms Chinese consumers suffered decades of limited food supply. The depiction 
therefore not only causes embarrassment but also revives unpleasant memories. 
Further, the traditional value system in China has always praised people who 
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would rather die than accept jue-lai-zhi-shi (food offered from pity mixed with 
contempt). So, although there is more thought behind this failed brand promotion 
than at fi rst meets the eye, we would say knowing “quite a lot” is nonetheless not 
enough.
Even global brands invited to join in China’s celebration of heritage have 
found themselves at the center of a controversy in which China’s sovereignty, cul-
tural heritage, and future are debated. An apt illustration here is the opening of a 
Starbucks storefront café in the Forbidden City in fall 2000, following Starbucks’ 
1999 debut in China. The almost 600 year old Forbidden City encloses the imperial 
palace, which was home to 24 emperors until imperial rule ended in 1911. In the 
burgeoning tourist industry spawned by gaige kaifang, the invitation extended to 
Starbucks to open a café in the Forbidden City was part of the museum administra-
tors’ attempts to improve service in China’s top tourist attraction (People’s Daily 
2000). Whereas some reports suggest that the invitation was a strategy whereby 
administrators could raise money to maintain the 178-acre complex of villas and 
gardens, palace management claims the decision was driven by a desire to meet 
consumer demand, and not by profit (China Daily 2007). Almost immediately 
after its opening, website debates emerged, with some Chinese bloggers protest-
ing the presence of Starbucks on the grounds that it was damaging to cultural 
heritage (People’s Daily 2000).
In January 2007, six years after the opening, a China Central television host, 
Rui Chenggang, aroused resentment in a blog where he pronounced the Starbucks 
in the Forbidden City to be a joke among western tycoons (China Daily 2007c). 
Email exchanges between Chenggang and the CEO of Starbucks, Jim Donald, 
reveal that the Starbucks presence was contested as insensitive and even disre-
spectful of China’s cultural heritage (China Economic Times 2007):
[email letter to CEO of Starbucks from Chenggang] Jim, how are you doing? 
I’m the Chinese anchorman you met last year at the Yale CEO Summit. We 
talked about why Starbucks should move its shop out of the Forbidden City. 
And I really appreciated it when you told me you yourself were not in favor of 
that. Am curious to know if you have a plan to have it removed. It’s still there. 
Did your Chinese partner agree with you?
All the best.
Chenggang
原文[original email] Reply via email)
Dear Mr. Rui,
Thank you for your note and for your concern regarding Starbucks Coffee 
Company’s presence in the Forbidden City.
 When Starbucks was invited by museum officials to open a store six years 
ago, we did so with great sensitivity to, and respect for, the historic and cul-
tural heritage of the Forbidden City. We have shown and continue to show our 
respect for local history, culture and social customs, and have made serious 
efforts to fit within the environment of the Forbidden City.
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 We are honored and humbled to have been invited to offer customers a 
place to relax and enjoy a cup of coffee with their local Barista.
 Connecting with our customers and the communities in which we operate 
is important to us. Ever since our entry into China, we have been involved in 
the local community and its culture. An example of this can be seen in our 
China Education Fund activities.
 Thank you again for reaching out to me. Should you have any additional 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. In the meantime, I have asked 
Eden Woon, vice president of Starbucks Greater China, to reach out to you 
personally.
Sincerely,
Jim Donald
The email letters can be found on the blog of Rui Chenggang (http://blog.sina.com.
cn/s/blog_4adabe27010008zk.html). Whereas some bloggers held that Starbucks 
was an instrument of further interjecting capitalism into China and called for cul-
tural protection, others questioned the essence of “cultural protection,” anticipat-
ing that Starbucks would be replaced with a local coffee (rather than tea) provider. 
Others questioned the cultural independence of Rui’s argument, as he seemed 
much concerned with Westerners’ opinion of the Starbucks in the Forbidden City.
In short order the Starbucks closed following the January 2007 blog protests 
and debates. The blog debates were followed in March by a motion submitted 
to the National People’s Congress by a member of parliament, Jiang Hongbin, 
to close the outlet. Jiang fi led the motion on the grounds “As long as it stays in 
the imperial palace it poses a challenge to our traditional culture” (China Daily 
2007b). The prospect of a host of tourists attending the heritage cite during the 
2008 Olympic Summer Games in Beijing perhaps also elevated concerns for 
showcasing the palace as traditional culture untainted by global forces (see Belk 
2003), as the ongoing renovation of the palace more generally involved toning 
down commercial symbols. In July of 2007, Forbidden City managers decided 
that all shops on its grounds would operate under the palace’s brand name. While, 
given the debates, one might presume that a tea house would replace the Starbucks, 
in 2008, on the same site, the Forbidden City Café opened its doors to provide 
coffee and other drinks (China Daily 2007a). 
Current knowledge of Chinese consumers’ meanings and motives that guide 
their responses to foreign brands amounts to the pinhole in a black sheet of paper 
held against the sun; there is an abyss of lacking knowledge. Our contribution to 
this abyss is guided by the foundational premise that just as brands are no longer 
product trademarks but rather live in the consumer’s imagination, so too has 
the nation been freed from a fi xed physical time and place. The nation is also 
imagined, drawing from the past and from expectations of the future to assert 
collective identity present day (Friedman 1992a, 1992b). As suggested by the 
three cases of the Toshiba-framed National Day celebration, the web-posted KFC 
patriotic-themed promotion, and the Starbucks café in Forbidden City, imaginings 
of brands are interwoven with imaginings of the nation.
6  Imagining China, imagining brands
This book aims to demystify the tensions regarding the presence of foreign 
brands in China that emerge at such moments. It offers insights into the complex 
responses of the state and its citizens to global brands in China by showing how 
these responses are interwoven, mutually shaping, and multipositional. This 
multipositionality refl ects that different views of Chinese nationalism offer different 
prescriptions for foreign brand consumption, and emerge from both globalization 
and more micro-level processes of individuals asserting their autonomy. The depth 
of cultural knowledge shared in Consumer-Citizens of China facilitates sensitivity 
to the potential for a proposed foreign brand signage, promotional campaign, or 
storefront presence to become the latest cultural gaffe in the eyes of Chinese State 
Offi cials or consumers.
The insights offered here are the culmination of our research into the meanings 
that underlie Chinese consumers’ motives for responding to foreign brands. To 
date, inquiries into the meanings of foreign brands in China have not attempted 
to understand foreign brand meanings from the perspective of Chinese consumers 
and in the context of their daily lives. This lack of information is repeatedly 
lamented by CEOs of transnational corporations attempting to introduce their 
brands into China (Knowledge @W.P.Carey, 2009), as it holds the potential to 
inform promotional campaigns, product design, distribution, brand positioning, 
brand pricing, and handling of customer complaints. Such insights might help 
alleviate the current high rate of Western brand failures in China (Croll 2006).
We show how nationalism is perceived and used by Chinese consumers to infuse 
foreign brands with meaning, rendering them useful in articulating a reaction to the 
West, and materializing imaginings of the future China. Whereas “nation-building” 
implies that a top-down construction by political, military, and intellectual leaders, 
“nation-making” emphasizes broader social participation by citizens in the course 
of their everyday lives (Gerth 2003, 4). Our work reveals the underlying processes 
by which Western brands become linked to various assertions of nationalism 
and visions of the future, which motivate choices between foreign and domestic 
brands. An understanding of consumption motivational practices must start with 
an understanding of the consumer’s world of subjective meaning and a discovery 
of “how it is divided into units” (Campbell 1994, 45). That is, is the concept of 
“foreign brands” meaningful to Chinese consumers? Not entirely, as “foreign” is 
deemed to refer to global brands possessing particular traits.
Foreign brands as global brands from the imagined West
We began our inquiry into Chinese consumers’ meanings and motives for “for-
eign brand” consumption as a category of significance in China’s history (Gerth 
2003). We found that foreign brand meanings are formed by local cultural under-
standings of China’s historical relationship to the forces of capitalist globaliza-
tion, along with current discourses on China’s future in the global economy. Our 
Chinese participants disclosed that “foreign brands” is an “otherness” that is selec-
tively imputed to brands associated with the “West.” This finding converges with 
those emerging from the study of the meanings of foreign advertisements, where 
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consumer culture theorists suggest that the term “global” has come to mean 
“Western” in people’s minds (Abbas 2000; Zhou and Belk 2004).
This “West” is not a geographical entity but one of the imagination. It includes 
nation-states that constitute dominant powers in the globalization of capitalist ide-
ology and which have shaped China’s position in the global economy: the United 
States, Western European nations, and also Japan. Chinese national narratives 
which seek to forge a collective national identity through discourses that place 
China in opposition to the West also include Japan (Gries 2004). As Gries (2004) 
notes, Japan is not west of China, but Chinese often include Japan in both the 
noun and the adjective “Xifang” – “the West” and “Western” – reflecting that it is 
through Japan that the Chinese have sought knowledge of the West. Participants’ 
responses to our questions mixed references to brands from the United States and 
Western Europe with those from Japan, and excluded those from other nation-
states. This phenomenological view of Western brands emerges from their histori-
cal use in the construction of Chinese nationalism (Gerth 2003; Friedman 1992a; 
Zhao and Belk 2008b).
Whereas most Western brands comprising our Chinese participants’ discourses 
qualify as global (that is, most claim 20% of their sales from foreign nations; 
Business Week 2001), the concept of Western brands is more narrow. Apart from 
those from Japan, global brands from Asian-Pacific nations were rarely mentioned. 
This exclusion may reflect the effectiveness of brand campaigns that cultivate a 
regional Asia-Pacific identity and market (Cayla and Ekhardt 2008), operating 
in the absence of cultural memories of conflict. Indeed, whereas one design goal 
of these campaigns is to elide past military conflicts (Cayla and Ekhardt 2008), 
our participants’ inclusion of Japan as “Western other” suggests that memories of 
past national humiliations are not easily glossed over. The National Day incident 
mentioned above suggests as much.
Although Western brands are associated with selected nation-states, consumers 
do not identify them by an objective assessment of their country of origin. Rather, 
the participants’ concept of Western brands reflects localized attempts to deal cre-
atively with the country-of-origin confusion produced by outsourcing practices 
and complex international chains of assembly and cross-national joint ventures 
(O’Cass and Lim 2002; Thakor and Kohli 1996; Zhou and Belk 2004). Resolving 
this confusion, they find that the legitimacy of Western brands resides in their 
global status: that is, Western brands also must be “world famous” – guo-ji-ming-
pai. Drawing from local knowledge of quality control measures demanded of 
exports in post-reform China and survival-of-the-fittest notions of capitalism, some 
of our Chinese participants insisted that Western brands must be of higher qual-
ity and technologically superior to domestic brands if they have gained access to 
China’s market. From some participants’ perspective, owing to China’s protectionist 
history very few domestic brands are global, and thus have not passed the same 
product standards of the international marketplace. The significance of Western 
brands’ global stature is highlighted even if challenged by local media stories, noted 
by our participants, that draw attention to cases where Western brands exhibit 
lower quality in China than the same brands in developed nations (Yu 2007). Brand 
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names aid the designation of a Western brand but are not as defining as attributes of 
global fame, quality, and technological superiority. This reflects local experience 
of encountering a proliferation of domestic goods branded to convey Western-ness 
and capitalize on presumed positive associations (Zhou and Belk 2004). Chinese 
consumers’ discussions of translated brand names reveal a practice that Gerth 
(2008, 41) labels “nationalistic visuality, centered on training the eye to identify 
visual clues and to distinguish between the foreign and the domestic across social 
life.” In semi-colonial China of the early 20th century, the goal of this visual prac-
tice was to buy China-made goods (Gerth 2008). Today some of our participants 
engage in this practice to screen out counterfeit Western brands, and others lament 
the shamefulness of consumers’ fascination with Western brands which has forced 
quality China-made goods to pass themselves off as foreign.
In our work, when we speak of brands we are for the most part speaking of prod-
uct forms of the brand. The vast majority of Western branded products discussed 
by our Chinese participants also refer to corporate brands, for example Coca-Cola, 
Jeans West, KFC, Nike, and Mercedes. In China, where many Western brands are 
sold from similarly branded storefronts, as in the case of KFC, Jeans West, and 
Gucci, for example, the product form of the brand is more visibly linked to the 
physical presence of the corporate brand. Through logos, labels, and promotional 
campaigns, Western brand producers have attempted to infuse these product forms 
with the identity of the corporate brand; each product contributes to the corporate 
identity as well as basks in its reflected glory (Balmer 2006). This is in contrast to 
a strategy whereby the corporation crafts a distinct brand identity through separate 
brand names and brand campaigns for each product in its portfolio. The move by 
marketing managers to target customers with corporate brands has been motivated 
by macro-level forces, particularly internet technology, which renders corporate 
acts visible and inseparable from their product brands (Fog et al 2005; Trentmann 
2007). Corporate brand identity is built from communications that articulate who 
the company is and what it stands for that distinguishes it from other organizations 
(Schultz and Hatch 2006). The values and beliefs of the corporation shape the 
brand identity and serve as the basis for securing consumers’ affinities towards, 
identification with, and emotional attachments to the brand.
Whereas the brand traditionally targeted only customers, it is increasingly 
being used by corporations in dealings with their various stakeholders, including 
employees, shareholders, the financial community, suppliers, and regulatory bod-
ies (Schroeder and Salzer-Mörling 2006; Ind 2001; Schultz and de Chernatony 
2002). Consumers and employees in particular are encouraged by brand corpo-
rations to “be the brand” or “live the brand” (Schultz and de Chernatony 2002). 
Croll (2006, 45) notes: “It has become a world-wide marketing truism that brand 
names are not only about product choice and quality but also about the appropria-
tion of new identities and lifestyles.” Our findings suggest that the more specific, 
distinctive, or niche-oriented identity and lifestyle positions that corporate brands 
from the West seek to cultivate may to some extent become conflated in the eyes 
of Chinese consumers, for whom the branded product’s association with “the 
West” is the most distinguishing feature of its identity.
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Western and domestic brands as materials for realizing 
an imagined future China
Our findings reveal that Chinese individuals engage the past to imbue Western 
brands with national identity meanings tied to four different imaginings of the 
future China. As Wilk (1994) asserts, objects play an active role in constructing 
images of collective futures as they represent aspirations and create directionality; 
they make a given future seem concrete. In contests for desired futures, groups 
engage goods in different ways to “stake their claim, map their route, and con-
vince others of its inevitability . . . Just as people use objects to invent tradition, 
they also use them to invent the future (Wilk 1994, 98).” This perspective is differ-
ent from the suggestion that confidence in the future, as dictated by conditions of 
employment, healthcare and retirement, determines Chinese consumers’ spending 
on global brands (Croll 2006). Reversing the direction of influence, our exten-
sion of Gerth’s (2003) theorizing highlights consumers’ agency and citizenship in 
attempting to direct the future of the nation through their brand choices. Closer to 
our conception, Watson (2006b) notes how local-born youths in Hong Kong were 
driven by their vision of a more cosmopolitan Hong Kong than existed in the past 
to disapprove of consumers’ abuse of public facilities (such as taking napkins and 
condiments out of the McDonald’s establishment). They tied such practices to 
the past when an influx of immigrants with no stake in the local economy took a 
“take money and move on” attitude, and when a climate of economic insecurity 
prevailed along with fears of a Red Guard takeover. A different vision of the future 
shaped these youths’ consumption behaviors in the present.
Here we outline the four imaginings of the future China materialized through 
reactions to Western brands. We offer selections from our data to illustrate the 
ways in which these imaginings were expressed by Chinese consumers. Reactions 
to Western brands are revealed as linked to different national cultural narratives 
(Gries 2004), each of which appropriates China’s past to inscribe Western brands 
with selected meanings. The narrative of the West as experiential venue represents 
Western brands as instruments of freedom and new experiences. A narrative of the 
West as imperialistic oppressor imbues Western brands with the capacity for cul-
tural domination of China. In a third narrative, in which China seeks redemption 
from humiliation at the hands of the West, Western brands take on the meaning 
of tough market competitors which, if defeated by national brands, will redeem 
China in the eyes of the world, recovering an interrupted destiny as a world leader. 
In a narrative of the West as economic partner (Gries 2004), Western brands coex-
ist with national brands in harmony through mergers and distinctive competen-
cies. We more fully analyze these narratives, their prescriptions for Western brand 
consumption, and their use in imagining the future China over the course of the 
book.
Briefly here, each of the four cultural narratives which are used to make mean-
ing of Western brands reflect temporal poaching of and leveraging from ideolo-
gies manifested in nation-state governing practices. These include various means 
of asserting state ideology that comprise and serve to realize the official vision of 
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the future nation-state, such as political speeches, published discourses, policies 
such as those to curb or stimulate consumption, and state-sponsored programs of 
education. Each of the four cultural narratives pieces together themes from pres-
ent and former nation-state administrations and uses them to enliven imaginings 
of Western brands. Once Western brands are imbued with “historicized” meanings 
(Martin 2004) that align them with select ideologies of China’s relationship with 
the West, consumers’ responses to them become a means of materializing various 
preferred imaginings of the future China.
In the preparation of this book we spent the past year presenting our findings 
to colleagues in China as well as at academic conferences and seminars in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. A recurring reaction was fasci-
nation with the rich responses provided by our Chinese participants. Although our 
research, conducted in four Chinese cities, involved multiple methods, including 
interviews, focus groups, and surveys, it has been data from our survey-adminis-
tered projective tasks that audiences have found most intriguing. This involved 
asking consumers to write a dream about a foreign brand. The dream could be 
either a good dream or a bad dream. This choice was also informed by recogni-
tion that critical expressions and sentiments tied to Western foreign brands, or 
the domestic Chinese brands that compete with them, would be more likely to be 
aired under indirect and masked forms of inquiry (Gries 2004). This methodologi-
cal choice was deemed useful in eliciting free commentary on whatever imagin-
ings the participant considered relevant (Hilgard 1980; Holbrook and Hirschman 
1982). The survey responses form the focal voice of our research narrative; other 
voices from interviews and focus groups are used in ways that harmonize or con-
trast (Price and Arnould 1998).
One vision our Chinese consumers sought to realize through consumption prac-
tices is that of a future China characterized by greater freedom, conceived as more 
choice, enhanced convenience, more information, and greater plurality of views. 
This vision draws from a national narrative of the West as experiential venue and 
Western brands as instruments of freedom (Gries 2004). This narrative theme of 
freedom manifested in a host of dreams:
[The more foreign brand products I have], the more confident I would 
feel about myself. [Dream] In my dream, I drive a Benz car, wear a Swiss 
watch, freely walk all the way to my friend’s home to chat. The two of us 
have such a good talk: how comfortable Nike tennis shoes are, how suc-
cessful Samsung and BMW are, the Piao-rou (meaning “flying gently” in 
Chinese, known as Rejoice or Pert in English) shampoo really has made my 
hair smoother . . . After that, we go to eat KFC, and while wiping our mouths 
we praise foreigners for coming to China and bringing convenience to our 
people.
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
Microsoft turned into a young, energetic, and knowledgeable wise person. 
He took me into the Microsoft world . . . I wanted to see the sea, he would . . . 
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give me a virtual experience of being there. Then I wanted to know about the 
universe. He could give me totally new thoughts and feelings. 
(23 year old male survey participant, Tianjin)
By engaging the narrative of the West as a route to new experiences, consumers 
reconstruct the past in the present (Friedman 1992b). This appropriated narra-
tive capitalizes on present-day official discourses that espouse the depoliticized 
nature of Western brands, rendering their consumption constitutive of “the spirit 
of nationalism” and essential to promoting the national economy and elevating 
citizens’ standard of living. It draws Western brand meanings from 19th-century 
historical movements which embraced Western goods because they brought with 
them ideological insights pertaining to democracy (Liu 2004). Summoning this 
past lends meaning to Western brands as instruments of freedom, voice, and choice, 
not only in the current economic realm (Coulter et al 2003) but also as tools to cre-
ate an imagined future China transformed by access to experiences and ideologies 
from the West. Contrary to a notion that nationalistic narratives are synonymous 
with discourses of protectionism and domestic brand loyalty (Wang and Wang 
2007), this nationalistic narrative encourages global exchange and Western brand 
consumption. Although it calls upon Western nations for transformational insights 
tied to improving national circumstances, it is not lacking in nationalistic concerns 
and sentiments of patriotism. Rather, it reflects a different view of the process of 
gleaning and asserting political and economic power for the nation-state.
A second vision is a future China that returns to Mao-era protectionism. This 
vision draws from a Chinese national narrative of the West as imperialist oppres-
sor (Gries 2004), as reflected in the following survey responses:
In the dream, I saw myself wearing Beaty clothes, holding a Chanel handbag, 
wearing Red Earth cosmetics on my face, Shi-si shoes. Suddenly, it started 
to rain, I ran forward, then my shoe sole broke along with the tearing sound 
of the clothes. I tried to run home, looked into the mirror, found the “water-
resistant” cosmetics ruined by the rain, and I became a big colorful cat. Thus 
I threw them away, never sought after foreign brands.
(18 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
I’m driving a BMW, listening to Sony music, drinking Coca Cola, and come to 
a wild and empty place. With Nike shoes on my feet, I run like crazy, running, 
running. On the grass, beside the tents, there are many red flags with five 
stars [Chinese national flag], around them are herds of cows. Many work-
ers are milking the cows, they milk like crazy. Up in the sky, floats a slogan 
“Bright Dairy” (a Chinese dairy brand) . . . The workers are dying one after 
another . . . I have sold all my foreign brand products including my BMW and 
Sony video camera etc.!!! Then I buy “Bright” milk to feed pandas.
(23 year old male survey participant, Baoding)
The Chinese national narrative of the West as imperialist oppressor proj-
ects China’s past subjugation of the semi-colonial era onto the future, thereby 
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heightening the fear of a territorially dominated China. It links marketplace invasion 
to an immanent threat of military invasion, through a logic in which profits from 
Western brands fund Western military operations. Within this narrative, Western 
brands are demonized as encouraging the practice of individualistic, conspicuous, 
and leisurely consumption, echoing past criticisms levied in Mao-era socialist dis-
courses. The elevation of Mao Zedong as a heroic cultural figure by post-reform 
administrations renders this past accessible. On this basis, this narrative emphasizes 
that present-day consumer practices mark a divide-and-conquer strategy by Western 
powers. As this narrative asserts an agenda of protectionism, ownership claims to 
physical territory become essential. It represents China’s territory as being marked 
by Western brand dominance, as exhibited in homes, on store shelves, and retail 
centers within heritage sites. Such images create a serious and compelling image 
of an invaded China, thereby facilitating an imagined invasion of China’s less 
tangible spaces, cultural, economic, and political. The narrative resolves the inva-
sion fears by calling for a return to Mao-era trade protectionism, where domestic 
brands once again become the staple of lived experience. Abstinence from Western 
brand consumption is a nation-making act, marking a call to create a future China 
whose physical borders are not transcended by foreign trade. 
This vision seems to be the one most likely held by the National Day celebra-
tion viewers who complained of the background image of the Toshiba advertise-
ment. In the eyes of these viewers, the Toshiba brand may have embodied past 
Japanese military aggression, which can be conjured as a current threat, given 
that economic power (delivered through global brands) offers the means to fund 
national militia. This meaning makes the Japanese brand particularly disruptive to 
the National Day celebration, which featured a Chinese military ritual.
A third vision is a future China that rises to a dominant position in the global mar-
ket economy, as illustrated in the following responses of Chinese consumers who 
dream of introducing Chinese brands to Western nations. This vision draws from a 
Chinese national narrative in which conquered Western brands symbolize China’s 
redemption from past humiliations at the hands of Western powers (Gries 2004).
[The more foreign brand products I have], the less money is left in my pocket. 
[Dream] Chinese products’ quality improves very fast, and the post-purchase 
service goes up, too. They push foreign products out of China’s market, and I 
would feel gratified if I could see this point. Everybody in China buys Chinese 
products. Then I dream that I come to Las Vegas of America, taking Chinese 
products with me, hold a “Chinese product news release”, and compare them 
with American products on the spot. I immediately beat the foreign products, 
winning honor for China. Then I wake up from the dream.
(24 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
One day, streets of foreign countries are running Chinese Red Flag (a car 
brand), foreigners all wear Double-star (a Chinese shoe brand) and Pu-dun 
pants (a Chinese brand).
(survey participant, no demographics, Baoding)
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Emerging from a narrative in which China subjugates the West, this imagined future 
China guides a reconstruction of the past in terms of the present (Friedman 1992b). 
The envisaged capitalist expansion of China via the global spread of China-made 
brands is grounded in a selective cultivation and creative combination of China’s 
pre-communist, capitalist period with Mao’s (socialist) expansionist aspirations. 
Here there is also a call to buy China-made goods, yet no protectionism is sought, 
as this constrains the realization of the imagined future China ascending in the 
global economic order. The West-as-subjugated narrative also revitalizes the cul-
tural memory of past Western military aggression, yet it transforms the meaning 
of these losses in terms of present-day circumstances and values (Friedman 1997), 
blaming these aggressions for China’s failure to rise to the top of the global econ-
omy. Western brands in China that are inferior to the same versions sold in other 
countries, or whose local representatives offer poor service, are reminders of the 
semi-colonial period of humiliation in which China’s ports were forcibly opened 
to foreign trade. In envisioning a future China pre-eminent in the global economy, 
Western brands are a potential target for close censorship. Chinese consumers 
screen those Western brands that attempt to reimpose past humiliations through 
double standards in the treatment of Chinese consumers compared to their Western 
counterparts. These include culturally offensive ads such as the web-posted ad 
featuring Chinese soldiers and KFC food, which may be read as appropriating 
Dr. Sun’s “Principles of the People” in a trivializing manner. They also include 
Western brand practices of being unresponsive to customer complaints, placing 
inferior-quality Western brands in China, failing to recall unsafe brands in China, 
and setting up high barriers to the return of Western branded goods once concerns 
for product safety are publicly reported (Yu 2007). Viewers possessing this vision 
of China were unlikely to be among those complaining about the Toshiba ad at the 
National Day celebration – although perhaps these viewers would have found it 
more appropriate to see one of China’s global brands, promoted in the background. 
Further, bloggers who challenged the “cultural invasion” arguments that led to the 
closing of Starbucks in the Forbidden City, perhaps would have preferred to see 
a domestic coffee brand claim the space as a result of higher consumer demand 
rather than cultural heritage controversy.
The fourth vision of the future China is an existentialist nation that is constantly 
changing through contact with global forces while remaining distinctively Chinese 
due to its grounding in indigenous ways and values. This vision emerges from a 
popular national narrative of the West as harmonious economic partner (Gries 
2004). Projective survey responses reflecting this fourth vision were common:
[The more foreign brands I have] it shows the richer I am. Dream: I imag-
ine that foreign brands and Chinese brands are two people with high qual-
ity, optimistic and positive attitudes. They walked together, and became best 
friends! They learned from each other and helped each other to make up 
for each other’s weaknesses. The Chinese brand was down to earth, and the 
foreign brand was gorgeous. The Chinese brand drew on the foreign brand’s 
advanced technology and management experience, and at the same time, it 
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entertained the foreign brand and made the foreign brand benefit greatly from 
the Chinese brand. Hand in hand, and shoulder by shoulder, they worked 
hard together for mankind’s happiness. 
(29 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
The more foreign brand products I have, the more . . .] I feel successful, how-
ever, it’s better to own Chinese famous brands. [Dream] In a quiet mountain 
village, everything was so pure and clean. One day a traveler came, trying to 
sell to those simple and innocent villagers a kind of good drink, Coca Cola. 
The first time I was exposed to it, I tried it. It tasted bitter. “It tastes so hor-
rible!” I said. This time, grandma walked over. “Wrong. You should not drink 
it this way. You should drink it as if you were drinking Chinese herbal medi-
cine. Add water and sugar.” Then, grandma took over the Coca Cola mixed a 
big cup for me. She put in a lot of sugar. I drank some. “Wow! It tastes great!” 
Thus, I cheered, “Everywhere is home!”
(23 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
This vision comprises the narrative of the East and West as partners in elevating 
the conditions of all mankind. Accented here are the value-added components 
brought to the table by each partner. Balancing the West’s contribution of techno-
logical know-how, this narrative conjures a Chinese heritage ground in harmony 
with nature, and an appreciation of the elderly and their wisdom. This heritage has 
been iconized in practices of traditional Chinese medicine, notably a pre-modern 
practice and one of China’s most renowned exports globally. As a practice that 
emphasizes harmony with nature, it reflects an attempt to revive aspects of the 
pre-modern world which have value in the present by way of contrast (Friedman 
1997). This practice of locating social identity in eco-friendly or rural pasts which 
have become valued in the present has also been identified among movements that 
seek to reinstate indigenous identities (Hawaiian, Native Americans; Friedman 
1992b, 1996; see also Manning and Uplisashvili 2007). Leveraging from this heri-
tage, the envisioned future China is one that makes its own distinguishing contri-
butions to the world economy while creatively engaging products from abroad 
in a manner that is uniquely Chinese. This partnering view of East and West 
seemed pronounced in the China Daily reporter’s description of the commercial 
landscape surrounding Mao’s statue in Chengdu square. The reporter notes that 
the economic prosperity following foreign investment in China’s manufacturing 
plants that produce Western branded goods also allowed for richer celebrations of 
Chinese Spring Festival and lunar new year. A partnering view can also be seen in 
the assertion that Western brands generated enough excitement to bring together 
Chengdu’s citizens in the square. 
In the partnering narrative, the historical cultural style of consuming and using 
goods rather than buying China-made is the basis of social identity. Much like the 
official vision of the nation-state, where protectionist policies that impede trade are 
not overtly promoted, this narrative works to unify categories of Western brands 
and domestic goods. This manner of asserting nationality through consumption 
Imagining China, imagining brands  15
also calls attention to the lack of realism regarding a divided market, given that 
Western brands are often made in China. Yet, its proponents find themselves react-
ing defensively against other nationalistic narratives. Their ambivalence towards 
Western brands is decided, a self-conscious choice that reflects awareness of the 
national identity politics at stake, and the seriousness of brand choice in the eyes 
of fellow citizens (compare with Friedman 1997).
Obscured state influence and consumer autonomy
Consumers’ temporal poaching of nation-state ideologies by endorsing selected 
national narratives is revealed throughout this book as obscuring whether Western 
brand meanings (and marketplace responses) reflect state influence or consumer 
autonomy. This obscurity is not inconsequential in light of Friedman’s (1992b, 
854) suggestion that, throughout history and across cultures, the emergence of a 
competing view of cultural identity “implies the fragmentation of a larger unity 
and is always experienced as a threat.” The threat resides in the inherent use of cul-
tural identities to lay claim to visions of the future nation-state (Friedman 1992b; 
Wilk 1994). The legitimacy claimed by linking to discourses of past adminis-
trations perhaps reveals a cultural adaptation to avoid social penalties for vio-
lating national consumption norms, as occurred in China’s semi-colonial history 
(Gerth 2003). Further, anthropologist Elisabeth Croll recounts that during her 
ethnographic field work in China during the early years of economic reform (the 
1980s), consumers shared with her that they were reluctant to show off their acqui-
sitions to neighbors. They were concerned that government policy might change, 
so that they would “become the object of political criticism rather than admira-
tion” as occurred during the Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong’s administra-
tion (Croll 2006, 37). The Chinese government did exhibit ideological reversals 
during the early years following the launch of economic reforms (Zhao and Belk 
2008b), when the consumerist lifestyle was accused of undermining the official 
ideology of socialism, leading to new campaigns championing socialist ideals of 
sacrifice, simple living, and trust in party leaders (Baum 1994; Zhao and Belk 
2008b). By the spring of 1992, however, slow reform progress led Deng Xiaoping 
and the Party to encourage and celebrate consumption (Ci 1994; Zhao and Belk 
2008b).
As differing visions of the future China are similarly legitimated through 
links to the past (Friedman 1992b; Wilk 1994), they contend with each other. 
Notwithstanding rural/urban differences in proffered national narratives and envi-
sioned futures, we do not see this contention as emerging from a hierarchy of 
social order where some visions of China and their constitutive identity and brand 
meanings are privileged, as emanating from a group of cultural elite (Friedman 
1997). Belying such a hierarchy, our multiple narratives emerged from a hom-
ogeneous cohort with respect to age and educational/professional status. Rather, a 
metaphor used by Wilk (1994) to describe the Belizean neocolonial order seems 
suitable. Referencing individuals’ differing visions of the future Belizean state, 
he refers to them as “a puddle of different colors of paint, with little vertical 
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order . . . [that] only blend at their margins. Any attempt to rise out of the puddle 
is met with opposition.”
The puddle mitigates or perhaps even pre-empts selected nationalist narra-
tives from routinizing responses to Western brands as something of a civic ritual. 
Nationalist narratives, if uncontested, may serve much like “a ritual script” in 
that they offer prescriptions for individuals’ marketplace behavior (Rook 1985, 
253). As “ritual repeats received ideas” (McCreery 1995), an individual reacting 
to a Western brand offering in a manner prescribed by a nationalist narrative is, 
in a sense, engaged in a ritual performance which makes use of brands as ritual 
artifacts. However, in the face of competing national narratives that prescribe dif-
ferent responses to Western brands, the performance does not become routinized 
to the point that political meanings atrophy and behavior becomes habitual or 
reflexive, either a goal in itself or dominated by other motives (Campbell 1994). 
The most striking voices indicative of this tension were participants who sponta-
neously defended Western brands as good for China and the Chinese people. In the 
absence of narratives that disseminate values of national self-sufficiency, protec-
tionism, and domestic brand loyalty, such defenses would be unnecessary. These 
defenses suggest that a heightened drama becomes attached to Western brand con-
sumption through the tensions posed by competing narratives.
This drama is further accentuated through narrative discourses that seek to 
heighten the seriousness of brand choice by highlighting its social consequences. 
Previous consumer research has often treated assertions of national identity as 
experiences of solidarity with fellow citizens, achieved by expressing similar 
tastes and values. In illustration, Mick and Buhl’s (1992) participants held that 
distinguishing aspects of Danish identity included living for the future, avoiding 
ostentation, and the cultural principle of Danish beer drinking. In academic dis-
courses treating marketers’ attempts to promote their brands as national brands, 
the goods are treated as “central emblems” of resurgent national industries after 
socialism (Manning and Uplisashvili 2007, 626). For our Chinese participants, 
Western brands were not mere symbolic identity-markers: rather, they were seen 
as important to the cultural, economic, or militaristic security and survival of the 
nation-state. Echoing Friedman’s (1996, 128) view, consumers’ choices of narra-
tives to historicize Western brands shape brand decisions as assertions of social 
identity. These assertions are “deadly serious, and often seriously deadly” con-
tests. This is because the historical conditions in which social identity is grounded 
are deadly serious matters (Friedman 1996). Chinese consumers see their con-
sumption practices involving branded goods as a domain for directing the fate of 
their nation.
In summary, our emergent theory is that the meanings of Western brands are 
shaped by China’s sociohistorical conditions to motivate brand choice as an every-
day act of nation-making. Nation-state governing practices influence consumers’ 
meanings of Western brands and are guided by a particular vision of the future 
nation-state. In China, this “official vision” is a nation that remains open to capital-
ist markets, encourages conspicuous consumption, and does not promote protec-
tionist policies or laws (Croll 2006; Gerth 2008), but rather forges national unity 
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through reviving iconic images and social events from the past (Liu 2004). This 
official vision is not uncommon among nations enmeshed by global market forces 
(Wilk 1994), so it is understandable if the event planners who staged Chairman 
Hu’s review of military troops on National Day did not take special notice of the 
Toshiba advertisement in the background.
Threats to the official vision of the nation-state prompt governing administra-
tions to use historical referencing practices to legitimate power and amass support 
(Liu 2004). In China, however, this revived past is one where anti-Western values 
were officially sanctioned by former administrations (Gerth 2003).
Faced with state influence over the imagined future China, consumers none-
theless possess autonomy, which is exercised by engaging national narratives to 
historicize Western brands (Martin 2004). These cultural histories, which Chinese 
individuals use to construct and ground their social identity (Gries 2003), embed 
Western brands in systems of meaning that draw selectively from past moments 
and historical referents. Through their engagement with these national narra-
tives, consumers reinstate consumption categories that mark brands as Western 
versus domestic, reorganize their meanings in terms of present-day local logics, 
and wield these categories as instruments for materializing visions of the future 
nation-state that differ from the official vision (Wilk 1994). Each narrative recon-
structs a viable Chinese history, appropriating official governing practices from 
selected moments in the past such that they all claim legitimacy (Friedman 1992b) 
and obscure whether given responses reflect state influence or consumer auton-
omy. This legitimating process is critical to the survival of these identity posi-
tions, which otherwise might be construed as challenges to state sovereignty and 
risk censure and penalty. These reconstructed cultural histories reflect Friedman’s 
(1992b, 853) view of social identity as a “game of mirrors,” involving “a complex 
temporal interaction of multiple practices of identification external and internal 
to a subject or population.” Competing national narratives of East–West relation-
ships are revealed as promoting different nationalist identity meanings of Western 
brands and prescribing different marketplace responses to them.
The tensions stemming from these disputed nationalist identity meanings ren-
der the decision to acquire Western brands “meaningful” and a form of every-
day nation-making, rather than behavior which at a conscious level is politically 
“meaningless” (Campbell 1994). Constituting political action, the imagined social 
legitimacy of consuming Western brands, as opposed to actual experience, is suf-
ficient to constrain or propel future responses (Campbell 1994). Our theorized 
process is qualified where consumers’ visions of the future nation align with the 
official vision. In the absence of intervening challenges to brand meanings, ten-
sions are mitigated, political meanings atrophy, and Western brands become an 
end in themselves (Campbell 1994). Drawing again from the Toshiba incident, 
those of the viewing public who hold a view of the future China that is compatible 
with the official vision, such that they do not classify brands into domestic and 
foreign, might negotiate Toshiba’s meaning on grounds other than national 
identity. 
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Organization of the book
With this summary as our overview, we now elaborate and contextualize our the-
ory, drawing from the voices of our Chinese participants. We interpret their com-
ments in the light of insights from political science scholars, historians, consumer 
culture theorists, and anthropologists whose works examine the effects of capitalist 
globalization on local (nation-state) cultures. In Chapter Two we return to the state 
of knowledge of Chinese consumers’ motives for Western brand consumption at 
the time we began our study. Our analysis of the emerging literature on branding 
in China revealed that presumed motives for responding to Western brands had not 
been informed by Chinese consumers’ voices. Rather, most studies invoke expla-
nations from single-motive universal theories, such as Veblen’s (1925) theory of 
conspicuous consumption, which posits that desire to imitate higher-status others 
drives the acquisition of branded goods. In this regard, the field of marketing and 
consumer research exhibits a tendency which Anne Tsui (2007) notes of the field of 
management. Works tend toward homogeneous use of a model based on Western 
culture, such that “researchers inadvertently depress the development of novel 
ideas and theories that may prove to be useful in advancing knowledge in different 
national and emerging economy contexts” (Tsui 2007, 1354). Views challenging 
this emulative theory are rare in available works on Chinese consumers’ responses 
to Western brands. Those that present alternative views emphasize that some 
Chinese consumers reject Western brands because of nationalistic sentiments. In 
rethinking the applicability of the emulative-motive theory, we address a set of four 
popularly held notions of Chinese consumers’ responses to Western brands that 
suggest 1) the desire to emulate Westerners drives the purchase and consumption 
of foreign brands; 2) consumer nationalism is manifest solely or predominantly 
through foreign brand boycotting rather than other uses of these material goods; 3) 
Chinese people are mere consumers of the foreign brand meanings disseminated 
by foreign brand marketers, rather than active meaning makers; and 4) desiring and 
acquiring foreign brands while claiming strong nationalistic sentiments represents 
a paradox. The latter notion is reflected in the publicized “Patriot’s Paradox”– a 
label attached by global advertising agency Ogilvy & Mather to their finding that 
Chinese consumers reporting the highest levels of nationalism were no less likely 
to assert a preference for Western brands (Wang 2008). By airing challenges to 
these popular notions and expanding the frames within which we have come to 
think about Chinese consumers’ responses to Western brands, Chapter Two paves 
the way for open listening to the voices of Chinese consumers to discern their 
meanings and motivations for branded consumption.
Chapter Three offers a historical perspective on brands in China, drawing from 
selected moments, namely late imperial China, semi-colonial China of the early 
20th century, and post-reform China, from 1979 to the present. A selective review 
of these moments draws heavily on more comprehensive historical and ethno-
graphic reports – of Gary Hamilton with Chi-Kong Lai (1989), Karl Gerth (2003, 
2008), and Elisabeth Croll (2006), respectively. This brief review reveals aspects 
of national history, the traces of which can be discerned in present meanings of 
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Western brands and their relationship to Chinese nationalism. A glance at history 
also reveals that the state’s role in shaping the meaning of Western brands differs 
across these moments, reflecting different responses to the forces of globalization. 
This chapter reconciles the views of historians who hold that brands existed from 
as early as late imperial China, to views of cultural anthropologists and commu-
nication scholars that brands were introduced into China from the West during 
the semi-colonial period, banned during Mao’s administration, and then reintro-
duced with the economic reforms promoted by Deng Xiaoping. Reconciling these 
two different assertions requires an appreciation of differing academic traditions. 
Whereas historians provide compelling evidence for the assertion that brands 
emerged in China independently of Western influence, this history does not repre-
sent the lived experience of many Chinese today, who date their consumer expe-
riences with brands to the economic reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
These experiences are the consumption meanings that interest cultural anthropolo-
gists. With this recognition, it remains possible for nation-making and nationalist 
narratives in the future to appropriate a China-made brand history that pre-dates 
economic reforms, as has already begun in China brand reports that recognize a 
category of “time-honored” Chinese brands (Yu 2007, 2009). We note that among 
our participants, some talk of not recognizing China-made goods of Mao’s admin-
istration until economic reforms introduced brand competition. In contrast, others 
spoke of China-made brands present during Mao’s reign as if they had always 
been acknowledged as such. Thus Chapter Three, consistent with our findings 
in Chapters Five and Six, highlights the plurality of lived experiences of brands 
among Chinese citizens.  
Elaboration of our theory begins in Chapter Four. We introduce this chapter 
with details of our data collection method and sites. We then present the voices of 
our Chinese participants to substantiate our finding that the terminology “Western 
brands” is meaningful to Chinese consumers. More importantly, we highlight how 
Chinese consumers identify or distinguish brands as “Western.” We note that we 
found considerable homogeneity in the perceived attributes of Western brands, 
which, apart from their relative high price, are generally positive. This renders 
our findings in Chapter Five somewhat surprising, as despite their rather homoge-
neous views regarding the positive attributes of Western brands, Chinese consum-
ers attached not only positive but also negative meanings to them.
The process of contextualizing our theory continues in Chapter Five, where 
we elaborate the ways in which Chinese consumers imbue Western brands with 
meanings of Chinese nationalism. Building from Gries (2004) work on popular 
notions of Chinese nationalism, we identify four meanings of Western brands, 
with each meaning linked to a particular national narrative of East–West relations: 
1) the West as experiential venue and Western brands in China as instruments 
of freedom; 2) the West as imperialist oppressor and Western brands in China 
as instruments of domination; 3) the West as subjugated and conquered Western 
brands as symbols of Chinese redemption from past national humiliations; and 
4) the West and East as economic partners, and Western brands as harmonious 
partners of Chinese national brands. We base our identification of these meanings 
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on our participants’ imaginings of Western brands. As these different imaginings 
emerged from same age cohorts, we discount the notion that age-based socializa-
tion is the sole source of variation in Chinese consumers’ responses to Western 
brands. We conclude this chapter by calling attention again to the purpose served 
by embedding Western brands in historical contexts suggested by particular nation-
alist narratives. By doing so, Chinese consumers render these goods meaningful in 
materializing their preferred imaginings of the future China.
In Chapter Six, we turn from an emphasis on the shaping and negotiation of the 
collective imagining of the nation to look at individual-level processes of imagining 
Western brands. Chinese consumers’ use of national narratives to give meaning to 
Western brands is revealed as consistent with theories of how individuals enliven 
consumption fantasies through their imagination. Applying a recently introduced 
theory of fantasizing consumption (Martin 2004), we offer insights into how the 
different national narratives operate to shape the meanings of Western brands as 
resources for materializing imaginings of the future China. We also draw from 
this theory to posit ways in which the national-narrative shaping of Western brand 
meanings may influence individuals’ processing of Western brand promotions and 
promotional stimuli. We offer examples from interviews with Chinese consumers 
to illustrate these imaginative processes. 
We conclude with a brief epilogue that positions our findings in the broader 
context and theorizing of consumers’ efforts to realize the imagined future of col-
lectives through consumption choices (Trentmann 2007). Citizen-consumers are 
those who undertake consumption choices and practices with an eye toward the 
multiplicative effect of their decisions if many others respond or behave similarly 
(Trentmann 2007). Beyond our present work, we note emerging research using 
other nation-states as focal contexts that feature the consumer-as-citizen engaged 
in the practice of materializing the future nation. Pushing the theoretical ground 
that is being developed in this area to move beyond the nation, we suggest that the 
brands of transnational corporations, whether foreign or domestic, face another 
category of global band – that of non-governmental organizations – that seek to 
shape brand categories and meanings through new notions of citizen-consumers 
that challenge the domestic brand–foreign brand dichotomy that has heretofore 
characterized research into brand meanings. We see this as the future of brand 
competition in the imagined future China, as global brands, whether Western or 
China-made, must begin to deal with issues of the alleviation of poverty, environ-
mental protection, and the quest for human rights guarantees.
2 Rethinking popular notions of 
Chinese consumers’ motives for 
responding to Western brands
International news stories and popular business books in the West are often slanted 
to awaken an old dream that China’s market will make fortunes for Western brand 
producers (Croll 2006). This dream is encouraged by the mesmerizing potential of 
1.3 billion customers, who constitute the “golden goose,” the “magic market,” “the 
mother of all new markets,” or “the biggest market for everything” (Croll 2006, xi; 
Knowledge@W.P.Carey 2009). China represents the “last market,” the “last great 
frontier” (Croll 2006, 8). Elisabeth Croll, Professor of Chinese Anthropology, illus-
trated this slant in the report of the 2003 new development strategy outlined at the 
Communist Party’s Third Plenum. The strategy placed the expansion of domestic con-
sumer demand as a priority to shift from investment-led to consumption-led economic 
growth (Croll 2006). Whereas national news reported the strategy in terms of increases 
in jobs and salary levels, international news dramatized the announcement as an excit-
ing development for Western brand producers interested in the promise of the Chinese 
consumer market. Likewise, during the global economic crisis of 2008 international 
news depicted China as a “bright spot” for producers of Western luxury goods whose 
sales had declined in other developed nations (Voight 2009).
Translating China’s large population into market potential for Western brand 
producers is the premise of a host of business-oriented books such as Garner’s The 
Rise of the Chinese Consumer (2005). Concretizing the expansionist dreams of 
Western brand producers and legitimizing the strategic plans such dreams propel, 
similar books offer compendiums of market analyses, replete with sales forecasts 
for automobiles, televisions, mobile phones, personal care goods, fast food, and 
various categories of beverage. With top-down estimates based on growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP) and estimates extrapolated from survey reports of prod-
uct ownership or ownership intentions, these works map China’s consumption 
landscape in terms of the anticipated density of acquired consumer goods in given 
cities and regions (Garner 2005). Estimates extend to projections that by 2014 
China will surpass the United States as the largest market for consumer goods, to 
become “the engine of growth for the global economy” (Garner 2005, 3). Popular 
and academic reports herald China not only as the last great frontier for the expan-
sion of Western markets, but also as a buffer against shrinking demand as the 
restrained credit of American, British, and Australian consumers hampers their 
spending (Croll 2006; Fong and Shirouzu 2009; Ratner 2009; Voight 2009). 
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Despite the promise, failures of Western brands in China’s market are 
common.
. . . realizing China’s market is a long-held dream that has been perpetually 
postponed and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Analysts sup-
porting this view note the recurring pattern of hope or dream followed by 
disappointment or disillusionment and suggest that “a pendulum metaphor” 
best represents the rise and fall of foreign expectations of and experiences in 
the China market over past decades or even centuries. 
(Croll 2006, 14)
Such failures stem partly from the complexity of the market (Croll 2006; Wang 
2008), which has been neglected in the oversimplification of the motives driv-
ing Chinese consumers’ responses to Western brands. Translating China’s large 
population into a large market for Western brands has involved dismissing the 
competitiveness of China’s domestic brands in the belief that Chinese consumers 
prefer Western brands so as to imitate the lifestyle of wealthy Westerners. This 
presumed motive dominates the vast majority of discussions on the demand for 
Western brands in China. The exceptions are works suggesting that Chinese con-
sumers find Western brands undesirable, resisting them out of patriotic motives. 
In this chapter, we examine both of these motives more carefully, concluding that 
they probably do not tell the whole story. 
The emulative motive for Western brand consumption
Imaginings of China as the next great market for Western brands are bolstered by 
frequent claims that the “taste among the upper-middle class . . . is increasingly 
converging towards that of the Western consumer,” as a trend driven by Chinese 
consumers’ desire to display their “sophistication” (Garner 2005, 84, 85). 
Changes in consumer habits have now rendered some old stereotypes rather 
dated, especially where it concerns China’s rising upper-middle class in the 
first-tier cities. Sophistication has become more important and taste among 
the upper-middle class is increasingly converging towards that of the Western 
consumer, especially as many international magazines are publishing local 
editions in China (fashion magazines and even Elle Décor). International 
designer brands are now increasingly hosting high-profile promotional events 
in first tier cities [that is, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou] . . . 
(Garner 2005, 84)
U.S. Companies have been so successful in China because “Chinese consum-
ers have a ‘look up to the rich’ attitude and the United States is the world’s top 
developed country in their eyes.” 
(Gao Tao, consultant for International Brand Association in 
Beijing, quoted in the Washington Post, Cha 2008)
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This presumed desire to imitate Western lifestyles by choosing Western brands 
is not limited to luxury brands such as Mercedes Benz and Gucci. As those who 
herald the burgeoning Chinese market note, brand stories can be retold such that 
brands tied to mundane consumption in the United States are quite upscale and 
symbolic of cosmopolitanism in China. Wrangler jeans are not the work clothes of 
rural ranch hands, but are sported by successful urban professionals; Wal-Mart’s 
can be the social activity of the year; KFC and Pizza Hut can be places to impress 
dates (Cha 2008); and the American fast food icon McDonald’s can become a 
place of leisure and relaxation, as well as a transnational adventure special enough 
to celebrate momentous occasions (Yan 2006). 
Further, reports asserting that Chinese consumers are driven by a desire to dis-
play their sophistication by imitating Western lifestyles disclose, for instance, that 
sales of Western-brand automobiles are double those of Chinese models; demand 
for the Western skincare brand Olay exceeds that for the domestic brand Dabao; 
and Coca-Cola outsells Nongfu Spring (Garner 2005). In reports targeting Western 
brand producers it seems that only in the category of beer do Chinese consumers 
prefer Chinese brands (Garner 2005). These reports are not inconsistent with the 
general findings of the 2007 China Brand Report. Contributors to the report, which 
is produced by Chinese scholars and published by the Brand Research Centre of 
Shanghai Jiaotong University and the Shanghai Brand Promotion Centre, lament 
the fact that none of China’s domestic brands are in the world’s top 100 (Yu 
2007).
In positing that Chinese consumers seek to advance their social standing by 
imitating Western lifestyles and consumption choices, popular Western discourses 
of “the rising Chinese consumer” adopt an emulative model of consumption 
(Friedman 1994; Veblen 1925). They revive an old notion that emulation of class-
based taste is the key to consumer demand (Campbell 1994). Veblen’s (1925) 
theory of conspicuous consumption emerged to explain the success of the capi-
talistic economic system which revolutionized consumption in eighteenth-cen-
tury England (Campbell 1994; Friedman 1994). In China, the veracity of this 
model draws from the early nineteenth-century colonialist era (Wang 2000), when 
European expatriates living in China’s port cities imported Western brands (Wang 
2000). The observed adoption of these goods by local elites who could afford 
them has often been attributed to their desire to elevate their social standing (Wang 
2000; see also Wilk 1994). According to popular and academic reports, this envy 
of expatriates and their Western consumer goods was presumably disrupted by 
the advent of communist rule in China under Mao Zedong (Wang 2000). Since 
the economic reforms of 1979, which opened China’s market to Western brands, 
Veblen’s theory has re-emerged to explain or incite belief in the growing demand 
for Western brands in China; or, to borrow Croll’s (2006, 16) catchphrase, the trans-
formation of China’s citizenry from “comrades to consumers” of Western brands. 
Often accompanying this celebrated transformation is the presumption that post-
reform Chinese consumers are like Western consumers, driven by similar motiva-
tions, particularly individualistic pursuits of class status. Today, this presumed 
envy-driven desire to imitate Western lifestyles is attributed to the influence of 
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promotional media from Western brand producers, particularly magazines, bill-
boards, and consumer spectacles that offer a glimpse of Western lifestyles (Garner 
2005; Wang 2000). Collectively, these attributions echo Veblen’s (1925) view that 
the emulative motive is a pervading and persistent trait of human nature (Campbell 
1994).
Popular business reports of Chinese consumers’ attraction to Western brands, 
such as Garner’s The Rise of the Chinese Consumer (2005), are also largely depo-
liticized, as their target audience comprises executives of corporate capitalist 
brand producers in the West. Political conflict is, however, acknowledged in some 
academic discourses on globalization. Here, the emulative model carried to its 
logical conclusion portends a homogeneous world culture based on Western (pre-
dominantly American) culture (Wilk 1994; Zhao and Belk 2008a). This theory of 
homogenization via the instruments of foreign brands presents developing nations 
as “under siege,” leaving citizens as the “uncomprehending dupes of transnational 
corporations” who are being “stripped of their cultural heritage” (Watson 2006b, 
108; Yan 2006, 79). It is against this imagined future that resistance to Western 
brands emerges as a nationalistic or patriotic gesture.
The competing theory, which we embrace, holds that globalization produces 
cultural hybridization or glocalization (Hannerz 1990; Robertson 1994; Wilk 
1994; Miller 1998; Watson 2006a, 2006b; Yan 2006), whereby consumer goods 
introduced through globalization are appropriated by local cultures and infused 
with meanings that serve local cultural interests and values (Kjeldegaard and 
Askegaard 2006; Wilk 1994; Zhao and Belk 2008a, 2008b). Yan’s (2006) ethno-
graphic work at Beijing’s first McDonald’s, where the Chinese partner owned 50 
percent of the business, offers an example of the depth to which foreign brands 
are appropriated and localized. Yan (2006, 39) elaborates how the American fast 
food icon has been localized to create a “Chinese version of Americana.” Treated 
locally as window to the world or a “microcosm of the transnational,” where cus-
tomers can imagine they are in a Western city, or educate their children about other 
cultures, the McDonald’s store where the Chinese national flag was also raised 
daily became a place to languish over food for an hour or more, meet friends 
and family on special occasions, and develop personal relationships with store 
hostesses, referred to as “Aunt McDonald.” The eat-and-leave-quickly model so 
ingrained in the West was subverted in this early Beijing McDonalds. Despite 
such vivid ethnographies that attest to consumers’ appropriation of global brands 
to serve local interests, it has so far been the homogenization theory that has had 
the greatest influence on reported motives for rejecting Western brands. Chinese 
consumers are held to reject Western brands for patriotic reasons.
The patriotic motive for rejecting Western brands
Some China scholars suggest that Chinese consumers’ resistance to Western brands 
is driven by nationalistic motives as a symbolic gesture of loyalty to the nation-
state (Wang and Wang 2007). Inherent in this view is a challenge to the rhetoric 
of popular news stories depicting Chinese consumers salivating over Western 
Rethinking consumers’ motives for responding to Western brands  25
brands. Explaining such rejection as symbolic of nationalism among non-Western 
peoples has become a reflex in business and academia. This is illustrated by the 
work of some researchers who formalize concepts of “consumer nationalism” in 
terms of rejecting the brands of other nations. International corporate communica-
tions scholars, for instance, emphasize this linkage.
Consumer nationalism could become a barrier to multinational companies 
as they expand into overseas markets . . . By highlighting their respective 
national origins and identities, consumers impute a form of undesired “other-
ness” to international brands. . . . Two types of negative impact . . . are likely. 
One is that companies suffer immediate financial loss as a result of consum-
ers’ withholding consumption through boycotts; and the other is the damage 
to corporate image and reputation in light of the public unmasking of their 
(perceived nationality) and the negative associations with the issues of con-
tention. While the first impact scenario is direct and dramatic, the second is 
subtler but equally perilous . . . Since the economic reform in the late 1970s 
. . . China is now re-discovering its national identity . . . Consumption, once 
again, becomes an important platform for self-expression.
 (Wang and Wang 2007, 136–8)
Another apt illustration of the linkage of consumer nationalism to rejection of 
foreign brands emerges from research carried out by a transnational advertising 
agency. In 2003, Ogilvy & Mather conducted a survey of the brand patronage 
behavior of Chinese youth. Their findings revealed that Chinese youths who are 
the strongest patriots used Western brands almost as much as those with lesser 
feelings of nationalism (Wang 2008, 19). Executives perplexed by the finding 
dubbed it the “Patriot’s Paradox.” Both popular and academic coverage of the 
finding focus on the implications for age-based segmentation, noting that desire 
for Western brands among China’s youth is sufficiently strong to override patriotic 
sentiments, whereas the same does not hold for older consumers (Wang 2008; 
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce 2004). News coverage has not chal-
lenged the presumed paradoxical nature of patriotic people liking foreign brands.
This book enhances the understanding of Chinese consumers’ motives under-
lying their response to Western brands. At first, we were not convinced that the 
door should be closed on the study of such motives. For one reason, assuming that 
Chinese consumers seek to emulate Westerners through brand purchases denies 
non-Western peoples the creative capacity to use Western goods for their own 
purposes. At the same time, we questioned why the rejection of foreign or Western 
brands should be inherent in notions of nationalism, particularly for nation-states 
such as China, where reigning administrations endorse participation in the global 
economy. This perspective has been aired from different viewpoints. Zhou and 
Belk (2004, 64) suggest that Western brands that attempt “to play the [Chinese] 
nationalist card may now be considered as bi guan zi shou (closed-minded) since 
China has become a part of the World Trade Organization.” Wang (2008, 2) like-
wise comments on how China’s entry into the WTO has prompted debate on what 
the “new China” is.
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Opinions are sharply divided on what the “new China” is like now that it is 
a member of the WTO. Some predict the “demise of the authoritarian state”; 
others consider China’s ascent to the world stage to be a global self-promo-
tion that will hardly put a dent in the state’s capacity to control . . . With few 
exceptions . . . critical literature on the WTO challenge is prone to reinforce a 
mentality dating from the Cold War in its treatment of the globalizing China 
either as the Communist “other” or as a foe involuntarily losing its own iden-
tity to become one of “us.” Post-2001 China is neither. It is heavily influenced 
by the ideology of global partnership while struggling not to become a mirror 
image of the United States. “Country branding” is more challenging than ever, 
and the emerging brand “new China” eludes ideological preconceptions. 
We concur with Wang’s (2008) observation and provide our findings on how 
China’s consumers play a role in nation-making. This can be accessed by study-
ing their responses to Western brands in China. The stereotypical Western view 
of Chinese people as the puppets of a PRC propaganda machine has given way 
to recognition that Chinese citizens play an influential role in shaping govern-
ment practices in China (Gries 2004). The protests over the Toshiba ad in the 
background of the filmed National Day celebration, and those contesting the pres-
ence of Starbucks in the Forbidden City, suggest both agency and expected effect. 
Given this nation-making potential, we begin our inquiry by rethinking popular 
notions of Chinese consumers’ responses to Western brands.
Rethinking the primacy of the emulative motive for 
consuming Western brands
In rethinking the primacy of the emulative motive for Chinese consumers’ 
responses to Western brands, we identified the few works that challenge this the-
sis, either indirectly or directly. Some challenges may be described as indirect 
– that is, without critiquing the emulative thesis they suggest that other motives 
may drive the attraction to Western brands. Alternatively, these works suggest 
that other motives dominate decisions, rendering Western brands unattractive. 
Illustrating the former, Yan (2006) and Wang (2008) call attention to the impor-
tance of safety concerns in Chinese consumers’ attraction to Western brands. As 
for the latter, a small body of works suggest that Western brands are losing their 
appeal as Chinese brands become more attractive, as consumers respond to their 
improved quality and lower price, endorse “buy domestic” campaigns by govern-
ment and private industry, or become disenchanted with foreign brands because 
of the problem of counterfeits (Cui 1997; Li 2004; Weng 2002; Zhou and Belk 
2004; Zhou and Hui 2003). More recently, in debates over whether China’s con-
sumer market can rescue the world economy, CNN reporter Kevin Voight (2009) 
noted that “even as Western companies clamor for the China market it’s an open 
question of whether Chinese consumers – be they nouveau riche or just emerging 
from poverty – are interested in foreign goods.” Voight (2009) further quotes from 
Frederic Neumann, senior economist of HSBC, that “We see a lot [of penetration] 
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in the auto sector and the top end of the luxury market, but if you look at broad 
Chinese consumption trends, Western companies don’t have the cachet of local 
Chinese brand names.” Unfortunately, the source of this cachet was not identified 
in Voight’s report.
There are, though, direct challenges to Veblen’s (1925) emulative theory of 
consumption, more commonly known as the theory of conspicuous consumption. 
These challenges render the continued propagation of its basic assertions surpris-
ing (that is, the claim that “Chinese consumers are attracted to Western brands 
driven by status-envy of wealthier Westerners”). Criticisms of Veblen’s theory 
of conspicuous consumption emerged in anthropological discourses of the early 
1990s (Friedman 1994a; Campbell 1994). Veblen is classified as working from 
the “instinct school” of social theorists because of his tendency to explain human 
conduct in terms of simple drives or innate tendencies assumed to be common in 
human nature (Campbell 1994, 32). For Veblen, the drive to enhance social stand-
ing by emulating elite others was human nature. The “instinct school” references 
those whose theories grew out of a behavioral psychology perspective to view 
motive as a “temporary energy system” or a “force” that “drives” action from a 
state of apathy (Campbell 1994, 24). Among cultural anthropologists, the “instinct 
school” also perhaps holds a double meaning. Notably, Veblen’s (1925) work does 
not incorporate insights from eighteenth-century English people (Campbell 1994), 
although advocates of the theory sometimes sidestep this criticism, noting that the 
conspicuous consumer will rarely admit to such intentions (Mason, 1981).
We agree with those critics who challenge Veblen’s theory as a single-motive 
or universal theory and who instead seek to understand motives by discerning 
the meaning that actors attach to their actions (Friedman 1994; Campbell 1994). 
Motivational understanding requires more than mere observation of actions, but 
rather placing acts in the context of meaning in which actors are embedded. A con-
textualized understanding of actions shows how they connect with actors’ goals, 
desires, and outcomes, which are sometimes outcomes hoped for in the face of 
fears (Campbell 1994). Motivational understanding deals with what a person is 
striving towards and the meaning these goals possess (Campbell 1994, 29). We 
can observe whether a Chinese consumer at the counter in a retail store is buy-
ing Western brands. But we might ask “Is this motivated action or is it routine 
behavior?” “What is the importance of acquiring these brands in this person’s 
life?” “What meanings of Western brands make them significant?” “How have the 
meanings which the Chinese consumer attaches to Western brands been shaped 
by local cultural forces”? and “How have these local cultural forces that shape 
brand meanings been influenced by broader global forces?” By addressing these 
questions we can develop a sense of Chinese consumers’ motives for acquir-
ing Western brands. A prerequisite to all of these questions is ground work to 
determine whether “acquiring Western brands” is a meaningful category of 
action to Chinese consumers and not merely an arbitrary “observer-invented” 
category (Campbell 1994, 46). Our notion of motive aligns with that of cultural 
anthropologists who suggest that the study of motive cannot be separated from 
inquiring about general patterns of meaning shaped by local cultural forces, 
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which assist in understanding the observed behavior in the context of individuals’ 
hopes and fears (Campbell 1994).
With motives so conceived, invoking explanations regarding conspicuous con-
sumption from observations that Chinese consumers window-shop or acquire for-
eign brands may amount to speculation. This is because the explanation is not 
informed by these consumers’ subjective viewpoints and their cultural systems of 
beliefs and attitudes, which give meaning to the consumption of Western brands 
(Campbell 1994). Chinese consumer culture theorists Zhou and Belk (2004) 
note how the absence of Chinese consumers’ voice characterizes much academic 
research concerned with the homogenization of culture. In particular, they stress 
that the literature has emphasized either content analysis of themes in foreign ads 
or advertisers’ disclosures of how they created such ads, and carry with them an 
implicit assumption that consumers take from the ads the meanings that advertis-
ers intend. They conclude: “thus the presence of global images and foreign appeals 
are [erroneously] taken to mean that local culture is becoming globalized and that 
consumer values are changing accordingly” (p. 63). This underlying perspective 
is reflected in discourses on the rising Chinese consumer suggesting that Chinese 
consumers’ taste is becoming Westernized (Garner 2005).
Inferring Chinese consumers’ desire to emulate Westerners from observations 
that they acquire Western brands amounts to a process of labeling their actions 
(Campbell 1994). In a harsher indictment, Wilk (1994) suggests it amounts to 
labeling less affluent people in developing cultures as inept or intellectually inca-
pable of taking an active hand in manipulating symbols. Rather, they are presented 
as emulating a small elite group who are deemed the cultural meaning-makers 
(Wilk 1994). In assuming an emulative motive for consumption, this negative 
labeling can become compounded. When people of small economic means go 
to considerable expense to acquire consumer goods which are more affordable 
and abundant in the West, it is commonly seen as “some kind of mistake” by 
people who succumb to shallow, material constructions of identity because they 
“do not fully understand what ought to be their proper priorities” (Miller 1994, 
74). Recognition of such negative social labeling should lead researchers to seek 
alternative motives informed by cultural knowledge. 
Western cultural bias also is held to underlie the emulative model’s generic 
modern form of individualism (Friedman 1994). This flaw in the emulative 
thesis is emphasized by research findings that attention-getting displays in other 
cultural contexts are pursued for the symbolic value conferred upon the collec-
tive to which the individual belongs, and with an eye toward how conspicuous 
consumption influences collective outcomes (Miller 1994; Rowlands 1994; Wilk 
1994). As well as challenging aspects of the emulative thesis, Zhou and Belk 
(2004) show that status-seeking via branded consumption manifests differently in 
China, being shaped by local cultural values, and cannot be equated with Western 
status-seeking practices. Employing a reader-response method in which they 
asked Chinese consumers to react to global and local advertisements, Zhou and 
Belk (2004, 69) found that “a global orientation [meaning ‘Western’] increases 
face for successful people in China and is consistent with the Confucian idea that 
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a gentleman lives a lifestyle reflecting his high social status.” They distinguish this 
type of face as mianzi (prestige face), derived from a desire a for success-based 
reputation, as distinct from lian (moral face) (p. 64). 
Beyond culturally determined notions of status, understanding Western brands 
in terms of Chinese consumers’ quest for status or preservation of face requires 
close study of their lives. It is interesting that the popularity of Beijing’s first 
McDonald’s has been attributed in part to Chinese consumers’ beliefs that, unlike 
in Chinese restaurants, here they would be less susceptible to losing face (mianzi) 
in front of guests (Yan 2006). The Chinese consumers disclosed that banquets in 
Chinese restaurants involved competitions among customers to outdo one another 
by offering guests expensive dishes and alcoholic beverages (Yan 2006). Because 
it is common for the host to worry about losing face if customers at neighboring 
tables enjoyed better dishes, many sought to avoid this embarrassment by pay-
ing to secure a private room in the restaurant. As Yan (2006) discovered from 
the Chinese consumers he interviewed, McDonalds’ standardized food and the 
limited number of menu items promised an egalitarian environment in which one 
could not lose face. At the same time, a degree of face could be gained through 
the cosmopolitan identity the host could claim by entertaining guests in an exotic 
transnational venue. One Chinese consumer we interviewed also discussed his 
preference for Western brand restaurants. In contrast to Yan’s (2006) participants, 
our participant asserted that this was to avoid a showy display of having spent a 
considerable amount and thereby making guests uncomfortable: “I like the man-
ners in which the waiters served us, especially when he came with the bill. Instead 
of reading out loudly how much the meal cost, he quietly presented me the bill, 
pointed to the total cost . . . That way, the guests at the table wouldn’t know how 
much I spent. Sometimes when I treat friends at a Chinese restaurant, the guests 
would feel kind of uncomfortable when they heard the price . . . because they 
didn’t want me to spend too much. I really like the Western style restaurant, not 
for their food, but for the service.” In short, the meanings and modes of asserting 
status are grounded in culture, such that Western notions cannot be transplanted to 
observations made in China.
Still other scholars have called into question the supposed persistence of emula-
tive motives as presented by Veblen (1925). That conduct and motives can change 
over time was the focus of Weber’s Protestant Ethic (1930), which rejects Veblen’s 
thesis that capitalism could be explained in terms of acquisitiveness (Campbell 
1994). In Campbell’s (1994) review, Weber notes that the first capitalists acted 
from “revolutionary motives.” That is, they overcame the traditional value system 
in which work was a means of satisfying the goal of enjoying leisure, to assert that 
work is a goal in itself, showing “virtue and a proficiency in a calling” (Campbell 
1994; Weber 1930, 61). Weber shows how meanings attached to activities erode 
and fade away, such that “originating motives” are replaced by “perpetuating 
motives” (Weber 1930, 41, as reviewed by Campbell 1994). In The Protestant 
Ethic, Weber argues that the work motives of Protestants in Germany shifted from 
religious (working for the glory of God and for salvation) to economic (work-
ing for necessities and leisure time), and then to “sport” (working for the pursuit 
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of wealth; Campbell 1994). Each shift involves shedding the ethical basis of the 
previous motive (Campbell 1994), so even if one accepts that emulative motives 
characterized the underlying drive towards Western brands in the early years of 
reform for many Chinese consumers, there is no reason to assume such a motive 
will persist indefinitely.
Another challenge to the persistence of emulative motives emerges from cri-
tiques of the center/periphery models of globalization found in studies of colo-
nialism. Here, according to Wilk (1994), the colony was considered backward 
because of its timeless, isolated, and pervasive traditions, whereas the flow of time 
became the domain of well-traveled local elites who represented themselves as 
agents of “progress.” These elites deemed progress, symbolically represented by 
style and fashion, to be the movement in time from the unchanging past of rural 
areas to the dynamic future of the city (Wilk 1994). A colony’s progress was mea-
sured in terms of how far behind it lagged in displaying the fashions and styles of 
the metropolis deemed the center of culture. As Wilk (1994, 103) notes,
The flow of fashion requires the colonies to keep running faster to catch up . . . 
[it] serves the social and political interests of the colonial elites as well as the 
metropolitan powers . . . On the global scale colonial time affirms the political 
dependency of the undeveloped and developing on the developed and keeps 
the colonial elite in a subordinate position. 
This colonial time operated through the medium of travel. Local elites visited the 
metropolis and brought back new styles and fashions to legitimate their status. 
Today the time lag has been eliminated by satellite communications and the inter-
net. With time differences eliminated, only distance and culture, set locals apart 
from the West – or more specifically the United States (Wilk 1994). Wilk (1994, 
106–7) further suggests that the significance of this diminished or erased time lag 
is that it frees material goods from carrying temporal messages, so that they can 
now acquire new meanings. 
Local foods that were once tainted with connotations of backwardness and 
lack of sophistication can now be reinterpreted as “roots” (traditional) food, 
or ethnic food, or national cuisine. Objects can acquire historical or cultural 
referents that are truly in the present. Different interest groups can contend to 
appropriate them and attach new connotations – both positive and negative. 
Croll (2006, 46) likewise notes how the flow of time in China, beginning with 
the 1979 economic reforms, differs from that of semi-colonial China in ways that 
bypass former mediators of meaning.
. . . the presence of persons and things Western in China was not a new phe-
nomenon given the previous century of contact prior to 1949 but that pres-
ence, significant though it had been, was very much limited or bounded by 
treaty port and mediated by missionary and merchant. Without fast media 
Rethinking consumers’ motives for responding to Western brands  31
communication and a mass market, contact had been largely conducted via 
persons rather than goods and not much beyond the largest cities and com-
munication routes. Now it was television screens and shop counters which 
constituted the main points of encounter and reduced the distance between 
China and the Western other. 
Although the persistence of the emulative motive in China has rarely been ques-
tioned, a few scholars do comment on changing motivations for consumers’ attrac-
tion to Western brands. Yan (2006, 76) speculates that the “Chinese version of 
American culture” as experienced by consuming hamburgers at McDonald’s may 
be seen by the next generation as ordinary and local, as has occurred in Hong Kong 
and Shenzhen (Watson 2006). Croll (2006), in documenting the radical changes 
in material acquisitions made by Chinese consumers in the early years of reform, 
makes the interesting point that “most consumption was still conspicuous.” This 
resulted from the rapid shift from a production-oriented economy that manufac-
tured limited categories of uniform-style goods towards a market economy, in 
which rising incomes and the availability of imports introduced variation. The 
iconic representation of this shift is the transformation of workers’ appearance. The 
standard blue work clothes of the Cultural Revolution gave way to rapid changes 
in fashion that introduced a host of Western branded clothing styles and colors 
(Croll 2006). In an environment in which almost all consumption is conspicuous, 
explaining that Western brand consumption occurs because consumers notice and 
acquire what others have seems a fairly safe assertion. In early years of the reform, 
however, many product choices were predominantly Western (Croll 2006). This 
suggests that the acquisition of Western brands at that time may not have been 
driven solely by admiration/emulation. It also does not rule out that such acquisi-
tions may have been arrived at through complex identity negotiations. Further, 
since the early years of reform, domestic brands have emerged that compete in 
quality and international status with brands from the West. Given this, although 
initially the reform government’s bid to modernize and “catch up with the West” 
may have prompted consumers’ assertions of modernity through their display of 
Western brands (Croll 2006, 47), present-day Chinese consumers may deem that 
China has caught up, and assert this through loyalty to domestic brands. Notably, 
this motivation is quite different from fears of Western hegemony. Rather, it may 
reflect something akin to the collective pride noted by Zhou and Belk (2004), 
whereby consumers may bask in the reflected glory of successful national brands, 
gaining face at a national level of the extended self (Belk 1988).
Perhaps most damning to the emulative thesis is the recognition that a motive 
which operates the same everywhere ceases to be an explanatory variable, lead-
ing researchers to look for other explanations (Friedman 1994; Campbell 1994). 
These scholars remind us that historical and cultural variations produce different 
motives for consumer action, as well as different actions for the same motive 
(Campbell 1994; Miller 1994; Wilk 1994). This is not to suggest that emulative 
motives are unimportant. A rare cadre of anthropologists who have immersed 
themselves in China’s consumer culture over the course of economic reform have 
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noted the meaningfulness of emulating Westerners to some Chinese consumers 
(Croll 2006; Zhou and Belk 2004). Rather, following Weber (1930) and Campbell 
(1994), we suggest that motives during the early years following reform may dif-
fer from present-day motives. Where emulative motives exist, they may be less 
individualistic and more collectively oriented. Further, emulative motives may 
comprise broader overarching goals (Campbell 1994) or superordinate meanings 
that legitimize and moralize particular stances toward Western brand consumption 
(Kozinets and Handelman 2004) which have not been recognized. In light of a 
fuller inspection of Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption, we see emula-
tive desire as one plausible motive among many, the relevance of which requires 
delving into the meanings of Western brands held by Chinese consumers.
Rethinking “consumer nationalism” as synonymous with 
Western brand boycotting 
Academic discourses which assume the assertion of nationalism in the context 
of consumption as occurring exclusively through domestic brand choices and the 
boycotting of Western brands (Wang and Wang 2007) strike us as something of a 
myth. This myth emerges from neglected areas of study within the field of con-
sumer culture and globalization, often featuring the influential role of Western-
based transnational corporations and their brands. In pursuit of this focus, studies 
erroneously treat the nation-state as static rather than dynamic. They also deny 
the influence of domestic producers on Western brand meanings. As we elabo-
rate, these omissions leave the myth of the exclusive linkage between national-
ism and Western brand boycotting unchallenged. These same omissions underlie 
the unquestioned contrary assertion that Western brand choices reflect emulation 
of Western lifestyles and hence ambivalence about nationalism (Pecotich and 
Rosenthal 2001).
If we take nationalism to be “that outlook which gives absolute priority to the 
values of the nation over all other values and interests” (Hroch 1996, 62; Wang 
and Wang 2007, 136), at what point after a nation-state begins to participate in the 
global economy do we alter our conception of nationalism as a value manifested 
in resistance to Western brands? It seems simplistic to assume that the governing 
body of the nation-state is able to assert open trade policies without contending 
with past discourses that cast Western brand consumption as emulating Western 
lifestyles, unpatriotic, or “treasonous” (Gerth 2008, 42). We would not expect 
governments to lie dormant in the expectation that citizens will catch on to the 
ideological changes; nor would we expect their efforts in shifting citizens’ values 
to go uncontested (Gries 2004; Liu 2004). Yet, the static treatment of nation-state 
governance prevails because consumer research and globalization studies have 
emphasized the structuring of consumer motives and brand meanings by trans-
national corporations and their market ideologies (Kjeldegaard and Askegaard 
2006).
Leaving the ideology of the nation-state as the backdrop against which Western 
brand promotions operate results in two misrepresentations that contribute to the 
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notion of Chinese nationalists as boycotters of Western brands. One misrepresen-
tation involves fixing the nation-state’s influence on brand meanings and motives 
in the past. Here, the nation-state is recognized as the purveyor of past socialist 
ideology (i.e. prior to rapid globalization) now embodied within the consumer as 
part of their personal memory. Consumers’ meanings for brands reflect a negotia-
tion of their socialist memories in light of the current influence of corporate brand 
marketers (Coulter et al 2003). We recognize that any single work emphasizes 
certain study phenomena to the exclusion of others, yet by way of omission these 
works represent the nation-state’s actions as fixed in the past; that is, they rep-
resent the nation-state as currently uninvolved in shaping the meanings of and 
responses to consumer goods.
There is ample evidence to the contrary. Here we offer a brief example that 
illustrates how nation-state governments shape the meanings of Western brands. 
Our example involves a national project to build domestic brands inspired by the 
former Minister of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Bo Xilai. The 
initiative resulted in the 2006 “New Long March of Commerce: Ten-Thousand-
Mile Journey of Brands” (Yu 2007). This was an extravaganza that targeted the 
promotion of Chinese brands both domestically and internationally in an elabo-
rately orchestrated campaign trail covering 51 cities and 14,290 kilometers in 129 
days (Yu 2007). By mimicking to some degree the planned Olympic torch relay 
tied to the 2008 Beijing games, the Brand Journey might be interpreted as an 
attempt to invoke brand rankings as a competitive international sport. There is a 
subtle undermining of Western brands that rival emerging Chinese brands, yet this 
does not leverage from China’s Mao-era past in which socialism was wed to pro-
tectionism. Rather, it draws from China’s more recent participation in the global 
market economy and its aspirations to become a dominant player. Our findings 
suggest that in the eyes of some Chinese citizens this ascent in the global order is 
motivated by a desire for redemption from humiliations that date back to the semi-
colonial era. Chinese consumers responding to this campaign would probably not 
claim that they “boycott” foreign brands as being instruments of Western imperi-
alism, but rather choose domestic brands because they are superior.
A second misrepresentation emerges from treating the transition to a market 
economy as the critical moment, whereas what comes before and what happens 
after is (erroneously) deemed stable and unproblematic (Wilk 1994). This implied 
post-reform stability also contributes to a biased view of transition in terms of “a 
switch” or “changeover” to a Western-style capitalist market system which opens 
the way to full fruition of the emulative model’s predictions – a homogeneous 
world culture (Wilk 1994). Here, too, the image of China is fixed, but fixed as 
an instant replica of America’s consumerist culture following the transition. That 
a switchover is presumed in notions of “transition” is captured in titles such as 
Pei’s China’s Trapped Transition (2006). Pei (2006) considers China’s reform 
(compared to the more radical reform attempted by the Soviet Union), noting that 
China’s political framework traps the state in transition. Pei argues that the gradu-
alist approach has been taken because progress toward a more modern economy 
would effectively curb government action and power. Orientation towards a 
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switchover goal of transition denies more open-ended terms of “change” or “evo-
lution” that suggest creative possibilities. This representation likewise denies the 
present role of nation-state governing practices in shaping brand meanings and 
motives. As a result, Chinese consumers’ rejection of Western brands has been 
interpreted as a symbolic gesture of national loyalty (Mick and Buhl 1992). In 
the absence of a presumed “switchover” to Western-style capitalism, Western 
brands may be assumed to hold a greater variety of meanings beyond Western 
globalization’s “instrument of hegemony.” 
Exceptions to the inert post-reform treatment of the nation-state’s influence on 
Chinese consumers’ brand meanings have recently entered consumer research dis-
courses (Croll 2006; Zhao and Belk 2008b). In a semiotic analysis spanning the 
25 years since China’s initial transition from communism to consumerism, the 
work of Zhao and Belk (2008b) reveals that brand producers constantly adapted 
their advertising strategies to accommodate shifting government practices. 
Whereas commercial producers remain focal, the work is singular in recognizing 
that nation-state governance is organic, responsive to global forces with which it 
contends, and influential in shaping representations of consumer goods. Croll’s 
(2006) report of her ethnographic fieldwork is likewise replete with recognition 
that nation-state governing practices shape the meanings of consumer goods. Our 
work offers a complementary extension by further revealing the nation-state’s 
influence on consumers’ meanings and nation-making uses of Western brands.
By including nation-state governance as a constitutive part of the “culture indus-
try” (Abu-Lughod 2005), we may gain a greater understanding of the historical and 
cultural shaping of the meanings and motives of brand consumption. Abu-Lughod 
(2005) suggests that nation-states can be analyzed as models for ordering consumers’ 
everyday life. Nation-state governing practices entail speeches, published discourse, 
policies, and state-sponsored education programs used in the assertion of political 
ideologies which comprise the official vision of the future nation-state. Transition 
toward a market economy, or toward greater participation in the global economy, 
is followed by periods of negotiation and adjustment during which the administra-
tion attempts to amass public support through their governing practices (Liu 2004). 
This often entails attempts to shape the citizenry’s imagination of the nation – past, 
present, and future. The imagined nation is bound to neither geography nor time, 
but exists in people’s minds. As cultural anthropologist Jonathan Friedman sug-
gests (1992a, 1992b), political institutions, including governments, may selectively 
conjure and reframe the nation’s historical past to serve present needs, or amass sup-
port for projects tied to an imagined future nation. The government of a nation-state 
steeped in a socialist past need not discard its cultural history when it changes to a 
market economy, but rather may draw from it aspects that serve its present politi-
cal positions and economic aspirations. Demonstrating the reshaping of history, 
albeit from the private sector, restaurants themed to reflect the time of the Cultural 
Revolution via the name, décor, and simple menus, have become popular among 
Chinese who suffered the deprivations of this Mao-era movement (Zhou and Belk 
2004). Even a socialist history can serve this political/economic position under a 
creative state administration (Liu 2004). As such, nationalism or patriotism need not 
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be wed to boycotting foreign brands. Rather, meanings of nationalism may vary in 
ways that suggest different relations to foreign brands. Consumers may hold favor-
able meanings of Western brands while still holding patriotic sentiments (Zhou and 
Belk 2004). Following from their study in which Chinese participants in Shenzhen 
were shown advertisements with both local and global appeal, Zhou and Belk (2004, 
71) conclude that Chinese consumers valued global advertising elements, but that 
this did not involve “an abandonment of feelings of national pride, patriotism or 
Chinese values. Nor does it imply that participants embrace Western values and dis-
parage local and traditional values.” Thus, rethinking the notion that represents con-
sumer nationalism as synonymous with foreign brand boycotting, there may well 
be no paradox in the findings that Ogilvy & Mather labeled “The Patriot’s Paradox” 
(Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce 2004). 
Chinese consumers as active meaning makers
The emulative motive and the patriotic resistance motive for Chinese consumers’ 
responses to Western brands do not tell the whole story. If there is cause for critical 
analysis here, it resides in the absence of voice given to consumers (Askegaard 2006; 
Campbell 1994). Studies offering these explanations entail estimates of branded 
consumption based on China’s gross domestic product, observations of Western 
brand purchases or purchase intentions (Garner 2005), interpretative analyses of 
Western brand advertisements (Wang 2000), case studies of Western brand produc-
ers operating in China (Wang and Wang 2007), and advertising executives’ views 
of Chinese consumers’ motives (Wang 2008). Although these methods produce 
insights into market practices emerging in China, they often require researchers to 
infer consumers’ motives. Behavior can of course have many motives, and a given 
motive may be asserted through various consumption practices (Campbell 1994). 
Inferring motives in the absence of the consumer’s viewpoint and an understanding 
of their experience of the world leads to a suggestion that such motives are universal 
(for example Veblen’s 1925 theory) rather than challenging them (Campbell 1994; 
Friedman 1994a). In popular press reports this condition is often amplified where 
there is no elaboration and hence only a limited understanding of the cultural context 
(Miller 1994; Tsui 2007). Efforts to understand motives for exotic behavior are often 
lacking for consumption activities that seem commensurate with Western norms 
(Miller 1994), such as consumption of Western brands (Askegaard 2006).
It is not the obligation of any single author or work to attempt to understand 
motives, but rather is the aspiration of a field of inquiry. Brand research in the past 
has rarely taken a consumer perspective, which involves obtaining consumers’ 
responses to or ascertaining their relation to the brand. Most often the consumer 
is treated as the background against which brand management tools are tested 
(Askegaard 2006). Consumer culture theorist Søren Askegaard suggests this 
results partly from the orientations of researchers, who introduced more cultur-
ally oriented and social constructivist approaches into consumer research. These 
researchers were inspired by a mission to free consumer research from its bonds 
to managerial practice so that it might become a discipline in its own right (Belk 
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1986). “Brand research might have been judged to be too closely associated with 
the primacy of managerial purposes” (Askegaard 2006, 93). This has changed. 
Since the mid-1990s more and more studies have highlighted consumers’ sym-
bolic use of brands in their construction of group identity and the meanings of 
everyday practices (Schroeder and Salzer-Mörling 2006). The sociological and 
social psychological roles of brands are “no longer taboo for interpretivist con-
sumer researchers” (Askegaard 2006, 93).
Cultural perspectives of the role of brands in people’s lives (Schroeder and 
Salzer-Mörling 2006) have challenged the presumption that Western brands are 
everywhere objects of desire, driven largely by aspirations to emulate Western 
lifestyles (Arnould and Thompson 2005; Belk et al 2003; Coulter et al 2003; 
Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006; Mick and Buhl 1992). These challenges are 
highlighted by an emerging stream of consumer culture research in the context of 
developing economies, transitioning economies, and those on the periphery of the 
global economy. These works reveal that motives for consuming Western goods 
are more complex than mere emulation, and are shaped by notions of identity 
grounded in local cultural history (Bonsu and Belk 2003; Belk et al 2003; Coulter 
et al 2003; Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006; Mick and Buhl 1992). They have in 
common the pursuit of what Campbell (1994) terms “motivationalist understand-
ing” of the consumption of Western brands, as each seeks individuals’ subjective 
meanings of these consumption objects. All recognize that subjective meanings 
derive from larger social processes that cannot be grasped in acts of exchange and 
consumption, but rather require accessing the psychological states of consumers 
and how these are shaped by local cultural forces, which are themselves shaped 
by global forces. Their findings emphasize that consumers rework identity mean-
ings of consumption practices to fit their local contexts, such that they become 
inscribed in local, historically constituted cultural discourses (Kjeldgaard and 
Askegaard 2003). All offer theoretical insights elaborating the shaping of identity 
meanings and motives of Western brands and consumer goods. Our inquiry builds 
on this cultural perspective and seeks Chinese consumers’ meanings of Western 
brands and the ways in which they are shaped by local cultural history.
Social theorists argue that because the social emulation hypothesis appears 
applicable, it is accepted with little or no attempt to consider alternatives (Campbell 
1994, 46). We echo this argument for the proposition that rejection of Western 
brands is a symbolic gesture of national affinity. This book highlights the local 
cultural shaping of the meanings of Western brands to Chinese people, and in 
doing so it reveals the meaning-making processes engaged by Chinese consum-
ers, and how the processes themselves are culturally conditioned. These meanings 
and meaning-making processes reveal varied motives, all of which are directed 
towards the same goal: materializing imaginings of the future China. This higher 
goal is absent in popular and academic discourses on present-day responses to 
Western brands. Before turning to how Chinese consumers imbue Western brands 
with meanings such that they are useful to materializing the future China, we 
offer a brief historical perspective of branded goods, both domestic and foreign, 
in China.
3 Highlighted moments in the 
history of branded goods in 
China
In the fervor to promote China as the “last great frontier” for Western brand pro-
ducers seeking more territory (Croll 2006), the popular press in the West, as well as 
some academic works, often suggest that brands were introduced into China from 
the West during the early 19th century (Wang 2000). Corresponding with this view 
is one in which communist rule beginning in 1949 under Mao Zedong disrupted 
the presence of brands, which were reintroduced in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping’s 
gaige kaifang, a policy of economic reform which opened China’s markets to 
branded goods from other countries. Challenges to this narrative, albeit few, have 
emerged to suggest a different historical relationship of China to branded goods 
(Gerth 2003, 2006; Hamilton and Lai 1989). In particular, these works challenge 
the notion that brands emerged out of a capitalist economic system in Western 
nations.
This history informs our study and interpretations of the meanings of Western 
brands held by Chinese consumers. Our review features brief sketches of moments 
in China’s history: late imperial China, late 20th century semi-colonial China prior 
to communist rule, and post-reform China from 1979 to the present. It draws from 
book-length works and research programs by historians, cultural anthropologists, 
consumer culture theorists, and brand scholars to integrate these and highlight the 
role of state governing practices in shaping brand meanings.
The emergence of branded goods in late imperial China
Contrary to the view that brands were introduced into China from the West (Wang 
2000), Hamilton and Lai (1989) document that in late imperial China (a period 
from the tenth to the 19th century), brands were common and used to facilitate 
the distribution of products beyond their places of production. Here, we highlight 
those aspects of Hamilton’s and Lai’s (1989) analysis that carry forward to present-
day brand meanings and practices in China.
Hamilton and Lai (1989) suggest that the state had little to do with the vibrant 
commercial activity that existed in late imperial China. Rather, their analysis 
attributes this growth to a dominant private sector comprised of complex distribution 
systems which enabled the sale of goods outside their area of production. Although 
the state did not infl uence the growth of this consumer economy, it does seem that 
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the reigning imperials infl uenced the meanings that Chinese consumers attached 
to branded goods, albeit perhaps unmotivated or unintended.
Brands were used in a variety of product categories.
We have found either biaoji or hao labels [identifying producers and sellers, 
respectively] on the following late imperial products: cotton cloth, items of 
clothing, porcelain, boots, tea, wine, medicine and herbs, scissors, needles, 
copper locks, copper mirrors, gold and silver bullion, hair ornaments, jewelry, 
jade items, writing brushes, writing paper, ink sticks, ink stones, lacquer ware, 
books, and bank drafts. In no case was the brand name a signature affi xed to 
a one-of-a-kind product; instead it was the means of differentiating an entire 
line of products from that of competitors. And in all cases the brand names 
were on products that were distributed interregionally for sale. . . . A clear 
indication of the widespread promotion of differentiated products is found in 
the many lists of famous products that were published in late imperial times 
(Hamilton and Lai 1989, 258). 
Lists of “famous products” emerged from various sources, including local 
gazetteers who devoted a section to “famous local products,” and government 
offi cials who reported to the throne on the variety of products available in local 
markets (Hamilton and Lai 1989). Hamilton and Lai (1989) suggest that the 
most important lists were those compiled by the imperial household, as the lists 
contained those branded goods judged to be fi t for imperial consumption. Being on 
the list meant success for the producer or manufacturer. As illustration, Hamilton 
and Lai (1989) offer the case of a drugstore in Beijing, the Tongrentang, which 
became the supplier of drugs and medicines to the imperial household. Using a 
hao label to indicate the quality and reliability of the product being sold, the store 
began to market its product outside the region. The store fi rst leveraged from its 
imperial endorsement to attract candidates for the civil service examination to 
the store for free samples, hoping they would spread the word of the brand when 
they returned to their respective provinces. Later, the owners opened branches in 
large cities. The case illustrates that although most Chinese medicines are natural 
products, the hao of the selling fi rm became an important indication of quality and 
reliability. 
Hamilton and Lai’s (1989) analysis further documents that metal goods such as 
needles and scissors were likewise branded using hao labels, along with pictures 
akin to logos, to convey quality steel. For goods such as cotton fabric some 
manufacturers wove advertisements directly into the fabric, whereas merchants 
made their own mark known as a jitou (loom-head) at the end of each bolt of cloth 
they acquired for resale (Hamilton and Lai 1989).
Hamilton and Lai (1989) also recount incidents of brand pirating, whereby 
competitors in a given market used the mark of a highly successful brand to 
confer upon their lesser-known goods the high-quality associations of the more 
famous brand. Brand imitation and pirating continued throughout China’s history, 
resulting in consumers’ heightened sensitivity to the presence and discernment 
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of counterfeit brands, as has been noted for China’s semi-colonial period (Gerth 
2003). This discernment involves the use of attributes beyond labels to distinguish 
brands in the marketplace. 
In late imperial China, producers or sellers could be active in promoting their 
goods towards famous brand status by associating them with quality or prestige, 
which meant they could command a higher price (Hamilton and Lai 1989). Hamilton 
and Lai illustrate this process with the case of tea – a process that they suggest also 
applies to brands of wine, silks, and fi ne cotton cloth. Tea books spread the demand 
for tea while elevating the status of specifi c brands by discussing various types of 
tea and advising which were appropriate as gifts for offi cials (Hamilton and Lai 
1989). In short, the work of Hamilton and Lai challenges a widely held view that 
brands grew out of a Western capitalist economic system and were subsequently 
introduced into China. Hamilton’s and Lai’s (1989) historical work suggests that 
England was not the world’s fi rst consumer society and that consumerism did not 
emerge only under capitalism. 
There is no evidence from their analysis that branded consumer goods conveyed 
meanings of nationalism; rather, affi liations to towns, cities, and regions were 
used in branded labels. Even for exported goods these labels are noted, rather than 
national ones (Hamilton and Lai 1989). After the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, 
the meanings of branded goods were shaped by multiple institutional forces, both 
state and domestic private industry, to convey positions of nationalism.
Branded goods in semi-colonial China of the early 20th century
If late imperial China is characterized as a period in which the ruling body was 
ambivalent about shaping the meanings of branded goods, in semi-colonial China 
the governing body was constrained in its methods of doing so. During this 
period the Chinese state lacked tariff autonomy. “Unequal treaties” that “opened” 
China to trade following the Opium Wars (1840–42) denied China the ability to 
restrict imports by raising tariffs (Gerth 2003, 5). Gerth (2008) also elaborates 
the institutional and discursive processes that emerged during this period to 
demonstrate that consumption became a primary means for the Chinese people to 
conceptualize themselves as citizens of a modern nation. 
. . . a Chinese nation did not precede the notion of “Chinese products.” The 
two constructs evolved together. Nation-making included learning, or being 
coerced, to shape preferences around something called the Chinese nation 
and away from items deemed foreign. 
(Gerth 2003, 17)
Although the origin of Chinese nationalism has been debated, the dominant view 
is that China as a conscious national entity was not created until the 19th century, 
when the nation was confronted by Western powers, beginning with the Opium 
Wars between 1839 and 1842 (Gerth 2003; Zhao 2004). This war was precipitated 
by a trade imbalance, as Europe sought Chinese goods, particularly tea, silk, and 
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porcelain, whereas Chinese consumers found few goods from Europe attractive 
apart from opium. When China banned the importation of opium, the British 
responded with gunboats (Zhao and Belk 2008a). The defeat by the British during 
the Opium Wars and the imposition of the Treaty of Nanking marked the beginning 
of confrontations with the West. By the turn of the 19th century Germany was 
occupying the port city of Qingdao in Shandong Province, claiming railway rights 
in nearby areas, and the British had forced the Qing government to give them a 
99-year lease on the Kowloon Peninsula, north of Hong Kong. During this time, 
Japan and Russia also made claims to Chinese territory or trade access (Zhao 
2004).
The lack of tariff autonomy that followed the Opium Wars provided the impetus 
for and guided the methods of a diffuse movement that Gerth (2003, 2008) labels 
the National Products Movement. This movement, which began at the start of 
China’s industrial revolution, cultivated the practice of dividing consumer goods 
into China-made, deemed “patriotic,” and foreign, deemed “treasonous” (Gerth 
2008, 3). In this section we briefl y summarize Gerth’s (2008) analysis of this 
movement, along with additional points of contextualization from other scholars. 
The movement’s main players were unifi ed by a desire to halt the infl ux of 
imported goods and an inability to secure direct state intervention owing to the 
lack of tariff autonomy. Interested actors included politicians worried about trade 
defi cits, Chinese manufacturers faced with inexpensive and superior imports, 
and intellectuals concerned with loss of sovereignty. Tariff autonomy was not 
recovered until the late 1920s, and in the interim these parties created other ways 
of containment.
Integral to this was the effort to make product nationality the salient meaning 
of a commodity, more so than price, quality, style, or brand loyalty. By the time 
the National Products Movement was under way, Chinese consumers had had 
considerable exposure to Western brands, and brand loyalty was deemed an 
impediment (Gerth 2003). These imported goods entered port cities such as 
Shanghai and gradually spread to other parts of China (Zhao and Belk 2008a). 
Historical analyses document the presence of such global brands as Flying Eagle 
(condensed milk), Kodak, GE, Colgate, American Standard, and Quaker Oats, as 
well as Western-made products such as pharmaceutical goods, cosmetics, soaps, 
electric fans, Browning guns, high-heeled shoes, beauty parlors, and Japanese 
and Swedish watches (Gerth 2003; Zhao and Belk 2008a). These goods were 
supported by advertising, introduced by Western missionaries, which appeared in 
magazines and newspapers or on radio programs, neon signs, billboards, posters, 
cigarette cards, department store displays, and yuefenpai or poster ads in the form 
of calendars (Zhao and Belk 2008a, 46). Foreign brands in pre-communist China 
(i.e., before 1949), were often new products of which consumers had no previous 
experience. As such, they were clearly marked as “foreign” (by adding the word 
yang to the product name) and promoted with advertising tied to Chinese folklore 
and local culture in order to encourage adoption.
As Gerth’s (2003, 2008) historical analysis of semi-colonial China elaborates, 
appeals to patriotism were the National Movement’s means of asserting product 
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nationality as the foremost important meaning of a commodity. The patriotism 
of consuming China-made goods was advanced through advertisements, exhibi-
tions, nationalistic commodity spectacles, and organized rallies. Honoring product 
nationality above other criteria was represented in the movement’s promotional 
literature as the ideal patriotic, nation-saving sacrifice. Further, the movement 
suggested that powerful Western nations and Japan had already established prod-
uct nationality as the dominant consumption criterion. Campaigns educated indi-
viduals into the practice of visually distinguishing foreign products from Chinese 
products which varied in purity as contaminated by foreign components and 
workmanship. Notions of pure Chinese products and a pure economy were pro-
moted in movement literature that often represented China-made goods as “the 
national blood” and invoked eugenics slogans (2003, 8). Campaign discourses 
promoted the negative social labeling of those who bought foreign-made goods, 
announcing that authentic Chinese people did not consume imports lest they 
betray their nation (2003, 299). To do so would be “an immoral act” and “an 
unsurpassably shameful thing to do” (2003, 296, 285), marking the consumer the 
equivalent of an “inferior product,” “drifter,” or “prostitute” (2003, respectively 
306, 301, 305).
Receptivity to the movement’s campaigns intensified the need for explicit stan-
dards that identified which products to buy and which to boycott. National product 
(China-made) certification standards emerged first in non-government organi-
zations, but in 1928 were formalized by a new national government that made 
them law and institutionalized incentives for their application. Beyond appeals to 
patriotism and the use of legal institutions, the movement’s influence was wielded 
through “brute force” (2003, 20). Unlike other efforts to nurture affinities toward 
the nation-state, such as the creation of national opera and a national anthem, 
the National Products Movement rendered every person a participant, who 
with everyday consumption decisions could choose to support or reject the 
movement.
As Gerth (2008, 49) further points out, the notion of national products probably 
abetted the Communist Revolution and Mao Zedong’s ensuing reign by legitimiz-
ing the abolition of private enterprise: if China-made products were “national” and 
Chinese people should make sacrifices to consume them, then why should the prof-
its be private and benefit only a few capitalists? Cultural continuity across early 
capitalist and the communist period under Mao was experienced in the practice 
of dividing products into domestic and foreign and attaching respectively positive 
and negative nationalistic meanings to them. Gerth’s (2003) work challenges two 
common assumptions, namely, that consumerism is a uniquely Western phenom-
enon (see also Hamilton and Lai 1989), and that the Communist Revolution and 
the reign of Mao represented a total cultural break with China’s former capitalist 
period (Wang 2000). As Friedman (1996, 132) notes, “transformations of structure 
do not imply a total cultural discontinuity unless former life strategies are replaced 
by new ones.” As Gerth’s (2003) analysis makes apparent, China under Mao was 
experienced in valuing domestic-made goods and devaluing foreign goods to 
express Chinese nationalism.
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Branded goods since gaige kaifang – China’s economic reform
In contrast to late imperial China, where governing bodies appeared ambivalent 
to shaping brand meanings, and semi-colonial China, where governing bodies 
faced constraints on the practices with which they could shape brand meanings, 
administrations that introduced or supported gaige kaifang, or China’s opening up 
to trade with other nations, have made ample use of practices that shape Western 
brand meanings (Croll 2006).
We draw our review here from Croll’s (2006) work on post-reform China, 
supplementing this with events and trends reported by international management 
scholar Anne Tsui and China brand scholar Yu Mingyang. Gaige kaifang, 
introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, marked a move away from China’s centrally 
planned economy, where state-owned enterprises produced three-quarters of 
China’s goods. During Mao’s three decades of rule, the types and prices of goods 
produced were determined by state plans which were not driven by consumer 
demand. These plans offered employees of state-owned enterprises a package 
of social benefi ts known as the “iron rice bowl.” That is, they were given solid 
guarantees of lifetime employment, pensions, and services, which included low-
rent housing, schools, healthcare, and recreational facilities. Croll (2006, 31, 36, 
39, 42) offers the following impression of the available consumer goods and the 
commercial landscape in pre-reform China. 
During the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s the most popular items 
are said to have been bicycles, sewing machines and wristwatches. . . . . Apart 
from these goods, there had been virtually no durables or appliances available 
for purchase . . . During the socialist revolution, general trading and department 
stores were few and specialized shops rare. Even the main shopping street in 
Beijing, Wangfujing, boasted little more than a large book shop, a several 
storied department store, a covered market and a tourist arts and handicraft 
store. The one department store . . . was dark with bare concrete walls and had 
heavy brown plastic padded blinds fl apping at the door. Below and behind 
dusty glass counters was a narrow range of tired or faded goods, mostly small 
and made up of limited ranges of utility shoes, clothes, stationery, toys, plastic 
and other hardware daily necessities including the ubiquitous thermos fl asks 
and old-fashioned alarm clocks . . . During the revolution any promotion on 
billboards was limited to political slogans, perhaps a Mao Zedong thought or 
government propaganda for productivity and political education, as well as 
family planning in late 1980s.
Although, as has been observed in post-socialist nations in Europe (Manning and 
Uplisashvili 2007), state-owned trademarks in China are now revived as “time-
honored brands” (Yan 2007), China scholars suggest that brands did not exist 
in China between 1949 and 1978, and that even after the reforms the market 
from 1978 to 1990 was dominated by state-owned trademarks rather than brands 
(Croll 2006). Our participants’ stories, like the one below, concur with Croll’s 
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(2006) analysis that the concept of “brands” was not meaningful to some Chinese 
consumers until after the economic reforms. 
PARTICIPANT: There was hardly anyone wearing make-up until the 1980s. The 
only thing women used for their face, as I remember was a cream called 
Xue-hua-shuang [meaning “snow fl ake cream” akin to vanishing cream]. 
It was a very basic care for the facial skin. I mean more for the purpose 
to protect against cold wind in winter than to make ourselves look more 
beautiful. Make-up was only used on occasions of stage performance. 
That was a great moment because we looked so great after the make-up, 
though the make-up had to be exaggerating for it had to go with the effect 
of the strong stage spotlights. I do not remember if there were brands for 
the cosmetics used for make-up. To get lips red, a cream was used. It was 
not in the shape of a stick but in a small box and looked like Tiger Balm, 
even the texture was like that – more oily than creamy. It was made from 
animal fat – very natural. We never heard of anything chemical or had 
the fear of being hurt. To make red cheeks, yanzhi [rouge] was used. I 
was too young to remember whether it was the same thing used for lips, 
they were similar. However, one thing I remember clearly is that they 
both smelled so good, sweet and delicious.
INTERVIEWER: Were there branded cosmetics?
PARTICIPANT: I do not remember if there were brands at that moment. Even if 
there were we did not talk of them by using the brand names. We tended 
to mention products by their function more often than by manufacturer or 
the name the manufacturer had given it. Even Tiger Balm, at that moment 
we called it “qing-liang-you” [meaning “cooling oil”]. Nobody called 
it “Tiger cooling oil” though we did see this tiger printed on the box. 
The fi rst time I made the connection between the product and its brand 
was later when I started to work in Shenzhen in 1986 with those people 
from other countries. They asked me where to get Tiger Balm so as to 
bring some souvenirs back to their countries. I was lucky because my 
reaction was quick enough to immediately think about the tiger image 
on the box. Cosmetics for make-up were generally named by yan-zhi (to 
make red), fan-shi-lin (to prepare the face for or clean up after make-up, 
like Vaseline).
In the three decades following gaige kaifang, the emphasis on production and 
work shifted to consumption and lifestyle, facilitated by the rising incomes of 
employees of foreign joint ventures (Croll 2006).
Croll (2006) identifi es three waves of consumption, each marked by income 
and retail trends, categories of available or desirable goods, and demand cycles 
stimulated by distinct government practices that shaped the meanings of consumer 
goods, particularly Western brands. These practices include policies that altered 
credit, taxes, the state provision of homes, education, and other social services 
(toward privatization), along with state-initiated or approved brand spectacles. 
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The fi rst wave of consumption, as detailed by Croll (2006), took place during 
the 1980s. China’s cheap and abundant labor supply drew foreign investment, 
further encouraged by government policies. Disposable income increased rapidly 
in the early years of reform, and because rent and utilities were still government 
supported, increased wages meant increased purchasing power. Consumer 
spending, previously dominated by food purchases, expanded to include non-food 
items. Durable goods were commonly purchased items during this period, including 
bicycles, color television sets, electric fans, cassette players, refrigerators, and 
washing machines. Spending on new food and clothing also increased during 
this period. Western brand producers were committed to heavily promoting their 
brands in China, prompted by the success of global brands in Hong Kong, Japan, 
Singapore, and Taiwan.
In the 1980s the economic reforms were followed by the introduction of Western 
brands, the emergence of retail sites, and awareness of fashion. The former image 
of the West as exploitative was “transformed into an image of a desired destination 
fostered by the new reform government’s bid to modernize and ‘catch up with 
the West’” (Croll 2006, 47). Croll’s (2006) ethnographic account recognizes the 
following brand-related developments. Leading foreign fashion designers set 
up shop in Beijing and Shanghai and included Pierre Cardin, Elizabeth Arden, 
Louis Vuitton, Christian Dior, and Gucci, as well as less expensive stores such as 
Giordano, Benetton, and Gap. Elle and Cosmopolitan fashion magazines introduced 
women to Estee Lauder and Christian Dior, and Avon and Mary Kay introduced 
health and beauty aids using direct marketing. Beijing’s Wangfujing was one of 
the fi rst of the country’s main shopping streets to be opened up to joint-venture 
retailers. The fi rst KFC opened in China in 1987 in Beijing. By the mid-1990s 
KFC had opened 21 more stores in China, six of them in Beijing; McDonald’s 
entered China in the early 1990s in Shenzhen; Hardrock Café opened in Bejing in 
1993. Western brands were supported by the growth in television programming, as 
the most widespread form of popular entertainment. Promotion of foreign brands 
was not only facilitated by television advertising but also by how-to programs on 
dressing fashionably, applying make-up, and displaying home furnishings. The 
advertising industry grew from 10 people in 1979 to 11,000 agencies employing 
128,000 employees in 1989.
As Croll (2006) reports, not all consumers during this fi rst wave of consumption 
were comfortable with displaying their Western brand acquisitions. This period 
was characterized both by policies to increase consumption and by movements to 
contain the new trends, such as the 1983–84 “Anti-spiritual pollution” campaign in 
support of the “habits of simplicity,” and the 1986–87 “anti-bourgeois” movement. 
These created concerns that a reversal of policy might shift values back toward 
those of the Cultural Revolution, when many consumer goods, particularly Western 
goods, were vilifi ed. By the end of the 1980s, the government was more directly 
promoting consumption and new policies aimed at encouraging spending. 
The second wave of consumption recognized by Croll (2006) ran from the 
early to the late 1990s, and is marked by Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Tour 
talks. These talks promoted the economic reforms and endorsed individuals’ 
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accumulation of wealth as providing a trickle-down service that would elevate 
living standards in China. The following October, the Fourteenth Party Congress 
pledged that the Party and government would build “a Chinese-style market 
economy by the end of the century” (Croll 2006, 31). As further chronicled by 
Croll (2006), disposable income continued to rise during this second wave of 
consumption and peaked between 1992 and 1995. The elevation in consumption 
and material possessions is evidenced in the saturation of consumer durables 
among urban households. In 1996, of every 100 urban households, 93 owned 
a colour television, 90 owned a washing machine, and 70 owned a refrigerator. 
During this wave, people began to purchase additional consumer goods, including 
telephones or mobile phones, air conditioners, video recorders (VCRs), hi-fi  units, 
and microwave ovens. New public spaces were devoted to the display of retail 
goods. By the mid-1990s Western brand retailers with storefronts included B&Q, 
Carrefour, Metro, WalMart, Printemps (a French retailer), and Yaohan (a Japanese 
department store).
Other government practices in the mid-1990s reported by Croll (2006) included 
tax cuts on house and car purchases, new mortgage lending opportunities, interest 
rate cuts, and the adoption of a fi ve-day working week, with week-long holidays 
intended to encourage shopping. These policies were intended to stimulate 
consumption by mitigating a diminishing propensity to consume, given that by the 
mid-1990s there were fewer customers for foreign brands. As Croll (2006) reports, 
it was “More common to save rather than to shop despite the government’s best 
efforts to encourage consumption” (p. 53). One such effort was the privatization 
of housing in the expectation that this would fuel domestic demand for consumer 
goods. 
At the same time, however, other economic reforms threatened jobs and pensions 
in the state sector and increased the cost of health insurance and education (Tsui 
et al 2004), leading to uncertainty which inspired saving rather than spending. Job 
insecurity was created by downsizing state-owned enterprises and government 
departments. Banks burdened with nonperforming loans made by noncompetitive 
state enterprises were threatened. In an effort to transform state enterprises into 
self-managing organizations responsible for their own profi ts and survival, in 
1998 Prime Minister Zhu Rongji introduced a three-year strategic plan guided 
by the principle of “grasping the big and letting go of the small” (Tsui et al 2004, 
110). This allowed larger state enterprises to reform and prosper, whereas smaller 
ones were to be sold or, if bankrupt, closed. Steps were also taken to reduce the 
operating costs of enterprises by cutting workers and subsidies provided for social 
services and welfare (Tsui et al 2004). These reforms meant laying off millions 
of workers and dismantling the guarantees of lifelong employment, pensions, 
and social benefi ts (Tsui et al 2004). While self-employment and employment in 
private enterprises increased, employment in urban state-owned and collective 
enterprises fell from 142.9 million to 86.5 million between 1991 and 2001 (Tsui 
et al 2004).
The effects of practices noted by Tsui and her colleagues (2004) correspond 
with Croll’s (2006) reports that decreased consumer spending ensued from higher 
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unemployment and the perceived uncertainty among the employed. The result, as 
reported by Croll (2006), was numerous closures of Western brand retail centers 
as consumers turned away from expensive Western luxury brands toward greater 
price sensitivity. By the mid-1990s, Chinese brands offering comparable quality at 
lower prices, such as Qingdao (beer), Forever (bicycles), and Legend (Computers), 
emerged to compete with Western brands (Croll 2006). In this environment, 
enthusiasm for Western lifestyles began to wane, reinforced by everyday concerns 
that there were few social venues for displaying conspicuous consumer goods for 
which people had paid considerable sums of money (Croll 2006). Insights into 
such concerns were offered by some of our professional-class participants who 
recalled their purchases from this period.
PARTICIPANT: The Avon perfume I bought is a 9g bottle, which cost over 50 
yuan. I bought it in college and I like it, but I haven’t found any chances 
to use it. 
INTERVIEWER: What do you mean by “no chances to use it?”
PARTICIPANT: There are too few people around. It’s just like my favorite clothes 
in my closet, like an evening dress, and I can never fi nd a chance to 
wear it. Working in a hospital, facing patients everyday, there is really no 
chance. So I just keep them. Only on occasions where image is important 
can I use them. 
(female interview participant, Tianjin)
It seems from this that the imagined identities promised by Western brand 
promotions are not readily realized by merely acquiring the products. 
The third wave of consumption identifi ed in Croll’s (2006) analysis bridges 
the century and continues today. Nation-state governing practices in this phase 
intended to stimulate and develop domestic consumer demand emerged to counter 
China’s growing dependence on exports and overseas markets. China’s export 
growth rates fell in 2001, following the recessions of the late 1990s in neighboring 
Southeast Asian economies. The economic decline in America following the 2001 
terrorist attack on 9/11 also prompted concerns about a global economic decline. 
In subsequent years, reports of overspending American, British, and Australian 
consumers also posed a threat to China, as goods exported to these consumers 
were the source of China’s economic growth. This threat emerged anew in the 
2008 recession, dubbed by some “the Greater Depression.” Developing China’s 
own markets is deemed a proactive step towards shoring up a worldwide decline 
in consumer demand. 
As further described by Croll (2006), governing practices during this third wave 
can also be seen at work promoting the size of China’s consumer market to the 
West, the promise of which was deemed to facilitate favorable terms in China’s 
negotiations to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO). The large market 
potential for Western brands and imported goods was emphasized by China’s 
Minister of Foreign Trade and China’s chief negotiator for entry into the WTO, 
Charlene Brockevsky, as well as in China’s business press targeting Westerners, 
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Business Beijing. These discourses would be expected to shape favorable meanings, 
even nationalistic meanings of consuming Western brands in China. 
Coexistent with the nation-state governing practices noted by Croll (2006) 
that promoted China’s market as a rising star and potential cash cow for Western 
brands, other governing practices emerged during the third wave which called 
public attention to national brands and their prospective success as global brands. 
Admission to the WTO in November 2001 required China to open its markets 
and reduce tariffs on imports and exports. Membership also propelled China’s 
formerly protected domestic markets into strong foreign competition. Most 
markets, however, remained local or regional. Notably, registered names typically 
begin with a city or province, such as Shanghai Baosteel, and Qingdao Haier 
(Tsui et al 2004). Tsui and her colleagues (2004) offer the example of the beer 
industry, where more than 600 independent rival breweries engage in cut-throat 
competition, resulting in rapid turnover of fi rms. This has led to a government-
backed initiative to consolidate these into national brands.
Augmenting these attempts to promote national brands through organizational 
change have been other government-backed initiatives. A highly visible initiative 
was the “Ten-Thousand Mile Brand Journey.” The story of this consumer spectacle, 
recounted by China brand scholar Yu Mingyang, holds that on 13 September 2005, 
Minister Bo Xilai visited Hangzhou announcing that China should plan domestic 
brand construction and further its brand-building efforts (Yu 2007). The Ministry 
of Commerce subsequently listed the Ten-Thousand Mile Brand Journey as one of 
the top 12 tasks of 2006. Planning continued at the 2006 National Conference of 
Commerce. According to the 2007 China Brand Report (Yu 2007), the Ministry of 
Commerce deemed the event important: 
This is a necessary choice for changing the format of trading growth. At the 
present less than 20% of enterprises in the import export industry have trade 
marks, domestic brands comprise less than 10% of total export revenue. 
In 2004, 249 of the top 500 world brands were American brands, 49.8%. 
Without brands as a leading force, we will always be at the lower end of the 
international division and will always be making sweat money based on labor 
. . . We would need to sell 800 million shirts to buy one A380 airplane. 
(Yu 2007)
In short, the brand journey was deemed necessary to change the “backward 
situation of branding in China” (Yu 2007). Beyond acting to celebrate national 
brands, the public event was designed to establish a brand ranking and evaluation 
system, a brand promotion system, and a brand protection system. The event’s 
promotional tagline was China’s “New Long March of Commerce, the Ten-
Thousand Mile Brand Journey.” The journey started in Beijing and traveled 
through key points in the east, middle, west and northeast of China, along with an 
international route that traversed Britain, the United States, France, and Germany. 
The journey highlighted developed brands, emerging brands, and the revival of 
time-honored brands in various industries, including computers, automobiles, 
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porcelain, apparel, pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, and heavy 
equipment, among others (Yu 2007). Notably, many of the featured brands were 
in product categories that were the new consumer goods in China at the turn of 
the century: computers, cars, home furnishings that accompanied the acquisitions 
of private housing, and travel and recreation (Croll 2006). The event did indeed 
draw international press, as Italian coverage featured it under headlines such as 
“Style China: A New Silk Road” (Yu 2007). As noted earlier, this parade of brands 
occurred in anticipation of the 2008 Olympic Games and its iconic torch relay, 
and mirrored the Olympic structure, where contenders are positioned as national 
brands in an arena of international competition. China’s new era of national brand 
promotions is distinct in many ways from those of the semi-colonial and Mao-era 
periods, and as we shall see draws from a new vision of the future China.
Pleas to national pride in creating national brands for global markets are also 
seen in scholars’ continued calls to the Chinese government to stimulate brand 
innovation. 
Chinese brands have begun directly competing with international brands on 
a larger scale. China’s GDP is now ranked 4th in the world, China’s foreign 
trade is ranked 3rd, and China’s foreign currency inventory is ranked 1st in the 
world. However, among the top 100 brands in the world, there is no Chinese 
brand. This demonstrates that China is a “big” economic country, but not a 
strong economic country. As China’s development is going to be strapped 
by the constraints of energy, resources, environment, and the labor force, the 
Chinese government and enterprises will have to seek opportunities through 
innovation and the added value of brands. As illustrated by the cases of “Te-
lun-su” [a premium dairy milk brand; literally “gold medal milk” in Mongolian 
language] and “Rong-wei” [a Shanghai based automobile brand], high end 
Chinese brands with independent intellectual copyright have debuted and will 
completely change the past situation where international brands take the high 
ends and Chinese brands stay at middle and low ends. Chinese brands will com-
pete more in the middle- to high-end markets. We have witnessed how Chinese 
cigarettes, wine and tea successfully entered the market once dominated by 
foreign cigarettes, foreign wine, and foreign tea. We have also seen the emer-
gence of Chinese appliances, computers, and cell phones under the strong sup-
pression of foreign brands. We are seeing more quantity and better quality and 
stable prices of the products of the Chinese colored TV, refrigerator, washing 
machine, computer, and cell phone. Moreover, in the year 2006, we are glad to 
know that Chinese cars and Chinese equipment manufacturers started to chal-
lenge those strong international brands . . . We have good reasons to believe, 
with the talented Chinese people, firm manufacturing base, and growing eco-
nomic strength, Chinese brands will ultimately become famous in the world.
(2007 China Brand Report, Yu 2007, 4)
The successful entrance of Telunsu’s milk into the high-end was considered to 
bring “morning twilight to the premiumization of Chinese brands” (Yu 2007, 2), 
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and Rong-wei’s entrance demonstrated a national ability to employ the world’s 
advanced technology to invent and create completely new Chinese global brands 
without external intervention.
The 2007 China Brand Report is itself something of a momentous event, being 
the first of its kind in China. It not only records the planning of the Ten Thousand 
Mile Brand Journey, but also documents and analyzes major events in China’s 
field of branding for the preceding year. Prepared by 19 researchers from top 
Chinese universities, the report was reviewed by a panel of 68 experts from vari-
ous universities, professional associations, and media firms. The work documents 
efforts and trends related to the success and growth of China’s national brands. Its 
scope is comprehensive, with several areas particularly germane to the study of 
Western brands as they inform brand meanings held by Chinese consumers. The 
report covers not only state-endorsed China brand spectacles, but also the growing 
success or obstacles to success of Chinese national brands, and incidents involv-
ing Western brand misconduct, organized under the chapter title of “Brand Crisis 
Incidents.” These incidents highlight the “double standards” of Western brands, 
whereby Chinese consumers are subjected to lower levels of customer service 
with respect to complaint resolution, inferior-quality goods to similarly labeled 
brands in Western countries, producers’ failure to recall unsafe brands in China, 
and high barriers for returns of branded goods once concerns for product safety 
are publicly reported.
Relevance of these past moments to present-day brand meanings
This brief historical sketch serves several purposes. First, it highlights the early 
origins of the concept of “famous brands” as residing in late imperial China, where 
“famous brands” emerged in rankings of quality in city markets. As we shall see, 
the notion of a “world famous brand” is a requisite status or attribute of goods that 
Chinese consumers deem to be Western.
Secondly, the history recognizes the long-standing commercial practice of 
brand pirating or counterfeiting in China that continues today, motivated by simi-
lar circumstances. Yet, as our analysis will disclose, brand pirating or the selling 
of counterfeit brands is not necessarily frowned upon by all Chinese consum-
ers, some of whom argue that such practices have societal value. The prevalence 
of brand pirating, however, does require special consumption practices geared 
toward discerning authentic world famous brands. Further, our analysis shows that 
“counterfeit” takes a second meaning in present-day China, where the sellers are 
legitimate Western brand producers but leverage from their “world famous” status 
to offer inferior products in China relative to similarly branded goods in Western 
countries. 
Third, by revealing the presence of branded goods in late imperial China, this 
history offers a challenge to notions that the West introduced branded goods into 
China, which constitutes a form of cultural invasion. This history enables an 
assertion of brands in China as a home-grown cultural innovation by 
organizations interested in advancing such a position. We also note that some 
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Chinese consumers’ lived experiences are more akin to the notion that brands 
were introduced from the West, leading them to recognize comparable practices 
in Chinese culture that had been naturalized, owing to the absence of competition 
and promotions among brands. More generally, this history lays the groundwork 
for demonstrating that meanings and motives of branded consumption arise out of 
particular reconstructed histories of the specific culture under study.
Finally, we see that city and regional brand names in the late imperial China 
were used to mark quality and attribute differences which could be discerned from 
the place-of-origin labels. This practice continues today (e.g. the beer industry) 
and has given rise to government initiatives to consolidate competing firms into 
national brands that compete with Western brands in the global market (Tsui et al 
2004). 
Beyond offering traces of brand meanings and consumption practices that 
still exist, Gerth’s (2003) work on semi-colonial China reveals that consumption 
choices were instrumental in nation-making. We extend this theory to the present-
day context of globalization, suggesting that nation-making in China continues 
with consumers shaping the meanings of Western brands through various recon-
structions of the past to realize their preferred visions of the future (Belk 1992; 
Friedman 1992b; Wilk 1994). Whereas nation-states strive toward the ideal of 
the assimilation of its citizens into a common social project, with globalization 
they are besieged by the fragmentation of their former unity (Friedman 1997; 
Wilk 1994). Such fragmentation emerges from various groups asserting compet-
ing notions of social identity, which are constructed and legitimized by attrib-
uting a meaningful past to a structured present (Friedman 1992a, 1997). These 
researchers deconstruct collective identities not to falsify their genuineness, which 
as Friedman (1996) argues would be absurd, cynical, and patronizing, as all iden-
tity is constructed and authenticity resides in its experienced relevance; rather, the 
goal of deconstruction is to reveal the structures that perpetuate the existence of 
the social groups and contexts that motivate acts of identification. Our findings 
suggest that China’s 20th-century history prior to market reforms carries forward 
a common thread of experience and ways of interpreting the world that become 
relevant in assertions of national identity (Friedman 1996).
The active role of China’s governing bodies in shaping brand meanings is 
apparent in Croll’s (2006) report on the history of China’s economic reform. We 
add to the repertoire of governing practices noted by Croll that of government-
supported or -initiated brand spectacles. The case of the Ten Thousand Mile Brand 
Journey reveals a contrast with China’s semi-colonial past. Present-day national 
brand spectacles do not overtly vilify the consumption of Western brands, but 
nonetheless hold up China’s national brands as a source of cultural pride that citi-
zens can share in and support through their consumption choices. This suggests 
that nationalism asserted by rejecting Western brands in favor of national brands 
need not follow from China’s Mao-era planned economy. Rather, new governing 
administrations offer new consumption ideologies tied to nation-making that are 
consistent with participation in a market economy.
4 Foreign brands in China as 
global brands from the 
imagined West
A low threshold for dreams, easy access to sufficient goods to reach that threshold 
and a belief in objective limits, difficult or impossible to negotiate, to “genuine” 
needs and “realistic” desires; these are the most fearsome adversaries of the con-
sumer-oriented society.
(Bauman 2007, 46)
Perpetual desire satisfied by consumer goods is held to be the driver of a con-
sumer-oriented society, in contrast to a production society oriented toward securing 
basic needs. Given this, the elicitation of Chinese consumers’ dreams of Western 
brands figured prominently in our research design. We found ample evidence that 
Chinese consumers’ dreams of Western brands are at a high threshold that exceeds 
basic needs, and often realistic desires. Indeed, it would seem that the financial 
challenge of acquiring Western brands because of their high prices is one of their 
distinguishing features. Chinese university students group together the fantasized 
acquisition of endless access to Coke and KFC as well as of Mercedes or BMWs, 
suggesting that what is out of reach and perpetuates desire spans a broad spectrum 
of Western brand product categories. 
In this chapter, after describing our data collection sites and methods of elicit-
ing dreams of Western brands, we report our initial findings. We reveal “Western 
brands” to be a meaningful category of consumption to Chinese consumers. In 
particular we show how the inclusion of branded goods within this category of 
consumption is discerned by a set of defining characteristics: 1) attributes that 
convey “Western otherness;” 2) international fame; 3) guaranteed quality; 4) 
technologically advanced designs or production; and 5) highly priced relative to 
domestic brands. This understanding allowed us to progress to another layer of 
understanding, whereby Chinese consumers imbue Western brands with mean-
ings by embedding them in historical national narratives of East–West relations. 
Then, drawing from these meanings, they respond to Western brands in different 
ways to realize preferred imaginings of the future China. These deeper layers of 
understanding are elaborated in Chapter Five.
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Overview of research method
In commenting on Western nations or their brands, Chinese individuals’ convey-
ance of praise, affinity, or relational harmony may or may not be taken at face 
value, depending on the context. In China, indirect forms of communication, such 
as the use of metaphors, historical allegory, and discourses where the surface read-
ing is contradicted by the interpretive meaning, are the cultural norm for express-
ing criticism (Gries 2004). In Chinese terms, one must “listen to the sound of the 
gong” (luo gu ting yin), to discern whether it is rejoicing (announcing a marriage) 
or mourning (tolling a death) (Gries 2004, 9). Owing to a long history in which 
indirect language was employed as a symbol of education and class, Western-style 
direct criticism is considered by many Chinese to be vulgar (Gries 2004). This 
aspect of culture guided our research design, which combined projective tech-
niques with methods of direct inquiry.
Our interpretive analysis draws from various data forms collected over six 
months, with three months spent on-site in China. We began our analytic process 
by identifying consumers’ nuanced terminology to refer to foreign brands (wai-
guo-pin-pai) in initial preliminary interviews. We also obtained a general idea of 
their perceptions of these brands, including their affordability. We used this to aid in 
the formation of our research questions and the development of a survey question-
naire. Next, we elicited meanings of foreign brands from university students via a 
projective survey instrument. The survey, with projective tasks, was administered 
to over 200 students to permit the identification of recurring themes. It also seemed 
useful in eliciting the varied content of foreign brand meanings, given that students 
comprise a life period of “emerging adulthood,” characterized by a self-focused 
exploration of possible identities, which can be enacted with foreign brands (Arnett 
2002, 777). Further, with a sample of fourth-generation PRC youth, all socialized 
during Deng’s reforms, we were able to examine whether foreign brand meanings 
draw from historical contexts that pre-date consumers’ lives (Gerth 2003, 2008). 
We could also assess whether cultural history, if used to imbue foreign brands with 
meaning, possesses a plurality of meanings even among same age cohorts, leading 
to varied views of the identity meanings attached to foreign brands. 
We then augmented our analysis of survey data with an analysis of interview 
data obtained from working professionals who could afford more brands. We 
conducted these 25 Chinese-language interviews in multiple cities, and in par-
ticipants’ homes or in restaurants. All but two of these participants belong to the 
third-generation PRC, born in the 1960s and 1970s, but varied on gender and 
income level. They were asked to share their knowledge of foreign brands and 
translation practices. They were then asked to tell a story of both a favorite and a 
disliked foreign brand, though subsequently their stories incorporated their views 
of how the reform changed China’s consumer offerings, remembrances of cultural 
events which prompted reactions to Western brands, and changes in personal atti-
tudes toward Western brands over time.
We tacked back and forth between the data and the literature on Chinese cultural 
studies and political science which review China’s relationships with Western 
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nations from the Chinese perspective. Our consulted works include a host of 
Chinese popular press and scholarly reports on brands. Translated passages from 
these which appear throughout the book are our own. Immersion in this litera-
ture assisted us in recognizing many of the recurring themes in our data as being 
linked to national narratives of East–West relations. Our Chinese participants used 
these national narratives to imbue foreign brands with national identity mean-
ings. Following our identification of narrative themes from the collective texts, 
we return to the interview data, where we present a case-oriented analysis that 
offers evidence of the relevance of these narratives to Chinese consumers’ lives 
(Friedman 1996). 
Data collection sites
The cities from which we drew our participants vary on factors likely to influence 
local meanings of Western brands: population, status as a municipality, location, 
and degree of urbanization as a characteristic related to Western culture exposure 
(Wang 2008). Beijing, with a population of 12.8 million, hosts a variety of interna-
tional commercial activities, yet is also a municipality where the nation’s military 
headquarters are located. Tianjin is an industrial (cargo) ocean port city of 10 mil-
lion people and home to nearly 10,000 foreign firms. Shanghai is China’s largest 
port city with 14 million inhabitants and, comparable to Tianjin, has a high level 
of exposure to Western culture. Baoding, a rural industrial city of approximately 
553,000, has had the least exposure to Western culture of the four. Considered 
Beijing’s southern gate, Baoding hosts military forces deemed important to pro-
tecting the capital city. The cities where we conducted our fieldwork also varied, 
and include first-tier cities, Beijing and Shanghai, where most “Western watch-
ers” place their emphasis, a city from the second tier, Tianjin, and a third-tier city, 
Baoding, defined as sizable and relatively affluent (Wang 2008, 3). 
Our data collection methods
We distributed a self-administered Chinese-language survey containing a series of 
thought generation tasks to students of Chinese universities (n = 280 of 285 distrib-
uted): 100 from Beijing, 66 from Tianjin, 25 from Shanghai, and 89 from Baoding. 
Sentence completion items were used to elicit meanings of foreign brands and 
were presented as the initial task in the survey. The first of these items asked for 
responses to the statement stem “I think ‘foreign brands’ mean . . .” Participants 
could choose any or all of the following responses: “made abroad, imported to 
China,” “originated from abroad, made in China,” “product of independent foreign 
business in China,” “product of joint ventures of foreign businesses in China,” and 
“other.” A subsequent question asked participants to provide examples of foreign 
brands. The next nine statement stems were adapted from projective survey items 
used by Mick and Fournier (1998) in their US study of technological goods. These 
modified items appeared in the following order: 
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1. Foreign brands always . . . 
2. A good foreign brand should . . .
3. Foreign brands never . . .
4. The more foreign brands I have . . .
5. The biggest advantage of foreign brands is . . .
6. The greatest weakness of foreign brands is . . .
7. When I bought my (foreign brand product), I never realized. . . .
8. If I lost my foreign brand item, the worst thing is . . .
9. If all foreign brands disappeared from China, I would . . .
Six additional sentence-completion items elicited examples of “good” and “poor,” 
“best” and “worst” translated brand names, and what about the translated name 
renders it the “best” or “worst.” 
Following these tasks, participants were asked to complete a dream elicitation 
task. Specifically, participants were asked to “Please imagine you or your friend 
had a dream about foreign brands when sleeping” and to describe the dream, which 
could be either good or bad. Beyond these simple instructions, the participants 
received no other specific guidance. We realize that in other works employing pro-
jective techniques, like those of Rook (1985, 260), participants have been asked to 
“write creative and imaginatively complete stories.” We did not ask for creative or 
imaginative writing, but simply asked for a positive or negative dream. Even so, 
the elicited dreams appear amazingly creative. We speculate that the richness of the 
dream data is due to several factors. First, at the time of data collection, only about 
30 percent of China’s high school graduates were eligible to attend university, and 
these are chosen on their academic performance. Thus, relative to the general popu-
lation they are highly articulate. Second, the metaphorical use of language, as an 
indirect form of discourse, has been culturally instantiated and pervasive in every-
day life, which probably renders participants creative in this domain. Third, the 
language itself, with characters being pictorial and with each sound possessing a 
meaning, would seem to engage the practice of visualization, relative to the English 
language where individual syllabic sounds often have no meaning. And finally, 
China arguably has been influenced by modernism’s rationalist orientation over a 
shorter period of time and to a lesser degree, perhaps with the result that there has 
been greater exposure to and practice with imaginative thinking and writing.
The questionnaire was drafted in English, and following refinements suggested 
by members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, was translated 
into Chinese. Additional Academy members provided feedback on the Chinese-
language version, until all items were deemed appropriate. 
The transcribed Chinese-language textual data were translated into 205 sin-
gle-spaced pages of English. The survey data contain references to 102 different 
foreign brands, largely from product categories for which foreign brand ads are 
prominent: soft drinks, fast food, electronics, and health and beauty aids (Belk and 
Zhou 2001; Wang 2000). These categories represent “highly symbolic and richly 
connotative product classes” (Mick and Buhl 1992, 320). The dream elicitation 
task produced 247 consumption fantasies.
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Responses to selected sentence-completion items, along with the questions 
regarding what counts as a foreign brand and participants’ examples of foreign 
brands, were used to identify what constitutes a meaningful consumption cate-
gory to Chinese consumers. In responding to statements such as “Foreign brands 
always . . .” “Foreign brands never . . .” “The biggest advantage of foreign brands 
is . . .” and “The greatest weakness of foreign brands is . . .,” participants revealed 
how they distinguish foreign brands from China-made brands, also referred to as 
national or domestic brands. We highlight these findings in this chapter. Other 
sentence-completion items, along with the data from the projective dream task, 
aided our understanding of how brand meanings emerge from linkages to local 
history, and how consumers selectively engage historical moments to enliven their 
Western brand fantasies. These themes are the focus of subsequent chapters. 
After gathering this survey data, we also conducted personal interviews with 25 
Chinese consumers who had graduated from Chinese universities and held mainly 
professional positions. Following initial requests to discuss a recent incident that 
the participant experienced involving a foreign brand, the interviews flowed much 
like a conversation. In our presentations of these, we use pseudonyms to refer to 
our participants.
Foreign brands as Western brands with distinguishing 
characteristics 
From our Chinese participants’ perspective, “foreign” included imported prod-
ucts, products produced in China by a foreign company, and products of joint 
ventures between foreign and Chinese companies. In a sense, brands that were 
not purely Chinese in terms of their conception, labor, and ownership of related 
patents, trademarks, and production facilities were deemed “foreign.” This find-
ing is reminiscent of views during China’s semi-colonial era, in which “foreign” 
was marked by not being purely China-made (Gerth 2003).
The meaningful category of branded consumption to Chinese consumers was 
not, however, merely anything that was not purely Chinese. Five characteristics 
were perceived as constitutive of the meaning of foreign brands: 1) “Western 
otherness,” as conveyed by perceived country of origin and through translation 
practices; 2) international popularity or fame; 3) guaranteed quality; 4) techno-
logically advanced design or production; and 5) a high price. 
Western otherness 
Foreign brands were considered only those with perceived ties to developed 
countries of the West. These included the United States (e.g., Nike, Coca Cola, 
Pepsi, McDonald’s) and Western European countries, including Germany, France, 
Italy, and Finland (e.g., Mercedes Benz, Christian Dior, Pierre Cardin, and Nokia, 
respectively), but also brands from Japan, as a country through which China has 
learned about the West and one which was participating in the global economy 
before China (Gries 2004). 
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Among our Chinese participants, designations of “Western otherness” depended 
less on an attempt to discern the product’s country of origin and more on whether 
the brand name translation reveals deviations from norms of Chinese language 
and culture. A few illustrations of traditional Chinese brand names may help to 
appreciate some aspects of brand name construction, such as names that convey 
product meaning. For Feige bikes, fei means flying while ge means dove, ren-
dering a meaning that the bike flies as fast as a dove. Hudie (butterfly) sewing 
machine conveys both the transformational process and the ease or lightness of 
sewing. For Hongxing radio, hong means read and xing means star, and reflects an 
early norm for many technological goods to bear names tied to nationalism. 
We identified three forms of Western brand name translation into Chinese that 
reflect deviations from Chinese cultural language norms and thus reflect their for-
eignness. First are cultural deviations suggested by brand names that do not sound 
Chinese, such as Mo-tuo-luo-la, or Motorola in English. Second, brand names 
that do not possess a product-relevant meaning are interpreted as foreign. For 
example, Ka-fu, or Kraft in English, where the Chinese translation literally means 
“choke husband,” forces people to view it as foreign. As other examples, Hao-shi, 
the translation Hershey, means “good times,” and Wan-bao-lu, the Chinese brand 
name for Marlboro, means “road of ten-thousand treasures.” Third, brand names 
that violate norms of character combinations are interpreted as foreign. That is, 
the meaning unit ts’u or ci in modern pinyin, which may be comprised of mul-
tiple words, reflects an atypical combination of words. In illustration, Gu-te-yi or 
Goodyear, means “solid, special, different.” All three characters in Chinese have a 
fourth tone (all falling). This sound combination is very awkward and thus is read 
as foreign. Qian-bi, the Chinese brand name for Clinique, has components qian, 
which means “pretty,” and bi meaning “green jade.” The meaning is somewhat 
relevant to the greenish packaging of Clinique, but the sound is awkward. Both 
characters “Qian-bi” have the fourth tone in Chinese, which breaks the norm of 
Chinese character combinations.
Not all brand names that exhibited these deviations were viewed as Western. 
For example, some translated brand names convey a lack of knowledge of Chinese 
language and culture which suggests foreignness. Yet, the clumsiness of their pre-
sentation detracts from their credibility as a famous global brand, with the quality 
and backing to gain access to China’s market. The lack of sophistication exhibited 
in their brand name translation rendered these outside the category which Chinese 
consumers considered Western. 
I once bought a loaf of bread, which was covered with foreign letters. When 
I looked closer, it was all Chinese pinyin [a system of Romanization used for 
transcription of Chinese names and terms]. It was so ridiculous – a big bread 
called “Chocolate pie.” These kinds of names are not so much disgusting as 
they are ridiculous. They make you want to laugh at them.
(25 year old male interviewee, Tianjin)
Whether the products are good or bad, high- or low-quality, with good or bad 
packaging, there is absolutely an acceptance issue. For example, crackers, 
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why would you want to call them “ke li jia”? I didn’t even know what it 
meant! I thought what the heck am I buying? 
(39 year old male interviewee, Baoding)
Participants’ comments contextualize Zhang’s and Schmitt’s (2001) finding that 
translating a foreign brand name to be semantically meaningful enhances its effec-
tiveness. The latter quote suggests that (high) quality and (elaborate) packaging 
combine with cues provided by the brand name to convey Western-ness, as we 
elaborate later. 
Also outside the category of Western brands were some with translations pos-
sessing such a strong Chinese cultural orientation that they were not recognized as 
foreign. To illustrate, the brand Pantene was excluded from participants’ discus-
sion of “foreign brands.” When questioned about specific Western brands, one 
Beijing participant elaborated: “I knew Lux is an American brand, but I didn’t 
know Pantene is one too. Pan-ting is a very traditional original Chinese girl’s 
name, and the first celebrity who appeared in the Pantene commercial was the 
movie star Ms Pan Hong. So I thought the Pantene brand was her brand.” Brand 
names successfully localized so that they do not convey foreign-ness or Western 
otherness forgo any presumed positive associations with Western brands or abili-
ties to trade on their exoticism.
Some brand names, however, were translated to capture nuances of the Chinese 
language and culture, exhibiting both cultural sensitivity and sophistication while 
still designating the goods as foreign. In some instances this was effected with a 
Chinese-language sound but a character meaning tied to foreign-ness. 
Ken-de-ji (KFC). I think this name is well made. Ken-de-ji, how should I put 
it. It’s not that much like a Chinese name . . . Ji-rou [chicken meat] seems to 
be used in China. 
(24 year old female interviewee, Beijing)
Here, the foreign brand is translated to maintain a sound corresponding with the 
original (“Ken-de” for Kentucky is meaningful even though the Chinese name is 
“ken-ta-ji”). Literally translated, the brand means “willing virtue chicken.” Ken 
is also the same sound as the verb “gnaw” or “nibble,” which could help visualize 
the way people eat chicken wings. “Ji” means chicken, which adheres to the cul-
tural practice of conveying product meaning. The “de” component in the middle 
of “nibble . . . chicken” just does not make sense in Chinese. If it were changed 
to “ken-ji-dian” (nibble chicken store) it might sound more like a Chinese name. 
Thus, the KFC brand name in China is obviously foreign as the character combi-
nation is unconventional. 
As another example following this pattern, Yu-lan-you (Oil of Ulan in Asia in 
the 1980s, later Oil of Olay) means “oil of orchid flower.” The orchid flower has 
long been used in China to symbolize pure and pretty girls, as it is known for its 
tenderness. The flower is a symbol of innocence and youth. Thus the translation of 
the Western brand name possesses points of compatibility with Chinese culture. 
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As one of our Baoding participants succinctly put it, Yu-lan-you means “fresh, 
elegant, and tells it all.” Telling it all includes giving away its foreign origins. The 
translation maintains an element of the foreign. Yulan is a popular name for girls, 
but the combination of “yulan you” (oil of yulan) is not often used. So a bit of 
Chinese flavor in a slightly strange combination implies a foreign brand designed 
for Chinese consumers.
Safeguard has similarly been translated into Chinese to imply it is a foreign 
brand with local sensitivity: its Chinese brand name “Shu-fu-jai” means “com-
fort skin nicely.” The name conveys the attributes of the product, consistent with 
norms of Chinese language. As expressed by one of our Baoding participants, “it 
explains the features and usage of the product, and has some Chinese flavor in it.” 
Yet, as this participant recognizes, there is an atypical combination of characters. 
The combination of three characters ending with an adverb is not often used in 
traditional Chinese brand names. 
As a final illustration, BMW uses the brand name “Bao-ma” in China, which 
translates as “precious horse.” Many Chinese use “precious horse” as a metaphor 
for vehicles because precious horses have been known to run reliably fast for a 
long time. The choice of word definitely reflects a Chinese orientation, but using 
this word for a brand name is new in China, thus it is obviously a foreign brand. 
As another Baoding participant commented, the brand name “integrates the notion 
of modern transportation with Chinese traditional means of transportation.” While 
leveraging from China’s cultural system in its recognition of a popular metaphor, 
Bao-ma nonetheless is obviously foreign because Chinese brands in the same cat-
egory, such as Hongqi (Red flag) and Dongfeng (Eastern wind), usually bear some 
mark conveying their domestic origins or political alignments, following prec-
edents set during the Cultural Revolution. 
From some Chinese consumers’ perspectives, to be considered a well-made 
Western brand name, the connoted foreign-ness need not accurately convey the 
brand’s country of origin.
I think the brand name Bi-sa-bing (Pizza Hut) is made very well. . . . Pizza 
reminds people of the Leaning Tower of Pisa in Italy. Just by seeing the brand 
name you can tell its country of origin which reminds you of its cultural legacy. 
(38 year old female interviewee, Beijing)
Further, some suggested that a stronger western-oriented brand name translation 
seemed appropriate for hi-tech products to reinforce their origin in the West, as a 
place that many deemed produced technologically superior goods.
For daily use products, their names should make you feel nice and genial, and 
they should be in line with the liking of Chinese people. But for some hi-tech 
products, including some electronic products, they should have some meanings 
of hi-tech. Though not absolutely everything, but high tech products such as 
electronics will be better if they are translated with more Western style. 
(38 year old female interviewee, Baoding)
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Brand names aid the designation of Western brands but are not as defining as 
are attributes of international fame, guaranteed quality, technological advance-
ment, and relatively high price. This reflects local experience of encountering a 
proliferation of domestic goods branded to convey Western-ness and capitalize 
on presumed positive associations. Responses to translated brand names reflect 
a practice that Gerth (2008, 41) labels “nationalistic visuality, centered on train-
ing the eye to identify visual clues and to distinguish between the foreign and the 
domestic across social life.” As our analysis in subsequent chapters points out, 
motivations for making such distinctions are varied among Chinese consumers 
and directed toward buying Western brands, buying national brands, or making 
comparisons and contrasts between the two in assessments of China’s progress in 
developing globally competitive brands.
International fame 
Participants suggested that foreign brands should be referred to as “famous foreign 
brands:” “Foreign brands? I think you should call them ‘famous foreign brands’ 
because they have to be famous before they can enter China.” In the sentence-
completion task, stems such as “Foreign brands always . . .” included responses 
such as “establish reputation all over the world,” and “[possess] huge fame.” These 
types of response dominated the elicited data.
 Foreign brands always . . .
• are very famous,
• have high reputation,
• are quite popular, or 
• have outstanding brand image.
 The biggest advantage of foreign brands is . . .
• the brand is internationalized,
• they are famous, or
• [they are] well-known.
The “fame” of foreign brands is also noted in the dream data. In the following 
dream, fame is conveyed by a Western brand that arrives as a celebrity at an event 
attended by Hollywood actors and actresses.
A fine horse wearing a Versace black lace nightgown appeared on the starlit 
runway of the Oscar ceremony, and flew into the seated audience. Riding on 
the back of the horse is the immortal young and handsome Versace. Under 
the bright starlight, wearing striped casual clothing designed by himself, he 
waves his hand to the people who stand up and salute to him – he is the great 
master, great master forever. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Baoding)
The fame required for products to be deemed Western brands is conveyed by other 
dreams in which the Western brand is proudly displayed by a celebrity endorser, or 
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dreams in which wearing the brand renders the Chinese consumer a global celeb-
rity. Along with celebrity endorsement, Chinese consumers considered famous 
foreign brands to be only those with strong promotional backing from their pro-
ducers, manifested by attention to advertising and packaging.
 Foreign brands always . . .
• have fi ne and novel packaging, well produced advertisements, and good 
brand reputation,
• emphasize the brand’s promotion and occupation of the international 
markets,
• have good packaging,
• have pretty packages, or
• have lots of ads and know about packaging.
 Foreign brands never . . .
• neglect promotion of its image and products,
• forget to advertise,
• are too frugal to advertise,
• casually spoil their image, or
• are ugly.
With the introduction of Western brands beginning with the economic reforms of 
Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, Chinese consumers were exposed to packaging 
practices that differed from what had been common in China. Similar to the per-
spective Wang (2008) noted for Chinese advertisements in early years following 
reform, packaging practice in China was consistent with values emphasizing sub-
stance and honesty. Consistent with this, many Chinese would rather have a good 
and valuable product with simple packaging than an ordinary product in elaborate 
packaging. Heightened attention to the “look” or “appeal” of the package was 
somewhat novel at the beginning of the reform, leading Chinese consumers to 
distinguish Western brands according to style of packaging. Whereas almost all 
respondents noted the attention to packaging exhibited by Western brands, opin-
ions varied, reflecting differing levels of receptivity to such practices, or to the 
modernity that they represent.
Guaranteed quality 
A prevailing theme that distinguished Western brands in the minds of Chinese 
consumers was an attribute commonly referred to as “guaranteed quality.” Quality 
here refers to the durability and reliability of manufactured products and a perfor-
mance consistent with promotional promises and consumers’ expectations. It also 
refers to the presence of after-sales processes for resolving complaints. 
Perhaps this finding is not surprising, given that reports of product quality issues 
with China-made goods also appear in the Western press. As noted by China schol-
ars led by Tsui (Tsui et al 2004) and Croll (2006), China’s industrial revolution 
occurred concurrently with its consumer revolution. The Western popular press 
Foreign brands as global brands from the imagined West  61
often highlights quality shortcomings in manufacturing, rather than recognizing 
the tremendous progress of a nation whose industrial revolution took off at the 
same time as economic reforms. More appropriate would be to recognize that 
much of China’s manufacturing sector has evolved in the relatively short period of 
a few decades since the reform. 
Perhaps more novel to Western readers is that, from Chinese consumers’ per-
spective, after-sales processes for resolving complaints were deemed to distin-
guish Western brands from domestic ones.
Foreign brands have very good reputation. If you say it’s not good, it’s not 
good, and they will give you a refund without even checking. Therefore I feel 
comfortable buying foreign brands. Of course generally there aren’t prob-
lems like this. Another thing is the brand. My parents’ TV is a Toshiba brand, 
bought a long time ago. It’s been 20 years. But until today it’s still very clear. 
But the same product, when we got married in 1988 we bought a Chinese 
brand, [Chinese brand name] which we threw away in 1998. Why? It turned 
green, didn’t work no matter how we adjusted it. We asked people to repair 
it for us, they said that the color contrast was bad, so its quality was not up 
to standard. Therefore, although more expensive, we should buy brands of 
better quality. Without quality guarantee, they would not dare to come to 
China without quality. They [Western brands] wouldn’t make enough money 
because there would be few repeat customers. It wouldn’t work. Plus tariffs, 
the prices will be more expensive.
(38 year old female interview participant, Baoding) 
Drawing on local knowledge of quality control measures demanded of exports in 
post-reform China and “survival-of-the-fittest” notions of capitalism, the partici-
pant quoted above, like others, insisted that Western brands must be higher quality 
than domestic brands if they have gained access to China’s market. From their 
perspective, owing to China’s protectionist history very few domestic brands are 
global, and so do not possess the same quality standards of the international mar-
ket. Branded products must possess quality in order to survive in the global mar-
ketplace. The presumed quality of Western brands was expressed in other ways.
[The more foreign brand products I have], it will help improve my quality 
of life, because their products usually work pretty well. [Dream] Within one 
night I own many super famous foreign brand products. 
(22 year old female survey participant, Tianjin)
The more foreign brand products I have the more peace of mind I have when 
using them. 
(22 year old male survey participant, Shanghai)
Guaranteed quality as a distinguishing feature of Western brands was expressed in 
various ways in the sentence-completion tasks. 
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 Foreign brands always: 
• appear to have guaranteed quality,
• have good quality,
• have stable quality,
• have quality that is truly reliable,
• have post sale service, or
• have good credibility.
 The biggest advantage of foreign brands is: 
• good quality,
• fi rst class quality,
• they are durable and don’t break easily,
• good reputation, or
• good service.
 Foreign brands never: 
• have worse quality than local sellers,
• are made rough and poorly,
• make fake products,
• are disappointing,
• ignore customers’ complaints,
• cheat consumers,
• trick consumers,
• deceive consumers,
• have quality problems, or
• neglect applying for copyright.
To elaborate the latter response, cases of copyright and trademark infringement 
brought by Western brand producers against producers of counterfeit brands in 
China have received considerable coverage in international news. Resolving these 
concerns was central to international discourses on China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization. The response that “Foreign brands never . . . neglect applying 
for copyright” reflects our Chinese participants’ awareness that Western brand 
producers use the brand name to identify the consistent and reliable quality they 
attempt to provide, and thus attempt to protect it. Yet, as noted previously, because 
copycat brands with similar but slightly altered names continue to exist, Chinese 
consumers learn to attend to nuances of the visual presentation of brands to distin-
guish Western from domestic (Gerth 2003). Data from our projective task reveal 
the use of quality to discern Western brand status. 
[The more foreign brand products I have] the less time I spend on dealing 
with defective products. [Dream] I just bought a West Data hard disk with 
40GB but when I took it home it didn’t work. This cannot be possible. It is a 
Xishu hard disk (Chinese name for West Data). The quality shouldn’t be that 
bad. I took it to be repaired, and the shop was able to fix it. How weird, it 
stopped working again when I got back home. Heavens, I almost went crazy. 
What kind of hard disk is this that the quality is so bad. Therefore, I took it 
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to be repaired again, but the people at the reception desk said that it had 
exceeded the warranty period. I had bought it only four days before. “Isn’t 
the warranty period three months?” Thus, he pointed me to the warranty 
label, I was stunned after looking at it. It was clearly written “three days.” 
“Not possible, Xishu also rips people off?” [The receptionist replied] “What 
Xishu [West Data], we are Xibu-riqi [West Date].” I looked at their company 
name “West Date” and looked at the label of my hard disk. It was also West 
Date. I immediately felt sick, blacked out and vomited several liters of blood. 
Heavens, why I am always the one to be hurt?
(22 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
Although the data suggest that most of our participants associated Western 
brands with the offering of after-sales service or processes for addressing com-
plaints, there was not total agreement that such services were unproblematic. 
Some reported that the greatest weakness of Western brands was “inconvenient 
repair,” “hard to repair if they break,” “post sale service is quite complicated,” or 
“when imported from abroad the instructions are not very clear and are hard to 
understand.” Whereas Western consumers are accustomed to the idea of replac-
ing durable goods after a number of years of use, the Chinese consumers’ need 
for after-sales service may have been the result of past consumption experiences 
with less durable domestic brands and the tradition of frugal lifestyle encouraged 
by governments until the 1990s. Consumers’ experiences with after-sales service 
suggest too that their usage experiences also involve Western brands that are not 
durable and reliable. It may be that the use of guaranteed quality to define and 
recognize Western brands contributes to dissatisfaction, by elevating expectations 
beyond what some Western brands deliver. We address this theme in Chapter Six. 
Technologically advanced 
Most participants deemed Western brands modern and technologically advanced 
relative to domestic counterparts. The interview data reveal that “technologically 
advanced” resides more specifically in offerings of greater safety, durability, and 
comfort, along with enhanced performance and lack of undesirable attributes. 
There is some overlap here with the feature of quality. Yet, beyond functioning 
reliably, our Chinese participants commented on the “research,” or “scientific 
processes” that rendered Western brands capable of different, new, or enhanced 
functions or performance outcomes relative to domestic brands. Western brand 
electronic equipment such as razors, audio recorders, remote control televisions, 
and air conditioners were commonly mentioned as being more modern and 
technologically advanced. Participants also reported that Western brand health 
and beauty aids, fast food, and sports equipment were all technologically 
advanced. In addition to responses such as “Foreign brands always . . . ‘have trendy 
designs’” or “Foreign brands never . . . ‘become outdated,’” were ones such as 
the following.
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 The biggest advantage of foreign brands is: 
• they are advanced,
• they are more trendy,
• create the new from the old with rich imagination,
• [they offer] new design, high technological element, and good exterior 
appearance, or
• [they] fi t the market; [they] are compatible with the trend.
For some Chinese participants, Western brands were deemed to function bet-
ter because of the advanced technology used in their design and construction. 
Consider the following stories told by some of the people we interviewed. 
[A domestic brand] it’s been on the market for a pretty short time, and it’s 
not as good as the other ones. Truthfully, I think many things are this way: 
although made with the same materials and all made in China, I think the 
others’ [foreign] quality and workmanship is better than the domestic ones. 
Really. Including electronics, I think foreign ones are better than domestic 
ones. Put foreign ones aside, even the joint ventured products are better than 
the Chinese products. For example, my family’s air conditioner, it’s very obvi-
ous. The one in my parents’ room is Sanyo, a joint venture. Its remote control 
is finely made, even the corners and edges are very well made, and its buttons 
felt very nice. The one in my room is [a domestic brand]. You look at the plastic 
buttons on the remote control, oh my gosh, they are terribly rough. The same 
with TVs. The TV in my parents’ home is a foreign brand. Wherever you point 
the remote control, you can “remotely control” the TV. You just look, good TV 
brands are all absolutely the same, including Panasonic, Toshiba, etc. You’ll 
know it as soon as you try it once. But my family’s [domestic brand] TV, if you 
don’t point to the reception spot, you can never expect to switch channels. 
Therefore it’s not that I look down on Chinese people, but you have no way to 
support (national industry) even if you want to. You (Chinese brands) are so 
much behind the others (foreign brands). Take the example of remote control, 
the others (foreign brands) can remote control anywhere and everywhere, and 
you can only point to that spot. 
(24 year old interview participant, Beijing)
My younger brother once used a shaving razor, domestically made, [domestic 
brand name]. As soon as he brought it home he found that it leaked elec-
tricity when charging, but he just got by with it for six months. Now he is 
using Philips. It’s very good. After using it for so long, it’s still very quiet. The 
domestic brands are very noisy. Take the audio recorder I bought some time 
ago for example. I’ve used a few Chinese brands, and found that the quality 
is unbearable. The difference (of Chinese and foreign brands) is very big. The 
domestic products don’t usually last very long, either they’re broken, or the 
sound becomes too noisy. I’m very angry about it, but I have no choice. Truly, 
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you can’t compliment on the domestic products. Whenever you buy them, you 
end up getting upset.
(26 year old female interview participant, Tianjin)
The perceived technological advantage of Western brands resided not only with 
electronic goods. Western brand cosmetics and beauty aids were recognized as 
based on modern science and made with chemicals and manufactured scents. 
Participants contrasted these with products of traditional Chinese medicine and 
remedies. Our participants reported that prior to the entry of Western brands, prod-
ucts were “very natural, we never heard of anything chemical or had the fear of 
being hurt.” These participants reported pre-reform practices using natural rem-
edies for enhancing the skin, such as eating almonds, drinking soup of pigs’ feet 
or chicken claws, using eggplant and lemon, or washing with milk. Those for 
hair care included washing with honey and tea, or with cooking vinegar or with 
Zao-jiao – that is, honey locust, a fruit presumed to keep hair shiny and healthy. 
Make-up prior to the introduction of Western brands also involved practices such 
as painting eyebrows with the dark brown residue obtained from burning plant 
leaves underneath a wok. The following excerpts from our participants illustrates 
the use of these natural remedies based on traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) in 
everyday life. 
XIAN: In my hometown in Henan province, there is a kind of plant. It’s 
called “Zhijiahua” (meaning nail flower).
INTERVIEWER: Oh yes, in my hometown in Hebei province, we also had 
that.
XIAN: My mom would wrap the ground flower paste to my finger nails at 
night and the color would be on the nails the next day.
JING: The nail flower would be ground together with some alum (a special 
cooking ingredient like rock sugar) which could give you orange nails. 
And we would use the leaves of mulberry trees for red fingernails. It 
was so mysterious in childhood. We would stretch out our hands and say 
“Look, do you have such colors?” the color would stay for a long time.
Although these reflect TCM’s long history of backyard preparation (Go 2003), 
some remedies are often packaged and sold, like the lip oil made from animal fat 
described earlier. Both backyard and packaged TCMs have been characterized 
as “mild but effective remedies causing few side effects” (Go 2003, 8). This was 
often pointed out when discussing Western brand health and beauty aids. Chinese 
participants found that owing to their scientific engineering, Western health and 
beauty aids possess more rapid or stronger effects. Some brands play on this per-
ception in their brand names, for example SK-II, meaning “secret key to beauty.”
The biggest advantage of using traditional products is they are without side-
effects. My mother is very much against dying hair with those imported chem-
ical products. She has never done this in her life even though now she has a 
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lot of white hair. She believes the products nowadays used to dye our hair are 
very much chemical and will definitely cause skin cancer sooner or later. One 
of her former colleagues, who dyed her hair often, did die of head skin cancer 
some years ago. I’ve never heard if there is any Chinese traditional way to 
make hair black but I believe there was in the old times in the Imperial Palace 
for those concubines. It is true that we have confidence in using anything 
made of traditional Chinese medicine. 
 However, as far as body care products and beauty aids are concerned, I 
give my equivalent confidence to those big famous brands such as Christian 
Dior, Estee Lauder, Shiseido, Lancôme, etc. These big brand products are 
not only reliable, nicely presented but also efficient just because they have 
more scientific research behind them. Traditional Chinese products, though 
having less chemicals, take longer to see the effect and very often we lost our 
patience before seeing the result. In a way, on one hand we do have confi-
dence in how they are made – no chemicals are added. On the other hand, we 
have less confidence in when they will finally bring us a revolutionary result. 
Besides, at present the quality of Chinese traditional cosmetics products are 
far from being fine either in the product themselves or their presentation. 
(41 year old female interview participant, Shenzhen)
Yes, I would often use Western brands. Their quality is better than our domes-
tic brands. I didn’t believe in any anti-wrinkle products before. I know it’s not 
good for you in the long run. They use some growth factors in the product so 
that your skin would look good for now, but you will lose the radiance once 
you stop using the product. I tried Dabao eye cream and it’s too dry. Lancôme 
is much better. I don’t know if it can prevent you from having wrinkles, but at 
least I feel good about it. 
(38 year old female interview participant, Beijing)
Advanced technology was also noted by our Chinese participants in discussions 
of Western fast food establishments. The standardization achieved through mod-
ern scientific principles that render these branded foods consistent and reliable 
(“McDonaldization”, Rizter 1993) enabled some Chinese consumers to see them 
as “good foods,” as they minimized the risk of stomach or intestinal disorders. 
Coca-Cola is what we buy most often for our family. And Sprite is also a for-
eign brand. We have the peace of mind when drinking these things because we 
know we won’t have diarrhea. When we go out, we often eat in McDonald’s, 
not for its taste, but for the sanitation. We feel we have trust in it. 
(46 year old female interview participant, Tianjin)
Watson’s (2006b) study of the first McDonald’s in Hong Kong details both the 
distinguishing feature of standardized practices tied to consistently ensuring sani-
tation throughout the retail establishment and Chinese patrons’ favorable response 
to these standards. 
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For others of our participants, the scientific knowledge used in Western brand 
food production was deemed to result in food with greater nutritional content. One 
participant who believed American brand fast food was more nutritious than tradi-
tional Chinese food and often took her son to McDonalds, nonetheless revealed: 
I’m not too concerned with the growth hormones used in raising chickens 
and cows. But I’m a little worried about the growing body of my three year 
old. So I let him drink organic milk and try to eat organic grains as much as 
possible. 
(40 year old female interviewee Beijing).
Finally, there was also evidence that Western brand sports equipment was deemed 
by many to be technologically advanced. This was exhibited less by the char-
acteristics of the exterior form of the branded product and more in terms of the 
precision and enhanced performance a consumer would experience as a result of 
wearing Nike or Reebok sports shoes. Indeed, some brand name translations con-
tribute to this perception. For example, the translated Chinese name for Reebok is 
Rui-bu, meaning “sharp stride.”
Also related to the perception of technological advancement is the notion that 
Western brands are always “new.” Technology by definition implies new knowl-
edge or processes such that the application of technology leads to new products. 
Participants’ comments and elicited dreams suggest that newness is a hallmark of 
Western brands, which sometimes undermine former versions of their product to 
stay at the forefront of novelty. 
The more foreign brand products I have the more depth and breadth of knowl-
edge I have about fashion. Dream. I dream that my Lux shampoo turns into a 
weird yellow color (it is originally pink), and it can’t produce foam anymore. 
The celebrity of Lux suddenly appears and tells me that she has quit using 
this product and switched to the new Lux powder hair products. Then I was 
surrounded by foam and bubbles. 
(21 year old female survey participant, Shanghai)
Although many Chinese consumers defined Western brands as technologically 
advanced, the referent here was what was available in China’s market. With access 
to information on the internet and increased international travel, several partici-
pants reported discovering that Western brand producers never “Simultaneously 
sell the newest product in China that they do in other parts of the world,” or never 
“Put their newest frontline products in China.” We find validity to these impres-
sions in reports by high-level Western brand executives that advise other Western 
corporations not to go to China with their latest products, given experiences of 
patent and copyright infringement (Knowledge@W.P.Carey 2009). As we elabo-
rate in Chapter Six, such practices do not go unnoticed by China’s consumers and 
create image problems for Western brand producers. 
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Expensive 
The perceived high price of most of Western brands was revealed in the sentence-
completion tasks. The following are illustrative of consumers’ responses. 
 Foreign brands always: 
• are expensive, or
• are high-priced.
 Foreign brands never: 
• have lower prices than domestic brands,
• have big discounts,
• are cheap, 
• save you money,
• compete on price with Chinese brands, or
• (always) have higher prices than domestic brands.
 The greatest weakness of foreign brands is: 
• too expensive, or
• high-priced.
 The more foreign brands I have: 
• the less I have left for my living expense,
• the more money I have spent,
• the less money I have, or
• it proves that a necessity of good taste is money.
 If I lost my [foreign brand item] the worst thing is. . . .
• I will never be able to buy again. 
Consumers’ dreams included winning the lottery to obtain foreign brands, or 
receiving them for free. 
Went to drink Coke, one glass of Coke after another, all free, and even met a 
beautiful woman! After drinking enough Coke, I would eat in McDonald’s. I 
especially wanted to eat ice cream! As (with Coke) one big cup after another, 
free! 
(25 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
The perceived difference between what is affordable and what is available in the 
absence of special, fantasized promotions was revealed in other dreams.
Foreign brands are getting cheaper, look better, cell phones are as available 
as pencils, and they are all miniature models. Buy one get 10 free, there are as 
many foreign brands as domestic brands. My favorite foreign music products 
are all very inexpensive. Everywhere there are famous foreign brand cosmet-
ics, they are available anytime you need and they are all free. 
(21 year old female survey participant, Baoding)
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I dreamed that Baleno are free to take, KFC are free to eat; Nokia buy the 
color shell get the cell phone free; Adidas buy shoe laces get shoes free; 
Panasonic buy earphones get CD player free.
(23 year old female survey participant, Baoding)
The more foreign brand products I have, the more money I spend. Dream: I 
dreamed that all the foreign brands in the world are free to take, but only for 
one day.
(22 year old male survey participant, Shanghai)
These dreams reflect that, although foreign brands are of limited accessibility, 
financial limitations do not pose obstacles to the fantasy of consumption. They 
also contextualize and underscore Croll’s (2006) finding that the proportion of 
China’s population able to afford and acquire Western brands is far from that envi-
sioned by Western brand producers wishing to enter China’s market. 
We would not expect that the distinguishing features of Western brands in the 
eyes of Chinese consumers to be stable over time. Owing to competition from 
well-made high-end domestic brands, even some of these traits (for example, 
higher price or quality relative to domestic brands) are beginning to lose their 
ability to define Western brands. Further, as the number of made-in-China brands 
that become global increases, this characteristic too may be temporally limited as 
a basis for distinguishing Western brands. This suggests that should the category 
of “Western brands” remain meaningful to Chinese consumers in the future, the 
manner in which it is defined may change as shaped by a host of complex macro-
level forces. 
Apart from for the exclusiveness or high price of Western brands, all of these 
distinguishing features would seem to lead to favorable meanings and responses 
to them. Yet, as we elaborate next, with this core set of attributes intact, meanings 
were quite varied in the emotional responses and behaviors they elicited from 
Chinese consumers. As we find, brand attributes, including their identity value 
promoted in advertisements, are not the sole source of meaning of Western brands. 
Rather, Chinese consumers employ national narratives of East–West relations to 
imbue Western brands with various meanings. 
5 Chinese national narratives 
and the meanings of Western 
brands
The emotional attachment of Chinese people to their national identity is deep-
seated and evolves from China’s dynamic relationship with other nations, con-
stituted largely by stories about the past (Gries 2004). Our Chinese participants’ 
fantasies of Western brands drew from discourses on East–West relationships 
that form multiple competing national narratives that vie for Chinese national 
identity (Gries 2004). From this perspective, nationalism may be described as 
“an ensemble of discursive practices, functioning through interaction between 
historically changing fields of struggle and ‘habitus’ of discrete dispositions, in 
which ideologies are legitimated and delegitimated” (Liu 2004, 68). Our empha-
sis on national narratives as opposed to stories is deliberate and dictated by our 
Eastern context. Narrative is a term of rhetoric that encompasses the genre of 
story (Reissman 1993). Stories, as the dominant narrative form in Western 
social science research, embody a Western assumption about time marching 
forward. Other, often overlooked narrative forms include topic-centered narra-
tives, which are stitched together by theme rather than by time, and are expressed 
as snapshots of past events thematically woven together; habitual narratives, 
which express events that happen over and over such that there is no peak in 
action; and, hypothetical narratives which depict events that could have happened 
(Reissman 1993). As reflected in our analysis, discourses about China’s national 
culture that inform its members about how the group is related to foreign cul-
tures take various forms and combine multiple narrative genres (Gries 2004; Zhao 
2004). 
The West as experiential venue, Western brands as instruments 
of freedom
In some dreams our participants praised the entrance of Western corporations 
into the Chinese market, imagined becoming more confident upon acquiring their 
brands, and dreamed of owning them as symbols of achieving a wealthy leisure 
class status. We return to a further analysis of dreams introduced in Chapter One.
[The more foreign brand products I have] the more confident I would feel 
about myself. Dream: In my dream, I drive a Benz car, wear a Swiss watch, 
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and drive freely . . . how comfortable Nike tennis shoes are, how success-
ful Samsung and BMW are, the Piao-rou [Pert] shampoo really has made 
my hair smoother . . . After that, we go to eat at KFC, and while wiping our 
mouths we praise foreigners for coming to China and bringing convenience 
to our people. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
I became a rich person . . . driving my own BMW sports car . . . wearing Nike 
clothes and Nike shoes, I am on the green grass, holding golf clubs, swinging 
under the golden sunshine, with a happy smile on my face. Actually this is 
. . . one of my earnest wishes. When someone owns all kinds of famous world 
brands, his life would be incomparably bright. 
(20 year old male survey participant,Tianjin)
Compared to other fantasies, these seem to exhibit a historical amnesia. They 
bear no traces of the Maoist ideology of national self-sufficiency attained by 
building an egalitarian socialist society through collective self-sacrifice, as do 
ideological themes carried forward from the earlier National Products Movement 
(Gerth 2003). There are no nostalgic fantasies of Mao-era collectivism, nor 
are there any explicit themes of Mao-era suffering against which imagined indul-
gence in Western brand consumption is celebrated. Absent are the expressions 
of active remembrance that pervaded Chinese literary and political discourses 
during the 1970s and early 1980s (Wang 1996). These dreams entail neither reflec-
tions on the personal wounds inflicted during the Cultural Revolution nor the 
repressed memory of the “century of national humiliation” (Wang 1996; Gries 
2004). 
Despite appearances, these apparently apolitical fantasies of Western brands 
do reflect historical discourses disseminated under Deng Xiaoping’s adminis-
tration to bolster support for gaige kaifang. Gaige kaifang reintroduced foreign 
brands which, despite a strong presence in the early 1900s (Gerth 2003, 2008; 
Wang 2000), had been absent since the inception of Communist government in 
1949. Gaige kaifang involved the abandonment of Mao’s revolutionary idealism 
and an elevation of economic development in order to build a modern, market-
oriented nation. The effects of Deng’s reforms are in contrast to the devastated 
economic state of China following Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the perestroika 
of Gorbachev that led to the collapse of Soviet-style socialism (Liu 2004). Since 
1979, gaige kaifang has succeeded in bringing rapid economic development and 
material prosperity while maintaining the political status quo under the Chinese 
Communist Party (Liu 2004). 
The absence of identity conflicts or ideological tensions in these stories is 
notable, as they reveal a desire for the individualized brands of Western capitalist 
corporations in China, where socialism, with its collectivist focus, is still the state-
sanctioned ideology. Yet this quality mirrors discourses introduced by Deng’s 
administration, under which the contradictions posed by increased integration into 
the capitalist world were strategically downplayed (Liu 2004). One such strategy 
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was the positioning of the reform in terms of pragmatism rather than ideology (Liu 
2004; Zhao 2004). During his tenure, Deng made a host of speeches prioritizing 
economic development while sidestepping debates about whether such develop-
ment, undertaken via a fuller integration into the capitalist system, undermined 
and compromised socialist ideology (Liu 2004). Using vernacular language which 
resonated with both rural and urban workers, Deng condensed the state response to 
these ideological debates with The Principle of Cat and The Principle of Fumble, 
which were widely circulated in popular culture (Liu 2004). The first is an apho-
rism stated by Deng in the 1960s: “As long as a cat can catch a mouse, it is a good 
cat whether it is black or white” (Liu 2004, 52, quoting from Deng 1993, 105). 
Applying this to both dismiss ideological conflict and silence ideological debate, 
Deng reiterated The Principle of Cat in his 1992 Southern Tour talks: “Now the 
key issue is whether it [the reform] is named “capitalism” or “socialism.” . . . 
the criteria for judging [the success or failure of reform] lie mainly in whether it 
benefits the productivity of socialist society, and whether it promotes the synthetic 
power of the state, and whether it raises the living standard of the people” (Liu 
2004, 52–53, quoting from Deng 1993, 105). Under Deng’s reform, performance 
legitimacy provided by high-speed economic development has taken the place of 
the revolutionary legitimacy of Marxism–Leninism (Zhao 2004). The Principle of 
Fumble, put forth in the 1980s, reflects upon the spontaneous and initially covert 
act of rural peasants, led by farmer Lao Zhang, to privatize the collective com-
mune which provided the momentum for the reform: “[In launching the reform 
and opening up,] we’ve fumbled our way to cross the water” (Liu 2004, 52, quot-
ing Deng 1993, 232). As an acknowledgement of the passivity of the Chinese 
Communist Party leadership in the economic reform from the beginning, this 
declaration credits the impetus to rural workers (Liu 2004). This discourse posi-
tions and bolsters the reform as emanating from the masses and modeled on their 
down-to-earth pragmatism (Liu 2004). Reinforcing the persuasive oratory strat-
egy is a second mode whereby, in the spring of 1992, Deng announced a three-
year ban on theoretical discussions of the ideological nature of reform (Liu 2004). 
Critiquing this act, Liu (2004) noted that, ironically, it made questioning Marxism 
and socialism in China taboo.
Further reinforcing the public’s receptivity to gaige kaifang have been state 
efforts to reframe and largely diminish historical moments that ran counter to mar-
ket-oriented economic reforms (Zhao 2004). To illustrate, the late 19th-century 
Boxer Rebellion, one of the first nationalist calls to boycott foreign brands fol-
lowing Western invasions, had been considered a patriotic movement during the 
Cultural Revolution. After the launch of Deng’s reforms, PRC publications criti-
cized the movement as an “irrational and fanatic anti-foreign movement” (Zhao 
2004, 55). Comparably, several of our interviewees highlighted the irrationality of 
expressing “nationalist emotions” by way of rejecting Western brands. Participants 
replaced such bases for decisions with judgments based on value, framing this as 
unemotional and rational. 
When we like something, we don’t want to involve it in nationalist emotions. 
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. . . If the others’ [foreign countries’] stuff is good, one should not consider 
political factors. 
(33 year old interviewee, Beijing)
In the October following Deng’s 1992 Southern tour talks, the Fourteenth Party 
Congress pledged that the Party and government would build “a Chinese-style 
market economy by the end of the century” (Croll 2006, 31). The announcement 
was significant in allaying consumers’ fears over a possible shift backwards to 
another cultural revolution (Croll 2006). Whereas Croll (2006) noted that in the 
early years after economic reform Chinese consumers were reluctant to display and 
talk about their material acquisitions, we found many of our participants talked or 
dreamed of them with pride.
The dreams in our data exhibit the effects of the popularization of consumer-
ist values which, Chinese cultural theorists reveal, has ironically been aided by 
the Communist Party’s promotion of consumerism (Wang 1996). Some partici-
pants’ fantasies appear to be fashioned after Deng’s unconventional promotions 
that “Getting rich is glorious” and his counsel to “Let a part of the population get 
rich first” (Liu 2004, 62; Kuhn 2000). One participant echoes these themes in his 
dream where a life of wealthy leisure is his “earnest wish [because] when someone 
owns all kinds of Western brands, his life would be incomparably bright.” Others 
dreamed of the type of “moderate affluence” which Deng established as the aspi-
rational goal of the masses (Liu 2004, 62), suggesting that this could be attained 
only after some had achieved wealth (Liu 2004). Dreams of moderate affluence 
often featured a single Western brand which magically made its owner more cos-
mopolitan and desirable. 
[The more foreign brands I have] the more internationalized I am personally 
. . . Dream: At a clear autumn dusk, I lightly leaned against the big window 
that faced the open field and blue sky . . . [when] a Gucci silk scarf floated to 
me from the universe, and it gently landed around my neck. Extremely excited, 
I stood up, . . . then a pair of soft but powerful arms held around me from 
behind, and a sweet kiss fell on my neck. 
(20 year old survey participant, Beijing)
As silk has been an iconic domestic product throughout China’s history (Hamilton 
and Lai 1989), ambivalence towards domestic brands is expressed by this partici-
pant, who opens her window to “the universe” to receive a Western brand silk scarf, 
which she greets with excitement and appreciation. Her acceptance is accompa-
nied by a feeling of being enveloped by a powerful but protective and gentle liai-
son. At one level the kiss and the envelopment represent stereotyped western style 
boldness and romance, as Chinese tradition makes such an act embarrassing. At 
another level the envelopment reflects an immediate magical transformation into 
a more socially desirable self. At a higher level, it conveys a liberating access 
to a broader world backed by a powerful, friendly supporter. The dream echoes 
the prevalent 1980s view of the West as a beautiful imperialist that frees Chinese 
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consumers from the restraint of traditional values of sacrifice and a simple lifestyle 
(Gries 2004).
Participants’ dreams entailed fantasized freedom in many forms. In one form, 
the Chinese body (shen ti), which is also the self (Tung 1994), was imagined as 
being freed by Western brands. For example, a dream of an extraordinary bas-
ketball performance aided by Western branded goods transformed Chinese ath-
letes into freely moving bodies. Such dreams highlighted having fast, spontaneous 
fun, involving continual rapid decisions, made on the spot. The action-oriented 
bodily movements associated with Western branded goods is perhaps reflective 
of a broader sense of a freely moving self. This self is experienced from a socio-
historical perspective in which Chinese individuals were restricted to particular 
geographical regions and where travel outside domestic boundaries was limited. 
Dreams of traveling freely within and outside China were common. Notably, 
China’s domestic tourism industry was spawned following gaige kaifang as part 
of government initiatives to stimulate domestic consumption (Croll 2006). 
I was driving a Buick, flying fast on an empty road . . . We were now fast, now 
slow, went through city after city, arrived in Tibet of my dreams. 
(23 year old female survey participant, Tianjin)
Foreign brands lowered their prices, and they are all authentic brands. 
Whichever country the brands are from, lucky customers will all have the luck 
to enjoy traveling to that country. 
(20 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
Consuming foreign brands as a symbolic act of crossing the boundary between 
home and the wider world gives rise to fantasies of a more literal boundary cross-
ing, and also to an experientially freer self. Anthropologists reporting on Chinese 
consumers’ reactions to the first McDonald’s in Beijing similarly note that, for 
many, McDonald’s was seen as a gateway to the world (Yan 2006). 
As another form of fantasized freedom, participants praised Western corpo-
rations and their brands for freeing Chinese consumers from restrictive ways of 
thinking. Western brands were seen as introducing Chinese consumers to new 
practices or new ideas. In the following examples, the Oil of Ulan brand (known 
as Oil of Olay in the Western) is animated as a fashion consultant who offers 
instructions on how to succeed in the recently created job market (in contrast to 
the government-assigned jobs of the past). Likewise, the humanly wise Microsoft 
brand introduces new knowledge, thoughts, and experiences.
I was going to the interview, and I was so nervous at this time, I wanted to try 
to dress myself appropriately . . . However, I . . . knew nothing about cosmet-
ics, and I was really stuck . . . Suddenly my Oil of Ulan [Oil of Olay] turned 
into a little angel, and she naughtily asked me, “Why are you looking blank? 
. . . Thus I told her my problem. The little angel just said one thing “leave 
everything to me, the Oil of Ulan little angel. Within a few minutes, I will 
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turn you into a beautiful little angel.” Then she started applying her skills on 
my face . . . within a few minutes, the me in the mirror was totally a different 
person: “Youthful, beautiful, white, and flawless.” I was very satisfied . . . I 
thanked the little angel, immediately went to the interview place. I believed 
that, with the encouragement of Oil of Ulan, I would surely be extremely con-
fident and perform well.
 (22 year old female survey participant, Tianjin)
Microsoft turned into a young, energetic, and knowledgeable wise person. 
He took me into the Microsoft world . . . I wanted to see the sea, he would . . . 
give me a virtual experience of being there. Then I wanted to know about the 
universe. He could give me a totally new thoughts and feelings. 
(23 year old male survey participant, Tianjin)
A host of Western brands were imagined as setting free assertions of the self. Some 
saw the transformative powers of Western brands as rendering them capable of 
better performances, an esteemed “star,” or more cosmopolitan world travelers 
who gained access to new experiences.
Several major famous brands that represent luxury and extravagance were all 
owned by me at the same time. While having these, it seemed like I became a 
star, wearing Rolex watch, dressed in Chanel clothes, driving Benz car . . . It 
may be only a daydream, but I’m still very happy . . . 
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
When I get married, I am wearing a Chanel wedding gown, Christian Dior 
shoes, DeBeer’s diamonds, riding in an extended model Cadillac, and going 
to Europe for my honeymoon – to Paris, Milan, London, and New York. I 
go shopping and buy LV handbag, Prada purse, CK [Calvin Klein] clothes, 
and Poison perfume. And I also go to the longed for Disney Land, European 
theme parks, and the global movie city [Hollywood] in Los Angeles . . . Such 
a beautiful dream.
 (21 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
As noted by Croll, this view of Western brands as delivering freedom has emerged 
against the backdrop of uniformity that characterized the early years following 
reform. 
It was not long before consumption came to symbolize a novel and immedi-
ate freedom after years of controlled scarcity so that the defining features and 
categorizations of the revolution – of work, occupation, blue-trousered com-
rades and class origins or class labels – soon gave way to new lifestyle prac-
tices, perceptions and self-perceptions substantiated by consumption goods 
and services. 
(Croll 2006, 30)
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Jeans were a symbol of independence against a background of blue Mao suits that 
conveyed the notion of a solidly grounded and conforming citizen (Croll 2006). 
Difference was also symbolized in that Western fashions displayed the contours of 
the body in ways that the Mao suit could not (Croll 2006). Although the suits com-
mon during the 1950s to 1990s are known as Mao suits in English, they are known 
to the Chinese as Zhongshan zhuang, named after Dr. Sun Yatsen, the founder of 
the Guomindang, the ruling party of Taiwan. Although these suits were modern 
compared to the traditional Chinese robes still worn in the early 1900s, in the post-
reform period they were considered outdated.
Likewise, clothing, jewelry, and cosmetics were used to construct a new gender 
identity that contrasted with the image of the Mao-era Iron girls dressed androgy-
nously in the unisex blue suits (Croll 2006). Western brands in these product cat-
egories provided a sense of freedom and movement, as consumption represented 
movement toward a desired identity. They were used to “become [feminized] 
women,” to reject the past, and to move towards becoming more progressive, 
cosmopolitan, or global (Croll 2006). The quest to transform identity through 
consumption is the distinguishing mark of a consumerist society that supplants a 
society of producers (Bauman 2007).
The symbolism of some dreams further depicted Western brands as freeing 
Chinese from a devastated economy, as exemplified by their offering a foundation 
that sustained survival and a solid platform to support upward mobility. For others, 
the presence of Western brands transformed them from desperate seekers in the 
barren desert into “hopeful” survivors of a plush land. 
A person . . . is deserted in the desert, thirst and hunger make him feel the 
threat of death, he is desperate and starts digging in the sand, digs and digs, 
finally he digs out a box . . . . there are five cans of Pepsi with a note: wherever 
you are, you always have my support. He feels the warmest thing in life, and 
. . . finds the green land and regained life and hope. 
(survey participant, no demographics provided, Baoding)
On a bright afternoon, my friend and I went to climb the Great Wall. We hiked 
for a long time, then my friend found that her shoes were broken, the sole was 
worn out. And my shoes . . . weren’t . . . I proudly told her that I was wearing 
Nike. Nike adds splendor to my steps. 
(23 year old female survey participant, Tianjin)
Shaped by Deng discourses in which wealth and consumption by the few lead to 
improved living standards for the masses, assertions of individuality and identity 
transformations in China cannot be compared to those in the West. Rather, they are 
more akin to findings in other cultural contexts that individual display is also pur-
sued for the symbolic and economic value it confers on the collective to which the 
individual belongs, and with an eye toward how conspicuous consumption influ-
ences collective outcomes (Miller 1994; Rowlands 1994; Wilk 1994). The following 
survey response to one of our sentence completion items sums up this perspective.
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[The more foreign brands I have . . .] the more it shows that our country is 
emerging in international status and our economy is moving forward.
 (survey participant, Beijing)
The view that Western brands offer a source of national pride makes sense in light 
of China’s efforts to gain entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this 
endeavor China’s Minister of Foreign Trade emphasized the large market potential 
for imported goods, as did China’s chief negotiator for WTO entry (Croll 2006, 
13). Whereas the notion of a consumerist society has been held to involve the pur-
suit of individuals’ desired futures (Bauman 2007) here we see consumption as the 
pursuit of visions of a collective future. 
The West as imperialist oppressor, Western brands as 
instruments of domination
Other dreams reflect a national narrative in which the West is deemed an imperial-
ist oppressor and Western brands are instruments of domination. Although here 
we trace the history that keeps this meaning of Western brands alive in China, it is 
important to note that this meaning does not view those who have not “caught up” 
to the ideological shifts endorsed by the state as “backward” (Wilk 1994). Such 
“backwardness” is often attributed by a well-traveled cultural elite claiming to be 
cosmopolitan, to rural dwellers or those less well educated (Friedman 1997). Yet, 
as Wilk (1994) has noted, these assertions break down with exposure to Western 
views, values, and fashions, aided by global media. Cultural elitism underpinned 
by global travel is diminished as access to information becomes widely available. 
Notably, the “oppressive” meanings of Western brands came from university stu-
dents and professional workers. Reflections of this can be seen in the writings of 
China’s intellectual elite. For instance, the 2009 China Brand Report described 
Johnson & Johnson’s acquisition of Dabao, a Chinese skin-care brand since 1985, 
and its acquisition of Huiyuan, a Beijing-based fruit juice brand launched in 1994, 
as “national brands falling into enemy hands” (Yu 2009, 44). The acquisition 
caused concern among Chinese consumers and brand scholars that Chinese brands 
would disappear. The owners of those acquired Chinese brands are further criti-
cized in the report as “betraying [the national industry]” to “maximize financial 
gain” (Yu 2009, 46–47).
In our data, the expressed meanings of Western brands as instruments of domi-
nation ranged from subtle symbolic implications to explicit pronouncements. 
The subtler dreams of Western brands as instruments of imperialist oppressors 
resemble those that draw from the narrative of the West as liberator, in that they 
too entail imaginings of a self which revels in a seemingly unbounded consump-
tion of Western brands. Yet expressions of gratitude are absent. Without directly 
challenging Deng’s discourses, these dreams convey a longing for iconic China-
made goods and a more materially simple life, reminiscent of Maoist ideologies 
of national self-sufficiency and anti-consumption, which echo discourses of the 
earlier National Products Movement (Gerth 2003, 2008). 
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In my dream I come to a palace, where every column is a Western brand 
name. The words on the columns mean to invite me to participate in a game. 
So according to the game rules, I devour every brand just like a worm eat-
ing beans . . . Then I come to a big door behind the palace, open it, there is 
the prize for my winning the game. The room is filled with Western brands, 
for home use, including electronics, basic commodities, cosmetics, expensive 
clothes. But before consuming them, I hope to make a last request of the game 
designer: please give me a pure silk sleeping gown made in China, because it 
is very comfortable, and I believe I’ll feel very peaceful in it. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Baoding)
My friend dreams that she is wearing clothes of famous foreign brands, using 
daily life products of Western brands, and she happily goes back home, just to 
see the low and old house, and her hard-working and simply-dressed parents. 
It is not realistic to blindly pursue or admire foreign brands. 
(survey participant, no demographics provided, Baoding)
In the palace dream above, an image of Western imperialism is detected where 
Western corporations set the rules of the (marketplace) game. Within the Western 
palace, consumption is rewarded with further consumption. The dream’s moral 
coda – that comfort and peace can only be found in a silk sleeping gown from China 
– introduces a subtle renouncement of Western brands. Notably a luxury product, 
the nightgown is not for conspicuous consumption. This renouncement challenges 
the perfect image of the West as the beautiful liberating imperialist (Gries 2004). 
This interpretation can be compared with the earlier dream in which the silk gift 
from an “open universe” is a Western brand Gucci scarf, which the consumer greets 
with excitement. Like the palace dream, the dream of happily returning to the mate-
rially simple home also suggests an ambivalence toward Western brands. Neither 
dream, however, contains expressions of anxiety over the absorption of China into 
the global system which might evoke a revolutionary discourse or a desire for 
intervention and resistance. Rather, they reflect a surface conformity to a particu-
lar nationalist discourse wherein revolutionary legacies are elided with debates in 
China in order to promote economic development (Gries 2004; Liu 2004). Chinese 
cultural theorists suggest this silencing of revolutionary discourse is symptomatic 
of a triumphant global capitalism (Liu 2004). Deng’s pragmatic nationalism is 
not, however, a hegemonic narrative because the state has been unsuccessful in 
reproducing social cohesion and a broad alliance of the general public (Liu 2004). 
Greater social and economic polarization, a condition recognized in the returning-
home dream of the Baoding participant, has led to discontent (Wang 2008).
The emergence of repressed discontent in these dreams parallels comments 
from our interview participants who likewise questioned the pursuit of Western 
brands. Several lamented that “Chinese still believe in foreign things.” 
I think Chinese are too stubborn in this respect. Everybody thinks this way, 
that anything Western is good. But I think it [valuing Western brands] will 
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have some negative influence on my family in the future. I won’t influence 
them towards these things. 
(23 year old female interviewee, Beijing)
Further, some participants responded to the sentence-completion tasks in ways 
that exhibited a disdain for Western brands.
[The more foreign brand products I have . . .] the less happy I am because I 
hope Chinese national industry will have greater development. 
(25 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
[The more foreign brand products I have . . .] I don’t think this is something to 
be proud of. Besides, I won’t do it. 
(19 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
In other dreams imaginings of Western brands as instruments of Western dom-
ination were quite pronounced. Many envisioned Western brands as a form of 
attack from the outside, or as an invasion from within, thereby enslaving Chinese 
people.
[The more foreign brand products I have] the harder the blow is to domes-
tic products . . . Dream: In the world of foreign brands, King Valentino and 
Queen Lancôme bring their daughters Head & Shoulders and Colgate, and 
their sons Nike and HP, to ride a Goodyear airship . . . with Coca Cola as fuel. 
Holding a big flag of Safeguard, cruising on the Fifth Avenue [a fragrance 
brand], with the help of Angels, Pampers, and Nokia, they are planning to 
launch an all-round attack on the Chinese market! 
(survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
Foreign brands swept China’s market as if they would block out the sky. 
Domestic products had no foothold. We had to purchase some of the necessity 
products with surprisingly high prices. Horrible! 
(22 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
[The more foreign brand products I have] it shows that domestic products 
are not popular. Dream: A certain brand comes to inhabit a person who will 
destroy us all. Therefore, we cannot “worship Western and fawn foreign.” 
(survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
Last night, I had a very scary dream. In the dream a big department store put 
out a new type of imported toy, a kind of mini robot. Its size and shape is simi-
lar to a Barbie doll, but this kind of mini robot could have simple communica-
tion with humans. It could tell stories, sing various songs, more importantly 
it could walk like a person, and could release electricity to protect its owner 
at dangerous times. What’s more, it constantly releases a light soothing scent. 
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Since it had so many advantages, it became very popular in the whole coun-
try, especially among teenagers. This kind of robot was seen in all streets, 
some walking with their owners some standing on their shoulders, some even 
crawling over their heads, proudly giving directions. Time goes by day by 
day. The robots had terrible changes. They grew taller and taller, and the pur-
chasers of the robots became exhausted and they grew smaller and smaller. 
What’s worse, while the robots grew bigger in size they started making copies 
of themselves like cancer cells, crazily proliferating. Finally everyplace was 
packed with the vicious and plump robots, whereas our poor fellows were 
enslaved by them. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
War metaphors were prevalent in the literature of the National Products Movement, 
which sought to link patriotism to the rejection of Western brands (Gerth 2003). 
As Gerth (2003, 2008) notes, this movement paved the way for Mao’s communist 
rule by establishing the market as a domain within which to assert the collective 
interests of the nation. In calling for the protectionist principles of the earlier 
nation-state, these dreams refl ect Maoist nationalist sentiments. Contrary to 
assertions that in Marxist theory nationalism is an anomaly, Mao established a 
Chinese Marxism that was integrated with nationalism (Zhao 2004). His project of 
an alternative modernity opposed both Western capitalist modernity and China’s 
old imperialism (Zhao 2004). In Mao’s discourse on nationalism, Confucianism 
also was vilifi ed as it represented the ideological hegemony of the imperial rulers. 
Rejection of Confucianism became an integral aspect of Mao’s construction of 
nationalism (Liu 2004). In the early 1990s, when the CCP attempted to foster a 
sense of national unity, Confucianism was revived and celebrated as a common and 
unifying cultural heritage, at the same time as Mao was resurrected as a national 
hero (Gries 2004; Liu 2004; Zhao 2004). Mao’s vision of an alternative modernity 
was based on an ideological and cultural revolution grounded in egalitarianism, 
economic self-reliance, and a one-party political system sustained by democratic 
centralism (Liu 2004). Mao’s attempt to realize this vision has been interpreted as 
a powerful counter-imperialist movement during the formative years of capitalist 
globalization (Liu 2004). 
Liu’s (2004) analysis details the use of Maoist revolutionary ideology as a legit-
imating force for the CCP as follows. As the pragmatism that epitomizes Deng and 
post-Deng administration has undermined Marxism and socialist ideals, the CCP 
has sought new means of acquiring legitimacy. One way has been to use Mao’s 
image as a cultural symbol while separating it from its revolutionary meaning. 
For example, the Deng administration financed a flourishing revival of Mao-era 
qunzhong wenyi (folk art). Mao introduced these practices during the Cultural 
Revolution to encourage the Chinese people to participate in folk arts so as to 
overcome the superiority of bourgeoise culture. The cohesiveness developed by 
present-day re-enactments has since been channeled toward Deng’s development 
agenda through discourses of “national spirit” and pride in attaining “moder-
ate affluence” (Liu 1994, 62). The re-enactments emphasize a national identity 
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constituted by symbols of nationhood, shared historical experiences, and a com-
mon language. Related to this strategy, official CCP discourses which consider 
the Cultural Revolution a tragedy largely exempt Mao and pass the blame to his 
advisors (“The Gang of Four”) who manipulated him. The use of Mao’s image was 
also evident in some of our participants’ discourses. 
Our knowledge about brands came from practice. The Chinese Chairman Mao 
Zedong once said “True knowledge comes from practice.” Take the t-shirt my 
husband brought back from Japan for example, it didn’t wear out until after 
eight or nine years of wearing . . . I bought a watch from Japan. It had a seven 
year warranty. And the battery lasted for seven years before it needed to be 
replaced. Even now grandma is still wearing it. It’s been eleven years. 
(46 year old female interviewee, Tianjin)
The revival of Mao’s cultural legacy holds the potential to awaken protectionist 
sentiments. Incidents of Western confrontations which pose new threats to 
the identity, interests, or integrity of China often provide the impetus for the 
reconstruction of nationalism (Zhao 2004) and invocations of protectionism. 
Western brands as weapons of cultural dominance 
Some dream fantasies of Western-initiated war and invasion seem metaphori-
cal and participants’ concerns that an authentic Chinese culture is on the edge 
of demise. The fantasies share a common plot in which the Chinese consumer is 
seduced by lures of individualism into Western brand consumption and becomes 
displaced from Chinese culture, which leads to her/his demise. These dreams mir-
ror a narrative in which Western corporations are motivated to dominate or destroy 
China’s culture and undermine its national identity.
[The more foreign brand products I have] the more it marks my own “value.”
Dream: One day, Lao Zhang was driving a BMW car, and he suddenly entered 
ancient times, where people were all surprised and wondered: what is this 
thing, why haven’t we seen it before? Then they asked Lao Zhang what it 
is. Lao Zhang answered, this is my Precious Horse [BMW’s Chinese name]. 
Someone said, I also have a precious horse, why do they look so different? Lao 
Zhang said, my Precious Horse is very fast, that person said, let’s race. Lao 
Zhang agreed and they got started . . . In less than two seconds, Lao Zhang’s 
Precious Horse was out of sight. Everybody said, it’s really so fast. Suddenly 
he heard a [warning] scream [from them], there’s a cliff ahead!
(21 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
This participant reflects ironically on the destruction of the Chinese self with 
Western brand consumption, which commodifies people (marks their “value”). 
In the dream Lao Zhang serves as a metaphor for the centuries-old cultural icon 
Zhang Guo-lao, the Chinese god of immortality, who is known to always ride on 
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the back of a donkey. The participant reiterates the theme of destruction of the 
collective self by imagining this god being seduced to give up his traditional trans-
portation, the donkey, and adopt the “precious horse” (the Chinese name of the 
BMW brand). Adoption of this status good forces him into a perilous and destruc-
tive high-speed competition. One of the most common names in China, Lao Zhang 
stands for the farmer credited with the first act of privatization in China (Liu 2004). 
Likewise, as an iconic symbol of the masses being drawn towards privatization, 
Lao Zhang renders the interpretation one of cultural demise, central to which has 
been the rapid commodification of people. As critiqued by cultural theorists, in 
the emerging fashion, modeling, and commercial job markets Chinese individu-
als now position, brand, and sell the self (Brownell 2001; Hoffman 2001). In this 
dream the consumer as god also recognizes the practice introduced into China’s 
emerging upmarket retail stores during the mid to late 1990s, where management 
taught their staff a new maxim: guke shi shangdi, which means “the consumer is 
god” (Croll 2006, 40). News reports of the introduction of Western brand stores in 
publications such as Beijing Scene quoted consumers who claimed that the “pleas-
ant shopping environment and better service really did enable shoppers to feel like 
gods” (Croll 2006, 40). The above survey participant warns that although Western 
brand acquisitions may offer a sense of godliness, they can also lead to demise. 
In some dreams, the loss of culture at the hands of Western brands was conveyed 
as a loss of self for the Chinese consumer.
One day, Ronaldo drove a Benz to my home and said, “The car is yours. Bye.” 
Then I arrived in a grand stadium in France. I suddenly turned into an Adidas 
ball, and Trezeguet kicked me against the post again and again. 
(21 year old male survey participant, Shanghai)
In this dream, overt seduction through the offer of high-status luxury goods is 
followed by abandonment, cultural displacement, transformation of the self into 
a commodity, and then torture. Still others convey a sense of being drawn into 
Western brand consumption, with faint suspicions that the Western brand seducer 
is a thief or a bandit. Nonetheless, they imagine being unable to resist an ironically 
involuntary sense of freedom.
[The more foreign brand products I have] the higher standard of living I 
have. Dream: Clear and bright moonlight beams into the room through the 
open windows, sprinkles all over the room, and sprinkles all over my bed. My 
body feels like fl ying up, I know that I’m fl ying with help from someone. The 
fragrance of Chanel is fl oating in the air, I want to resist, but can’t, because I 
like fl ying in the perfumed rain. I don’t care whether that someone is a thief or 
bandit, I like fl ying like this, on and on. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
As symbolized by the mistrust and hesitancy that belie the pleasure and freedom 
of “fl ying in the perfumed rain,” for some, the promises of freedom embodied in 
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Western brands is an artifi ce to charm Chinese consumers from their traditional 
culture. Such themes are reminiscent of a popular fi lm of the mid-1990s, “Ermou.” 
The fi lm featured a young woman village entrepreneur who sold noodles and her 
blood to save for a large television set. The television is so large that it displaces 
the family from their bed and, “still with its price tag visible, is watched by the 
whole family and admiring village neighbours” (Croll 2006, 51). 
Still other dreams recognize the entertainment industry as a signifi cant force 
fueling capitalist globalization in China. Yet, abandonment and loss of self 
nonetheless ensue.
One day, a man fortunately was chosen to be the celebrity of several different 
Western brands. Having a large number of fans, he could also enjoy using 
those Western brands . . . Just when he was enjoying life so much, bad news 
came, [the foreign companies] . . . terminated their contract with him . . . 
Therefore, within a night, he became a common person, nobody wanted to talk 
to him anymore, he became so lonely and scared, running with no direction.
(19 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
In numerous dreams participants imagined the domineering force of Western capi-
talist corporations and their insistence on material acquisitions. In the aftermath of 
such acquisitions, Chinese cultural life was often imagined as eroded to a narrow 
preoccupation with the disposition of accumulated Western brands.
[The more foreign brands I have] it shows I have some trust crisis towards 
domestic products. Dream: A sales representative from Adidas sent me a truck 
load of basketballs. I didn’t want them, because I don’t like playing. They said 
no (I can’t refuse), if I didn’t accept the truckload of basketballs, they would 
bury me alive with those basketballs! . . . Since then, my family has been liv-
ing nervously in a basketball flood: a basketball placed on the TV; a couple 
of basketballs would jump out when opening the fridge; even when we eat, we 
would sit on basketballs instead of chairs! How to get rid of the basketballs 
has become the main goal that my whole family tries to achieve. 
(22 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
Other participants conveyed concerns that Western brand promotions altered cul-
tural notions of what was aesthetically pleasing.
I think media has some influence on our aesthetic judgment. When I was a 
child I read a story called “What’s Beauty?” It said a pale skinned good look-
ing boy didn’t do any work, so he wasn’t beautiful at all but an iron-molding 
young man was working under the sun and exposed his bronze color skin. 
That is the beauty of working people. It had a very deep impression from a 
young age. But as time goes by, we’ve been exposed to Western ads. We’ve 
seen the beauty of Miss Globe, Miss Hong Kong, we know, “Oh, that kind of 
look is beautiful.” Media has an unobtrusive influence. 
(25 year old female interviewee, Beijing)
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Concerns expressed in these dreams parallel popular press reports that the 
presence of Western brands is corrupting, contaminating, or diluting Chinese 
culture and cultural space. In Chapter One we recount the controversy that 
followed the opening of Starbucks in the Forbidden City, which was deemed 
by many to be damaging to China’s heritage (People’s Daily 2000). In the bur-
geoning tourist industry spawned by gaige kaifang, Starbucks was part of the 
Forbidden City administrators’ attempts to improve service. Since the 1990s cul-
ture has repeatedly been a battleground in popular discourses, as clashes between 
Deng’s development strategy and China’s espoused socialist ideology have 
become more apparent (Liu 2004). These clashes have been attributed to the 
absence of a clear vision of the social and political values of gaige kaifang (Liu 
2004). Such ambiguity initially aided the acceptance of economic policies (Liu 
2004). Subsequently, in a reversal of the 1980s fascination with the West, this 
ambiguity intensified the legitimation crisis of the Deng administration (Gries 
2004).
Dream imaginings of a Chinese culture under attack and invaded by Western 
brands reflect a historical embellishment of brand fantasies (Martin 2004) with 
what Chinese political and cultural studies scholars call China’s re-emergent 
“victimization narrative” (Gries 2004; Liu 2004). This narrative is reportedly 
popular among China’s fourth-generation “revolutionaries” (Gries 2004), who 
grew up during the 1980s and 1990s under the relatively material prosperity that 
followed gaige kaifang (Gries 2004). Each preceding generation had suffered 
a form of vicitimization. The Red Guards of the third generation were sent to 
the countryside during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s; the sec-
ond generation suffered the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s; and, the first 
generation suffered the anti-fascist and civil wars of the 1930s and 1940s (Gries 
2004; Liu 2004). Encouraged by a number of popular nationalist diatribes (Song 
et al 1996a, 1996b), some fourth-generation Chinese see the takeover of China’s 
culture as their generation’s victimization (Gries 2004). Not incidental to the 
formation of this narrative were the Chinese Communist Party’s 1990s cam-
paigns of education in patriotism, launched as a response to US sanctions which 
followed the 1989 conflicts. Tied to a narrative in which China was presented 
as besieged, the Party’s campaign called for national unity under one-party rule 
and territorial integrity (Zhao 2004). These patriotic values were fomented by 
a shared Chinese history. Through this campaign, Chinese tradition, which the 
Communist state had attacked for years, became an essential value of nationalism; 
the Communist Party restored ancestor worship, celebrated the Great Wall as a 
patriotic symbol, and revived Confucianism (Zhao 2004). Government efforts to 
revive and preserve Chinese tradition continue today, as evidenced by the addi-
tion of two traditional festivals (Mid-autumn and Qingming) as national holidays, 
beginning in 2008 (Croll 2006). These national holidays serve a dual purpose, as 
they are often declared to promote leisure time and occasions for consumption 
(Croll 2006).
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Western brands as weapons of military dominance 
In concert with our dream data’s more explicit expressions of “attack” and 
“invasion,” the victimization narrative also entails the traditional militaristic 
meaning. 
[The more foreign brands I have] the less I am like a Chinese. Dream: The 
Western brand turns into a person and he is Napoleon or Hitler, holding his 
iron rod and marching over the earth. Wherever he passes, dead bones are 
scattered all over the ground. White bones fi ll the streets, not even a chicken 
is left within thousands of miles . . . 
(21 year old male survey participant, Shanghai)
The concerns apparent in this dream and others were fueled by the 1999 NATO 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2001 US–China standoff over 
the American spy plane which collided with a Chinese jet fi ghter, US arms sales to 
Taiwan, the deployment of the National Missile Defense, and US reports that China 
poses a threat to world order (Gries 2004; Liu 2004; Zhao 2004). These incidents, 
which are often publicized as threats to national security, prompt more overt attempts 
by Chinese institutions and individuals to politicize Western brands and their 
consumption. Following the 1999 American bombing incident, for example, public 
protests challenged American media reports that the bombing was an accident, 
framing it instead as an intentional act aimed at undermining China’s international 
image and power (Gries 2004). Public protests further framed the bombing incident 
as linked to China’s semi-colonial past, to suggest that China would not allow 
the long series of Western aggressions to continue (Gries 2004; Han 1999). Blog 
postings on the Guangming Daily website criticized the consumption of a host of 
Western automotive, clothing, fast food, electronic, and computer software brands 
and called for Chinese companies to revoke contracts with American corporations 
(Gries 2004). In concert, Chinese corporations pledged online promises to halt 
business relationships with companies such as Microsoft (Gries 2004; Liu 2004). 
In protests which erupted in over two dozen major cities, Chinese individuals 
carried signs saying “Kick American hamburgers out of China,” alongside placards 
declaring “Punish the war criminals!” (Gries 2004, 14). 
In some discourses, American goods were seen as the ultimate source of funding 
for the US military (Liu 2004). Calls for boycotts made much of the large numbers 
of Chinese upon whom Western corporations relied for profi ts, and called for 
Chinese unity in order to amass power in numbers (Liu 2004). Some Chinese 
consumers’ discomfort over the presence of the Toshiba ad at the National Day 
ceremony (see Chapter One) can be better understood in the light of this linking of 
foreign brand success with foreign military power. 
In our participant’s dreams parallel themes exist that call attention to the power 
of individual choice when replicated across the nation. Some dreams linked indi-
vidual choice of Western brands to an imagined apocalypse for the population of 
China. A fuller analysis of the apocalyptic theme of one of the examples in Chapter 
One follows. 
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I’m driving a BMW, listening to Sony music, drinking Coca Cola, and come to 
a wild and empty place. With Nike shoes on my feet, I run like crazy, running, 
running. On the grass, beside the tents, there are many red flags with five stars 
(Chinese national flag), around them are herds of cows. Many workers are 
milking the cows, they milk like crazy. Up in the sky, floats a slogan “Bright 
Dairy” (a Chinese dairy brand) . . . The workers are dying one after another 
. . . I have sold all my foreign brand products including my BMW and Sony 
video camera etc.!!! Then I buy “Bright” milk to feed pandas.
 (23 year old male survey participant, Baoding)
In his fantasy of renouncing Western brands in the interest of the common good, 
this participant clarifi es the values of gaige kaifang while alleviating the threat 
of the undesired identity transformation it poses. Mao’s revolutionary discourses 
called attention to the exploitation of individuals at the hands of global capitalists 
(Liu 2004). From this perspective, individualization through the accumulation and 
display of Western brands resulted in a loss of face, that is, a loss of social esteem. 
In his dream of “Bright milk,” the Baoding participant pre-empts this loss of face 
by renouncing Western brands and taking up production with the collective. His 
goal of aiding the survival of the indigenous culture with domestic production 
is embodied in feeding “Bright milk” (a domestic brand) to the panda, an iconic 
endangered but protected species. In other dreams, the loss of face or esteem 
is somatic, symbolized by disfi guration of the physical face (Tung 1994). May 
Tung’s (1994) analysis of the meanings of the body and its parts in Chinese culture 
notes that the face is closely related to social honor and position, as well as one’s 
self-respect. 
In the dream, I saw myself wearing Beaty clothes, holding a Chanel handbag, 
wearing Red Earth cosmetics on my face, Shi-si shoes. Suddenly, it started 
to rain, I ran forward, then my shoe sole broke along with the tearing sound 
of the clothes. I tried to run home, looked into the mirror, found the “water-
resistant” cosmetics ruined by the rain, and I became a big colorful cat. Thus 
I threw them away, never sought after Western brands.
 (18 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
In this dream the storm that follows consumption of the Western brands makes 
returning “home” a challenge, as the consumer’s face has been ruined. The loss of 
face expressed here as becoming a “big colorful cat” implies social embarrassment 
as a result of consuming Western brands. The term “colorful cat” has long been 
used by Chinese to describe the dirty face in a loving tone. As a discursive text, 
the dream offers parallel images to those comprising Deng’s Cat Principle. Such 
parallels lead to speculation over whether or not the dream implicitly contests this 
principle, which dismisses the color of the cat as insignificant, and by associa-
tion also dismisses the debate about whether gaige kaifang is capitalist or social-
ist in nature (Liu 2004). Whereas the Cat Principle delivers the moral that if the 
cat catches the mouse it is a good cat, regardless of its color (Liu 2004), this 
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participant sees that the performance criterion (that is, an outcome-driven assess-
ment) can have an undesirable impact. One interpretation of the colorful cat image 
is that it depicts gaige kaifang as individualistic, capitalistic, and undesirable. In 
other dreams, somatic symbolism was expressed as the loss of sweat and blood 
“sucked out” by Western brands, or as contamination or deterioration of the body, 
as representation of the self (Belk 1988; Gerth 2003; Tung 1994).
The market is glutted with foreign products and the packages are all covered 
with foreign languages. . . . Many domestic products are overstocked, national 
enterprises bankrupted, and workers laid off. Horrible, too horrible. I can’t 
determine my nationality while in the sea of these foreign products. 
(survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
I use L’Oreal moisturizer . . . Sassoon for my hair, and . . . [foreign brands for 
hair color, underwear, sweaters, and perfume] slowly I walk into Starbucks. 
My boyfriend is wearing Adidas . . . our faces . . . so obviously possessing 
Chinese characteristics – yellow skin, black hair, black eyes. Is this an inevi-
table outcome of the world’s grand assimilation, or is it the sadness that we 
have forgotten about our own national industry and blindly crave foreign 
brands. 
(23 year old female survey participant, Tianjin)
After Microsoft escaped from disintegration, it expanded with a faster speed 
and learned its lessons, started to control the government so that it would 
not be sued again . . . Not long afterward, governments of all countries in the 
world are under its control . . . Political imperialism was established. 
(20 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
Notably the vast majority of those who drew on a narrative of the West as impe-
rialist oppressor for their brand fantasies were residents of Beijing and Baoding. 
Certainly, the presence of military forces in Beijing would be expected to heighten 
attention to militaristic discourses of East–West relations. Further, the presence 
of numerous heritage sites there which benefit from an international tourist trade 
would render this city’s cultural space more frequently contested. The relatively 
rural and smaller Baoding possesses both of these characteristics. As “the southern 
gate of Beijing,” Baoding has been an important military center since Beijing was 
established as the capital of China in 1421, and now hosts one of the most impor-
tant military bases. Baoding later became the home of the first Military Training 
School in China, which was founded in the late Qing Dynasty (1902) and many of 
whose graduates were key players in China’s recent history (for example Chiang 
Kai-shek). Later, from 1949 to 1958, Baoding was the capital city of Hebei prov-
ince. In addition to the military significance, like Beijing, Baoding is also a city 
of historical cultural significance, as half the tombs of the Qing Dynasty emperors 
are scattered in the surrounding hills. Unlike those from port cities, residents in 
these two cities have more exposure to and knowledge of China’s recent history, 
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and have adapted to competition, drawing from military experiences as the only 
accessible, relevant history tied to foreign competition (Kuhn 2000). 
The West as subjugated, conquered Western brands as 
redemption 
In many dreams, participants fantasized scenarios of restoring national pride 
by conquering Western brands in the market. Underpinning such fantasies is 
the revitalized cultural memory of China’s century of humiliation at the hands 
of Western imperialists (including Japan). This remembrance draws from a 
victimization account in which the Chinese plight is often referred to as luohou aida, 
interpreted as “the backward will be beaten” (Gries 2004, 50–1), which explains 
China’s defeat as resulting from economic and technological backwardness (Gries 
2004). The legacy is one which many Chinese individuals seek to erase (Gries 
2004; Zhao 2004). 
Foreign brands turn into rows of soldiers with knives, and pour in fiercely. 
But with the resistance of superior equipment of domestic brands and the 
nationalist spirits of Chinese people, they are defeated and withdraw.
 (survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
[The more foreign brand products I have] the more I feel lack of national 
self-esteem. Dream: . . . Domestic brands enter into the international market 
and achieve good results. Chinese people hence no longer look down upon 
themselves. The Chinese economy soars. Every Chinese voluntarily supports 
state enterprises and Chinese enterprises. Our reputation gets better. What 
Westerners can do, Chinese can also. What Westerners cannot do, Chinese 
can also. We have been suppressed for too long.
 (survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
Chinese products’ quality improves very fast. . . . Then . . . I come to Las Vegas 
of America, take Chinese products with me, and hold a Chinese product press 
conference. I compare them with American products on the spot, and immedi-
ately beat the foreign products, winning honor for China . . . 
(24 year old survey participant, Beijing)
Narratives that seek to redress China’s past humiliations draw from national dis-
courses of victimization which emerged at different historical moments, spanning 
the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War until the British return of Hong Kong “to the 
Motherland” in 1997 (Gries 2004, 49). Following the Sino-Japanese War, humili-
ation was experienced by the Japanese imposition of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
which forced China to cede Taiwan, the Pesadores, and the Liaodong Peninsula, 
as well as opening up a specific section of the Yangtze River and the Ports of 
Shashi, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hunkou to Japanese trade (Zhao 2004). Although 
this victimization narrative was slightly diminished by Mao’s China-as-victor 
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discourses, Gries (2004) suggests it has been revived by bestsellers such as The 
Rape of Nanking (Chang 1997). This work and others documented World War II 
atrocities committed against Chinese civilians at the hands of the Japanese military, 
which the Japanese government did not acknowledge (Gries 2004). Also woven 
into cultural accounts of humiliation are Chinese allegations of disrespectful treat-
ment by the WWII Allies, the failure of the West to fully acknowledge China’s 
contribution to the Allied victory, and Japan’s refusal to acknowledge China’s vic-
tory despite acknowledging that of other Allied nations (Gries 2004). National 
humiliations of the 1950s and 1960s have been interwoven with earlier incidents 
of victimization. These included stories of America blocking the PRC’s entry into 
the United Nations, delaying it until 1971 (Gries 2004). Further plaited into the 
victimization narrative are other incidents deemed a national dishonor, such as the 
1993 loss of the bid to host the Olympics due to alleged American intervention 
(Gries 2004). As Gries (2004, 51) noted, the more popular interpretation of “back-
wards/beaten” has become “backwards because beaten” (luohou yinwei aida), 
implying that Western aggression has kept China backwards. 
Post-reform assertions of victimization include humiliation inflicted upon the 
Chinese people by Western corporations that price their brands too highly for the 
masses. In Chinese popular culture, anti-ads have emerged to dramatize this form 
of humiliation. One depicts an aggressive Ronald McDonald forcing a Chinese 
consumer to bow at the base of the golden arches, while refusing the consumer’s 
pleas for a discount (SOHU.com 2005). Our participants also found it humiliat-
ing that some Western brands in China were of inferior quality to similar brands 
offered in Western nations.
What is thought in dreams, is actually the wish to make up what is missing 
in reality . . . In any country, the commodity concept a brand represents is 
unchanged, there shouldn’t be any quality discrimination based on country 
or region. 
(24 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
These depictions of Western brands also mirror reports of the 2007 China Brand 
Report (Yu 2007). The reported brand crisis incidents highlight the double stan-
dards of Western brands, whereby Chinese consumers are subjected to lower lev-
els of customer service, goods that are inferior to similarly labeled brands in other 
Western countries, producers’ failure to recall unsafe brands in China, and high 
barriers to the return of branded goods once concerns for their safety are publicly 
reported. Carrefour, Toyota Reiz, P&G’s SK-II cosmetics, and Chivas 12-Year are 
all reported examples of Western brands that engaged in practices deemed disre-
spectful to Chinese consumers (Yu 2007, 323).
Many of the brand crisis examples reflect the data in our paper where Chinese 
consumers are concerned that foreign brands may dump defective products 
onto China’s market and that Chinese consumers might be treated with less 
respect by foreign brands . . . With the prevalence of internet and easy access 
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to information about the outside world, Chinese consumers are more aware 
of various brands and consumers in other parts of the world, and desire and 
expect equal treatment from companies (especially those of famous brands) 
including product quality (e.g., Chivas and Toyota Reiz) and related return 
policy (e.g. Bausch Lomb and SK-II). Any perceived difference in product 
quality or “double standard in return/exchange policies” would be interpreted 
by Chinese consumers as a lack of respect and would invoke a sense of humil-
iation from the past. This is another illustration of Chinese consumers’ view-
ing foreign brands as oppressors.
 (Yu 2007, 323)
Redemption was imagined in our participants’ dreams, not in terms of protecting 
cultural icons and heritage sites, nor in terms of protectionist exchange policies, or 
boycotting Western brands. Rather, participants fantasized that Chinese products 
would be sought by Chinese consumers because of their international competitive 
superiority while the status and prices of Western brands in China decline.
Foreign brands are defeated completely by domestic brands overnight. 
Chinese people are proud of buying domestic products, and Chinese products 
are recognized by the world, like Haier. 
(survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
One day, streets of foreign countries are running Chinese Red Flag (a car 
brand), foreigners all wear Double-star (a Chinese shoe brand) and Pu-dun 
pants (a Chinese brand).
 (survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
BMW rushed in front of me, and invites me to sit in. I’m so surprised that I 
throw up. Me, of a salary income class deserving to sit in such famous car in 
this lifetime, I won’t regret it even if I die. I shout, “It does not feel as cool rid-
ing you as riding my electric donkey [nickname for motor cycle]!” You should 
change your name to “wild donkey brand” . . . “All right.” Going country is 
the destined route for aristocrats to become common people. 
(survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
Chinese products will someday fill people’s thoughts and lives all over the 
world. On that day, I will have a dream, Western brands will no longer be arro-
gant. Just like that I throw out a few coins, wow, foreign goods all my way! 
(survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
Similar sentiments were also evident in the sentence-completion responses. 
[A good foreign brand should . . .] adapt to the reality of China instead of 
standing high above humanity. 
(survey participant, no demographic data, Shanghai)
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[If all foreign brands disappeared from the Chinese market I would . . .] feel 
glad because many Chinese products have quality that match international 
standards.
 (survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
In contrast to the former narrative, which is driven by efforts to shape nationality as 
an inward-directed sentiment that seeks to hold a nation together and guard against 
alien rule, this narrative operates by discourses that direct effort outwards (Gries 
2004, citing Comaroff and Stern 1995). In the redemption narrative, the view of 
Western brands as instruments of aggression produces expansionist attitudes, with 
victory sought in international market dominance (Gries 2004).
A historical trace of China’s outward expansion can be found in the 30-year 
Foreign Affairs Movement (Yangwu yundong) during the semi-colonial period 
following defeat in the Opium Wars. A group of ministers headed by Zeng Guofan 
proposed to the Qing Emperor (who rejected foreigners as teachers) that China 
should learn from foreigners to strengthen her power, acquiring skills that would 
allow China to defeat them in the future. Offi cials were sent to North America 
and Europe to learn about and purchase technological equipment, which was then 
incorporated into Chinese education and military bases. The persuasive line used 
by Zeng Guofan to appeal to the Emperor has been widely disseminated, “learn 
from foreigners to defeat them” (shi yi yi zhi yi). Also contributing to this view was 
Lu Xun (1881–1936), another prominent litterateur. In his article “Na lai zhuyi” 
(Appropriation/or “Taking”) published in 1934, Lu Xun advocated overturning the 
situation in which China was forcibly sold opium. He argued that Chinese people 
should actively appropriate useful things from the Western cultural system, and 
turn these things into goods that could benefi t China. Extending these notions to the 
present, many of our participants expressed the view that the presence of Western 
brands in China was an important opportunity for China’s industries to engage in 
benchmarking, using the best of Western practices as standards. They envisioned a 
national industry that learned and then ultimately beat Western brands in the global 
market with the introduction of successful, high-quality, and technologically 
sophisticated China-made brands, thereby elevating the Chinese economy. The 
currency for this redemptive narrative is heightened at moments that pose a threat 
to China’s global commercial success. Among others, such events include disputes 
with the US over trade defi cits, and charges of China’s violations of intellectual 
property rights (Gries 2004).
Redemptive fantasies entailed imagined transformations into a more esteemed 
self in the global arena, though this was often expressed as a collective self. 
Because (I) couldn’t meet [my girlfriend’s] needs of being covered with famous 
foreign brands all over, we fought, I got mad, I said “bye” . . . From then on I 
hated famous foreign brands, which represented people of vanity. I was deter-
mined to have my own company and beat foreign brands. My dream finally 
came true in my dreams. People all over the world were using my company’s 
products. 
(23 year old male survey participant, Tianjin)
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Some of our participants spontaneously expressed a belief that Chinese people are 
held in low esteem internationally. These participants tied redemption to economic 
development and China’s competitiveness in the global market, irrespective of its 
impact on cultural heritage. 
[In talking about best translation practices] A Western name, Chinese people 
can accept. I think the biggest shortcoming of Chinese people is that I feel 
Chinese worship Western things too much. This is an undeniable fact. It’s been 
like this since 1840. Any Westerner . . . will be adored like God in China . . . if 
I go abroad, to Europe, how they treat Chinese people, respect can’t even be 
mentioned . . . Although China has a history of several thousand years, you 
can’t live by holding onto history. The history is almost eaten away. Forbidden 
City? How long is it going to last? Will the Great Wall never fall? Why has the 
United States developed so fast? . . . So the current development is the most 
important, not the history.
 (23 year old female interviewee, Beijing)
The desire to reorder hierarchies such that the oppressed becomes the oppressor 
is not unique to the Chinese (Gries 2004), but cultural theorists have noted that 
many Chinese today want to change roles within the relationship, such that China 
is the “super big-brother” and the United States and other Western nations are 
likened to small children (Gries 2004). Gries (2004) suggests that this national nar-
rative of redemption has been prompted by academic writings which have crossed 
over into popular culture, such as Li Fang’s (1996) Our Generation’s America 
Complex, which criticizes Chinese consumers’ admiration for American culture 
and fascination with Western brands. Expansionist discourses can be found in 
populist writings that oppose anti-China discourses, advocating that the United 
States should build alliances to contain China (Gries 2004). In response, numerous 
Chinese popular books, including the “say no” books, took the position that the 
United States had repeatedly forced China into a series of confrontations. These 
texts “carried a warning to Washington that any containment effort was certain to 
fail” (Zhao 2004, 10–11). 
The opposition to containment fantasized by some participants parallels strate-
gic moves by some Chinese manufacturers to become global. Personal computer 
manufacturer Lenovo, brewer Tsingtao, appliance maker Haier, and automobile 
maker Chery are all seeking to become global brands (Cayla and Eckhardt 2008; 
Wang 2008), with some leveraging from their sponsorship of the 2008 Olympics. 
The popular catchphrase “created in China,” has been interpreted by Wang (2008) 
as capturing the vision of a China transformed from world factory to a heaven for 
brand innovators. This vision inspired other redemptive-themed dreams in which 
Chinese entrepreneurs took over Western corporations, shaping the brand and cor-
porate culture in a different direction.
[Dream] After graduation, I joined a foreign company. Building on nothing, 
I started from a little clerk and then was promoted to the president of the 
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company. I felt high spirited and vigorous and then started a new era of the 
company. I began to run several transnational corporations and become as 
rich as Bill Gates. Thus our products monopolized the specially endorsed 
products for the World Cup, Olympic, and all the major international confer-
ences. Brands like Nike, Adidas, all went bankrupt in the competition. 
(20 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
[The more foreign brand products I have . . .] to some extent the more satisfac-
tion I obtain from the products. [Dream] I will dream of acquiring this foreign 
brand and making it into a “famous national brand” and then market it in the 
global market.
 (survey participant, no demographic data, Beijing)
Again, and related to the previously noted local cultural differences, the use of this 
redemptive narrative to shape Western brand fantasies was more common among 
those from Beijing and Baoding.
The West as economic partner, Western brands as instruments 
of economic progress 
Other fantasies reflect a national narrative which promotes hopeful idealistic views 
of Chinese–Western relations. Foreign corporations were deemed eager to share 
technology and to adapt to and adopt Chinese ways. 
I imagined that Western brands and Chinese brands are two people with high 
quality, optimistic and positive attitudes. They walked together, and became 
best friends! They learned from each other and helped each other to make up 
for each other’s weaknesses. The Chinese brand was down to earth, and the 
Western brand was gorgeous. The Chinese brand drew on the Western brand’s 
advanced technology and management experience, and at the same time, it 
entertained the Western brand and made the Western brand benefit greatly 
from the Chinese brand. Hand in hand, and shoulder by shoulder, they worked 
hard together for mankind’s happiness. 
(29 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
One day, the beautiful girl Head & Shoulders with a head of floating elegant 
long hair, the boy Nike in sport clothes and I went to Disney together. This 
was a Disney in China, I was very happy that the two foreign friends could 
come to China to play in a foreign amusement park. After that, we went to the 
Great Wall . . . They were very glad, and said they . . . wanted to marry spouses 
in China, have children, plant their roots in China, and they even wanted to 
change to Chinese citizenship. 
(21 year old male survey participant, Tianjin)
One day I bought a bag of “Haoshi” (Hershey’s) chocolate and almost fin-
ished eating, with the last piece forgotten at one corner. After a long time, I 
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found it and thought it might have turned bad. Just when I was throwing it 
away, suddenly a voice said to me “Oh no! Please don’t throw me away!” I 
was a little surprised, so I searched around but couldn’t see anyone. 
Then a voice spoke again, “It’s me! I am in your hand!” I looked and 
found that it was the little thing talking to me. I was a little scared, but I 
still talked to it. “Oh, How can you speak? And can you speak Chinese?” It 
immediately jumped into my palm, “Yes, yes I can.” “Ha-ha . . .” I laughed. 
“You must have been in China for so long that you have secretly learnt 
some Chinese, right?” It smiled back at me, “Right. Please don’t throw me 
away. I have enjoyed living in your home and I don’t want to go outside.” I 
said “Oh yeah? OK then, you can be my good friend, but I’m afraid that I 
would want to eat you!” It said, “No problem!” I was surprised but still kept 
it. From then on, I found a heap of Hershey’s chocolate at my desk every day. 
I was so pleased. No need to ask, I knew it was my good friend repaying me. 
Ha-ha!
 (20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
These views of Western brands and corporations as partners can also be seen in 
discourses within China’s commercial brand industry. The China Brand Report 
2009 recounts the formation of the partnership between Jian-nan-chun, a Chinese 
liquor brand, with Absolut Vodka in 2008 after it partnered with Hennessy in 2007 
(Yu 2009, 53). This partnership and the subsequent creation of new unique brands 
is believed to have facilitated its leap from third place to the leader in the strong 
liquor industry. As Yu (2009) comments: 
When you mention Jiannanchun, people immediately think of the long history 
of Chinese liquor culture. On the other hand, Absolut Vodka would remind 
people of the bold and modern advertisement and transparent yet versatile 
packaging. The combination of the two brands is as incredible as the Mars hit-
ting the earth. We all agree that Jian-nan-chun brand image seems to become 
younger. While traditional culture should be respected, new blood should also 
be injected. The joining hands of Jiannanchun and Absolut Vodka has taught 
us a very vivid lesson. 
(Yu 2009, 53)
Our participants who drew from an East–West partnering narrative deemed the 
Chinese people capable of adapting to globalization in a manner that sustains val-
ued aspects of their culture. Here the consumer alters the product to one that better 
suits Chinese taste.
In a quiet mountain village everything was so pure and clean. One day a trav-
eler came, trying to sell to those simple and innocent villagers a kind of good 
drink, that is Coca Cola. . . I tried it. It tasted bitter. “It tastes so horrible!” 
I said. This time, grandma walked over. “Wrong. You should not drink it this 
way. You should drink it as if you were drinking Chinese herbal medicine. Add 
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water and sugar.” Then grandma took over the Coca Cola and mixed a big 
cup for me . . . Wow! It tastes great! Thus, I cheered, “Everywhere is home” 
(23 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
There does, however, appear to be a porous boundary between adaptive harmony 
and a subversive takeover tied to cultural redemption. Consider the contrast of the 
above dream with the one that follows.
I came to Coca-Cola company to be the boss. I sent employees to collect vari-
ous delicious fruits from all over the world, and made them into fruit flavored 
soda and offered it three days for free, sprinkled the orange flavored juice 
from the sky like rain so that people in the whole world would enjoy the taste 
of Coca Cola soda.
 (19 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
Participants often placed Western brands in a relationship of harmony with nature. 
The boundary transgression between technology and nature that in Asian culture 
could give rise to disgust is avoided by first transforming the technological foreign 
good into an element of nature. Further, the non-dualistic conception of society 
(and man) as being in harmony with nature is preserved (see Tung 1994).
One exhausting final exam was over, I muddle-headedly returned home, and 
my head itched terribly. Just then, a water honey bee named Head & Shoulders 
flew over, it guided me to the bathroom, turned on the shower nozzle, flew 
around my head. This time, I just felt a miraculous light flash over my head. It 
took away all my discomfort, my soft and smooth hair cascaded down, and I 
started to dance. The little honey bee also danced along with me, and we were 
surrounded by pleasant music. 
(21 year old female survey participant, Tianjin)
The sense of international harmony expressed in this dream and others was also 
found among some of our interview participants, who made comments such as 
“The world is one entity now. It’s not necessary . . . one should not refuse to 
buy it because it’s American.” Consistent with views of China’s more harmonious 
relationship with Western brands, some of our participants commented on how 
Western brands satisfied deep-seated cultural values in China.
I believe all of us want to look nice and young for our own sake, to wear make-
up and to dress nicely has just become a free enjoyment for all women. China 
is a nation with high sensitivity to beauty. I feel make-up has just rendered 
everyone a chance to be satisfied with our physical appearance and the avail-
ability of foreign brand cosmetics answered to our nature. 
(40 year old female interview participant, Beijing)
In other dreams, international partnering and cross-national competition reached 
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the pinnacle of Deng’s development policy, whereby moderate affluence for the 
majority is achieved. 
Summarizing, our data elicited through projective techniques suggest that 
Chinese consumers embed Western brand meanings in various reconstructions of 
China’s history. Fantasies where Western brand consumption resulted in a trans-
formation of the entire nation suggest that consumers find Western brands mean-
ingful in shaping the future China. Such imaginings suggest that Western brand 
consumption is not routine apolitical behavior (Campbell 1994), but rather con-
sciously motivated actions tied to materializing preferred imaginings of the future 
China. 
6 National narratives in
imaginative processing of 
Western brand promotions
Chapter Five highlighted the multiple national narratives that Chinese consumers 
use to imbue Western brands with local meanings. We then theorized that, imbued 
with these meanings, Western brands are used to realize consumers’ preferred 
imaginings of the future nation. From our analysis comes the realization that 
notions of how citizens should respond to Western brands to assert nationalism 
are many and competing. Further, the national government at various historical 
moments is revealed as engaged in rhetoric and policy making that may encour-
age rather than discourage consumption of foreign brands. Our understanding of 
how these competing cultural narratives shape individuals’ responses to Western 
brands remains limited. Our emphasis so far has been on the collective cultural 
imagination that is a source of creative material. Here we shift emphasis from 
macro-level negotiation of Chinese identity through Western brands to a micro-
level focus on how the various narratives affect the psychological processing of 
Western brand promotions. 
Imagined consumption 
It is well documented by consumer research that people may envision how a prod-
uct they have yet to consume will transform them once it is acquired (Belk et al 
2003). A vital tenet of Western consumerist ideology is the belief that “the con-
sumption of new products will transform one’s life” (Spring 2003, 6; see also 
Bauman 2007).
Individuals’ imaginings of consumer goods and their dreams of how they will 
be transformed by them are of considerable relevance in this time of expanding 
global capitalism (Cayla and Eckhardt 2008). Capitalism, with its central com-
ponent of the free market, has introduced Western brands to multitudes of indi-
viduals in less affluent, non-Western cultures (Arnett 2002; Cayla and Eckhardt 
2008; Coulter et al 2003; Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006; Liu 2004). A rare study 
of imagined consumption in this context suggests that consumers who cannot 
afford the Western goods they desire and aspire to possess, sustain their longings 
by repeatedly imagining how their identities and lives will be transformed once 
they do possess them (Belk et al 2003). These mental rehearsals are more aptly 
termed consumption fantasies (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982): that is, they entail 
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mental imagery and hypothetical scenarios of identity and life transformations 
which mix real and unreal elements (Belk et al 2003). Emerging from a focal inter-
est in consumer desire, these findings highlight imaginings of pleasant consump-
tion experiences and desirable identity transformations. Contesting a universal 
attraction to Western brands, a singular study conducted in post-socialist nations 
found that consumers varied in their involvement with branded products. Branded 
involvement was informed not only by Western advertisements, but also by varied 
and competing historical meanings of brands from their nations’ socialist past 
(Coulter et al 2003). These works highlight the influence of commercial produc-
ers in promoting imaginings of and involvement with Western culture and brands. 
Prominent among these are the advertising, fashion, entertainment, and consumer 
products industries, which supply the Western media with a stream of images and 
brand icons for global dissemination.
Since the turn of the century, Western brand producers operating in China have 
sought to enliven individuals’ consumption fantasies through visual promotions 
(Wang 2000; Wang 2008). In introducing a typical Western brand advertisement in 
China at the turn of the century, Wang offers the following description: 
At the heart of China’s capital city, Beijing, stands a huge electronic roadside 
billboard. Displayed on the billboard are three “heroes” – a Caucasian man, 
a Caucasian woman, and a Hennessy bottle . . . The dark suited man, glass in 
hand, is posed in the middle of the background. In the left foreground, barely 
visible in the scene, the woman is showing only a shoulder draped in a beauti-
ful scarf. On the right is the big Hennessy bottle, with its shape and texture 
occupying almost a quarter of the billboard space. Between the back and front 
is a row of Greco-Roman arches. The ad caption written in Chinese characters 
reads, “Hennessy. The Original X.O.”
  A moment later the billboard dissolves into a slightly different setting fea-
turing a curved white verandah overlooking the quiet blue sea. Standing on 
the verandah, the Caucasian man, gazing seaward and still holding a glass, is 
now impeccably attired in a white tropical suit. The Caucasian woman now 
appears in a high cut white dress, but only her back from hip to shoulder is 
shown. She also is looking out to sea. The Hennessy bottle remains promi-
nent, unaltered from its original position on the right side of the billboard. 
(Wang 2000, 4) 
Like many Western brand advertisements created for Chinese consumers the 
Hennessey ad plays up difference, exoticism, and the Western origins of the 
brand (Wang 2000). In our Appendix of billboard and storefront advertising that 
we photographed in China in 2009 we offer visual examples that suggest these 
promotional themes are still common. In his analysis of Western brand advertise-
ments, Wang (2000) argues these are deliberately designed with strategic elements 
to evoke Chinese consumers’ fantasies. Consumer goods from foreign cultures 
promise a magical transformative experience (Belk et al 2003). Such consump-
tion not only offers an experience of the exotic, but also enables consumers to 
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experience an extraordinary, idealized self-image – one where they are more 
cosmopolitan, sophisticated, and important (Belk et al 2003; Coulter et al 2003; 
Kimura and Belk 2004; Thompson and Tambyah 1999). As Belk (2003) elaborates, 
accessible objects from ones’ own culture are not deemed capable of creating a 
transformed ideal self, given that everyday encounters render them ordinary.
Like the Hennessy billboard above, Western brands in China often offer an 
idealized glimpse of the possible self – a self that is magically transformed (Wang 
2000). Paradoxically, this magic is achieved by modern technology. Just as the 
modern technological sophistication of the billboard underlies its metamorphosis, 
the modern technological sophistication of Western products is often the source 
of their “foreignness” and their transformational capabilities (Wang 2000). Albeit 
subtle, the Hennessy ad conveys this via the unchanging bottle – a symbol that, 
through Western technology, the magical potion has been engineered to be consis-
tent, reliable, and safe (Wang 2000; cf. Thompson 2004) by mysterious processes 
of blending and aging. Wang’s (2000) review of Western billboard advertising and 
other signboards throughout China revealed that Western producers have com-
monly promoted themes of exotic Westernness, modernity, newness or novelty, 
and science and technology. This promotional focus no doubt contributed to our 
participants’ views that Western brands are technologically advanced relative to 
domestic ones. 
Themes of difference or exoticism of course differ from promotions that seek 
to localize their appeal (Wang 2008) and rare advertisements, such as those in the 
Introduction, that attempt to leverage from China’s past. Yet, these themes are not 
mutually exclusive, as our participants revealed in their discussions of brand name 
translation practices. Like brand names, promotions of various types can display 
local cultural knowledge while nonetheless interjecting cues to their foreignness 
that render them exotic. 
To illustrate, in May 2006 KFC introduced a new television advertisement in 
China as part of its “encouragement series” (a follow-up of KFC’s “brotherhood 
series”). The new advertisement featured three teenagers, two boys and a girl, 
studying in a classroom, at a KFC restaurant, and atop the school building. One of 
the boys, wearing a red jacket, is always leisurely hanging out and eating at KFC, 
causing his classmates to worry for him. They urge “This is desperate. Are you 
not planning to take the exams?” The other boy, Xiaodong, offers the contrast of a 
diligent student. However, at the end of the ad, the girl and the KFC enthusiast are 
accepted into colleges, whereas Xiaodong surprisingly fails. Many Chinese view-
ers questioned the message sent by this ad, which seemed to suggest that those who 
play and embrace Western cultural icons succeed, whereas those who study hard 
but fail to take pleasure in Western brands will fail. This advertisement is localized 
by the context of the three-day university entrance exam, recognizing the central-
ity of education to Chinese families. The airing of the advertisement coincided 
with the timing of the exam, scheduled in early June every year throughout China, 
yet it clearly sent a foreign message, one counter to cultural norms. Following 
media coverage and internet discussions, KFC revised the advertisement so that 
all three students are accepted into universities (News Guangdong 2006). 
100  Narratives in the imaginative processing of Western brand promotions
As reactions to this “encouragement” advertisement suggest, Chinese consum-
ers do not merely accept the consumption fantasies and their transformational 
outcomes promised by Western brand promotions. This illustrates that Chinese 
consumers were skeptical about the effects of the advertisement, as it disrupted 
the cultural premise that hard work is the path to educational achievement. Such 
advertisements and debates fuel and are fueled by the cultural narrative of Western 
brands as oppressors that appropriate Chinese cultural space. Among the Western 
brand advertisements shown in the Appendix are additional illustrations of adver-
tisements that localize their appeal while nonetheless conveying a foreignness 
through values that oppose traditional ones in China.
A couple of other contextual factors surrounding Western brands in China are 
noteworthy. First, In developing countries Western brands may tantalize indi-
viduals with fruits which, albeit apparently within reach, do not often become 
possessions for consumption (Belk et al 2003). As we found, high price is a distin-
guishing characteristic of Western goods as perceived by Chinese consumers. This 
was exhibited in participants’ completion of the sentence stem “Foreign brands 
always . . .” with statements such as “have high prices” or “have prices higher 
than domestic brands.” This view was also revealed in dream fantasies, where 
a common dream entailed winning a lottery which enabled the consumer to buy 
desired Western brands. Whereas some scholars argue that obstacles to immediate 
gratification serve to sustain desire that fuels consumption fantasies (Belk et al 
2003), this does not preclude that consumers who are uncomfortable with per-
petual desire for the unattainable may engage in psychological strategies attempt-
ing to diminish such desire. Whereas this may underlie some of the negative or 
unpleasant dreams of Western brands, as well as those that led to abandonment of 
such brands, in the example that follows, the consumer explicitly counters desire 
with the decision to resist dreaming of Western brands. 
One evening I suddenly had a weird but fantastic dream. I hoped this fond 
dream would come true. I spent 20 Yuan and bought 10 lottery tickets. 
Unexpectedly I won the special award of five million Yuan. To me, this is 
really an enormous figure and it was truly very important to me. I can just 
use part of this award to buy all the foreign brand products that I had been 
longing for day and night all my life – Adidas sport clothing on my body, Nike 
sport shoes on my feet, Nokia cell phone clipped at my waist, buying a case 
of Coca Cola drinks from a supermarket and walking into my BMW car. A 
dream is after all a dream and is not real. I decided to come back to reality 
and never dream again. 
(22 year old female survey participant, Beijing) 
For some Chinese consumers, Western brands priced so high as to be unattain-
able may shut down active imagining or fantasizing about consumption of these 
brands. The dream further suggests the possibility that this resistance applies also 
to the category of goods – Coke as well as BMWs. The degree of affordability of 
these product categories would seem quite different from a Western perspective, 
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yet both may exceed a threshold of affordability for some Chinese. Although not 
addressed by us, a worthy research topic would be to investigate whether prac-
tices of closing out consumption fantasies may become a habit or heuristic. To 
the extent that this occurs, the practice may pre-empt consumption fantasies of 
Western brands even after consumers’ incomes rise, or when Western brand prices 
are reduced by competition or economies of scale. 
A second factor that may be involved in imaginatively processing Western 
brand promotions in the manner desired by their producers is Chinese consum-
ers’ views of technology. Western brands are promoted as modern and techno-
logically advanced relative to their local counterparts (Wang 2000). Through such 
promotions, Western producers expect to render their branded goods useful to 
consumers in constructing a more modern self (Wang 2000). Constructing a more 
modern self is not inherently in conflict with Chinese nationality in light of the 
government’s goal to “catch up with the West” (Croll 2006, 47). Wang’s (2000) 
review of Western brand advertisements recounts how a Sharp VCR promotion 
meticulously described technological details (e.g., stating in bold print the type of 
metal of the VCR head) and made the product transparent so that consumers could 
see the inner complexity. In the early years following economic reform in China, 
such images became the hallmark of Western advertisements (Wang 2000). Wang 
(2000) suggests that the techno-speech mystifies the product in a way that leaves 
consumers impressed with its technological sophistication. The use of modern 
science rhetoric and images to counter the perceived risks of foreign substances, 
albeit effective with Westerners (see Thompson 2004), may lead to skepticism 
among Chinese consumers. There was considerable evidence of this in our partici-
pants’ dreams and discussions of Western health and beauty products. Participants 
stated that Western brands in this category were more technologically advanced 
than those of traditional Chinese medicine in the sense that they had faster or 
more noticeable results, but also often had unexpected side effects. The follow-
ing dreams suggest that the value of technologically advanced Western brands in 
some product categories is viewed differently by Chinese consumers. Thus, imag-
ined consumption of technologically advanced Western brands may depart from 
the types of imaginings sought by Western brand producers. 
My classmate recently had been losing a lot of hair. He almost became bald. 
One day he dreamed of showering, and suddenly found there were numerous 
shampoos before him. Therefore he picked one bottle from them, examined it 
closely. It was gold-packaged Head & Shoulders. He washed and washed and 
afterwards, discovered that he was no longer losing his hair and there was a 
trend of fast growing, so he used more like crazy, pleased to find that his hair 
had grown back to look like it did before. Extremely happy after waking up 
from the dream, he has been using Head & Shoulders since. 
(21 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
Dream: Using Head & Shoulders all your hair will be gone and your dandruff 
will be left alone. What a horrible dream. 
(22 year old survey participant Baoding)
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Dream: After using Safeguard, my skin is not oily but very clean and clear. 
Who knew that when I woke up the next day, I would have acne all over my 
body.
(22 year old female survey participant, Baoding)
Again, here the body disfigured by technologically advanced Western brands 
doubles as a disfigured social self, including the collective sense of self or the 
Chinese nation (Tung 1994). These dreams again suggest that consumption fanta-
sies regarding Western brands possess layered meanings. A surface meaning may 
reflect imagined outcomes linked to distinguishing attributes of the brand (for 
example the side effects of the technology). These imaginings, however, may be 
shaped at a deeper level by meanings derived from national narratives upon which 
consumers draw. The negative side effects of the Safeguard soap (above) may 
refer not only to the consumers’ physical body, but also to the collective Chinese 
body that rejects the Western brand as something foreign.
The point of these illustrations is that the meanings of Western brands dissemi-
nated by their producers are not passively received by Chinese consumers. Rather, 
consumers negotiate and reconstruct these meanings, drawing from other local 
sources. Local producers as well as nation-state governments also influence indi-
viduals’ consumption fantasies. As our analysis in Chapter five elaborated, the 
governments of nation-states transitioning to a market economy creatively adapt 
rather than completely adopt capitalist ideology and Western consumerist cul-
ture (Liu 2004). They form hybrid political ideologies intertwined with prescrip-
tions for consumption practices (Gries 2004; Liu 2004). In vying for individuals’ 
national identity, purveyors of local values compete to shape consumer practices 
not only in the marketplace, but at a much earlier point: they compete for space in 
the consumer’s imagination (Gries 2004; Wang 2000; Wang 2008). 
Individual psychological processes of enlivening consumption 
fantasies
Martin’s (2004, 142) model explaining the enlivenment of consumption fantasy 
provides a foundation from which to interpret our Chinese consumers’ fantasies 
of Western brands. Martin (2004) suggests that individuals conjure their fantasies 
by focusing on a visual aid. For Martin, who studied imagining in the context of 
a magic trading card game, a card depicting a character served as the visual aid, 
though he asserts that such an aid is not required to evoke imaginative thinking. 
Individuals’ motivation to focus attention on a visual aid with the intention of 
enlivening the imagination ensues from a predisposition to fantasize, driven by a 
desire for participation in the imagined setting and the view that fantasy is valu-
able. Once focusing on the visual aid, imaginers may then engage various strate-
gies to enliven the fantasy. 
Martin’s (2004) theory recognizes three strategies to enliven consumers’ con-
sumption fantasies. Expansion strategies include the mental practice of multi-
plying what is seen, and adding complementary characters of a different type. 
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Embellishment strategies involve extrapolating to fill in what is missing from 
the visual aid, and adding character interactions. Embellishment strategies also 
include imbuing the object of visualization with a history. The third strategy is a 
replacement strategy whereby the imaginer mentally substitutes the visual depic-
tion with a preferred form drawn from memory. These same strategies were pres-
ent in Chinese consumers’ imagining of Western brands.
Martin’s (2004) theory also offers insight into how fantasies of the future China 
(as fueled by national narratives) reinforce or thwart the goals of Western brand 
promotions. In this context an individual’s focus on visual stimuli is a pivotal 
activity from which fantasizing ensues. Likewise, in extensive studies of Western 
brand communications in China, researchers note the rapid expansion and pre-
dominance of visual appeals (Wang 2008), many of which are crafted to prompt 
consumers’ imaginings of identity transformations that will result from consump-
tion (Wang 2000). Martin’s (2004) model suggests that specific national narratives 
of East–West relations may intervene in the initial stages by heightening desire for 
different imagined settings that compete with those suggested by Western adver-
tisements, thereby reducing attention to them. Further, after the consumer attends 
to the visual aid, they may engage a narrative to elaborate and embellish Western 
brand advertisements in their imagination (Martin 2004), which is a goal desired 
by Western producers (Escalas 2007). Yet, following on from Martin’s (2004, 146) 
identification of a “replacement strategy,” consumers may engage memory-based 
replacements which are antithetical to these producers’ intents. 
Strategies of enlivening consumption fantasies 
The strategies employed by individuals to enliven their consumption fantasies 
were also employed by Chinese consumers in their imaginings of Western 
brands.
Expansion strategies abounded in the dreams told by our participants, as evi-
denced in the stories of Western brands that become rows of soldiers with knives, 
or Western brand robot toys that proliferate first to aid and befriend Chinese con-
sumers and then later to enslave them. Expansion strategies were also present in 
positive dreams, as illustrated by the following.
This evening I had a dream. I dreamed that my favorite Safeguard filled my 
bathroom. This made me and my friend happy and worried. We were happy 
because we could use Safeguard to wash and we were worried because there 
were so many of them and we would be tired of them. Suddenly, there came 
a small animal before me and she told me that these Safeguards were given 
by the manufacturer who wanted us to help do some publicity. Meanwhile, 
this would improve the health of the children from the poor mountain areas. 
Then they could grow up happily and healthy, free of disease. I smiled with 
joy. Immediately, my friend and I started working and took care of the task 
well. 
(19 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
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Easy to discern in the above dream is a vision of how a future China (here freed 
of disease) is materialized through the proliferation of Western brands that reach 
even the poorer and more rural areas. Here the multiplication of the Western 
brand Safeguard is used in an imaginative narrative that mimics the saturation 
of Western brands in urban areas and their producers’ desire to expand by mov-
ing into relatively more rural areas (Croll 2006; Wang 2008). The narrative also 
parallels the process whereby urban dwellers are in effect the agents of Western 
brands, introducing them to their rural-dwelling relatives. Finally, the dream nar-
rative highlights the technological powers of the Western brand Safeguard in its 
ability to free people of disease, drawing in part from a narrative of the West and 
Western brands as offering freedom. 
Consumption fantasies scripted according to this narrative were contextualized 
with expansion strategies that took different forms. For instance, instead of mul-
tiplying a single Western brand, some participants multiplied Western brands in a 
variety of product categories. 
Last night my friend had a dream. Due to economic reasons, many things are 
unattainable in real life, but he achieved all of them last night. He owned the 
big Benz, happily Benzing (driving fast) on the wide road. He was wearing 
Baoyu clothes, drinking Coca Cola, even the sound from the car stereo was 
modern style foreign music. He parked the car, used Sony brand camera to 
shoot the beautiful scenery around him, Kodak and Fuji films were prepared 
in one minute, instant 3-D photos were made, and they were connected to the 
Internet, and numerous copies of the photos were printed out from Hewlett 
Packard printer for everyone to enjoy. After looking at the photos, he went 
into the bathroom, used Safeguard, Rejoice (Pert) to wash his hair, put on Fun 
brand [known in China as “famous American brand”] jeans. Everything was 
so pleasant but it was only a dream. 
(25 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
Expansion strategies not only followed scripts tied to the cultural narrative of 
Western brands as freeing: they were also guided by other national narratives. 
The narrative of Western brands as oppressors guided one participant to fantasize 
that she was drowning in a pool filled not with water but with Head & Shoulders 
shampoo. Similarly, another participant was inescapably inundated with Western 
brand promotions even in space. 
I was sitting on an airplane. In the room, on the doors of the airplane there 
were posters of foreign brands everywhere. Looking down to the ground, for-
ests, lands and mountains were all covered with large posters for foreign 
brands. I felt thirsty, picked up a bottle of water and a print ad appeared in 
the water, it’s also about a foreign brand.
(22 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
Embellishment strategies and character interactions comparable to those identi-
fied by Martin (2004) also emerged when we asked Chinese consumers to dream 
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(imagine) a Western brand. Several participants introduced angels, immortals, 
or animal characters to interact with the brand, which they animated as a living 
entity. Others dreamed of Western brands that morphed into such characters, with 
whom they held conversations. Such embellishment strategies served the different 
scripts offered by the competing national narratives.
Motorola turned into a dove and at this time I’m holding it in my hands and it 
said to me “I’m your message dove, delivering your messages and your voice, 
the difference is that I don’t eat grain, but I eat the bills in your pocket.” 
(21 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
To summarize, Martin’s identified strategies used by Chinese individuals to enliven 
their consumption fantasies seem also to emerge in our Western brand context. 
Narratives and imagined identity transformations from 
Western brand consumption
Chinese consumers’ choice of a specific national narrative shapes the form and 
desirability of the imagined transformation of the self and imagined emotional 
experiences. When Chinese consumers historicized Western brands with a nar-
rative of the West as experiential venue and Western brands as providing a sense 
of freedom, they imagined transformations in which they became more individ-
ual, cosmopolitan, leisurely, mobile, knowledgeable, and esteemed, even world 
famous, as a result of acquiring Western brands. Accompanying these imaginings 
were emotions of satisfaction, joy, excitement, hope, and happiness, and some-
times appreciation and gratitude toward the Western brand or its producers. The 
following dreams culminate in these types of desired transformation.
[The more foreign brand products I have . . .] the better quality of life I have. 
[Dream] I dream that Lancôme turns into a beautiful angel, she is strolling in 
the purple-colored woods. I say to her, please make me beautiful. She smiles, 
touches me with her slender hands, kisses me, and says I’m a good girl, and 
I will be very beautiful. 
(22 year old female survey participant, Shanghai)
[The more foreign brand products I have . . .] the higher quality of my life. 
[Dream] In the evening after brushing my teeth with Colgate, lying in bed the 
moonlight shines on my face. I smile splendidly and my teeth glow with shine 
like the stars. And really, little glowing stars and sparkles fly out.
(survey participant, no demographic data, Baoding)
[The more foreign brand products I have . . .], the higher social status I feel 
I’ve achieved. [Dream] I dream that there are foreign brands all around me 
and all over me. Everybody is surprised at me. I feel very proud.
(21 year old male survey participant, Shanghai)
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[The more foreign brand products I have . . .], the higher status I have. 
[Dream] I picture myself in a white tennis shirt and skirt, a vigorous body 
moving on the tennis court. Then wearing famous brand sunglasses I’m on a 
tropical beach. 
(22 year old female survey participant, Shanghai)
[Dream] I spent 20 Yuan, bought a pair of real Nike shoes, and the quality 
was very good. The shoe store owner told me, you have become the celebrity 
endorser of Nike company. From now on, you can wear all the Nike products 
free of charge. I went to the United States and made some commercials for 
Nike together with Michael Jordan. And I made some movies with America’s 
Hollywood stars, and became famous in the end. 
(22 year old male survey participant, Tianjin)
[Dream] Several major famous brands that represent luxury and extrava-
gance were all owned by me at the same time. While having these, it seemed 
like I became a star, wearing Rolex watch, dressed in Chanel clothes, driving 
Benz car. It may be only a daydream, but I’m still very happy. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing) 
[The more foreign brands I have . . .] it shows the better my quality of life. 
[Dream] I was wearing a white sheer dress, with blue silk ribbons at the waist, 
playing on the swing decorated with flower rings in the quiet and peaceful 
forest. A breeze was floating gently, and willows swaying slightly. Waves were 
shimmering in the lake nearby. The grass was so green on the ground, my 
Lancôme and Ou-bo-lai (Aupres) were accompanying me. What a nice and 
beautiful dream! 
(24 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
These imagined transformations of the self drawing from a national narrative in 
which Western brands offer freedom and a sense of liberation appear very com-
patible with general themes of Western brand promotions, as suggested by Wang 
(2000).
Fantasies historicized with a narrative in which Western brands are instru-
ments of domination led to imaginings in which the self was altered after 
consumption, and became more individual, wealthy, and colorful. Yet, these 
transformations were undesired, with connotations of anxiety, fear, isolation, 
loss, disgrace, humiliation, ruin, and becoming an unauthentic person who 
through their choices contributed to a demise of traditional Chinese culture and 
the Chinese nation. 
Wearing an Italian brand suit, French perfume and a Swiss brand watch, 
driving a German brand car, using a Japanese brand computer, and . . . liv-
ing in an American house, this is me. Standing in front of a mirror, I find 
myself with different colors, as if all these famous brands are glowing, but 
only myself is missing. Is there anything worse than not being able to find 
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oneself? All those things are good things, every one of them, but putting them 
together just doesn’t feel good. Follow nature, why torture myself? 
(21 year old male survey participant, Baoding) 
Somebody loved foreign brands so much that he would want to buy them 
even by borrowing money. One day, he was wearing famous brands from 
head to toe, walking on the street, feeling as proud as a peacock, showing 
off his famous brands to everyone passing by. However, not a single person 
cared about him, and they gave him a despising look. Suddenly, one person 
dashed at him like crazy, pushed him to the ground, and beat him up and 
yelled “Where did this devil come from?” 
(24 year old male survey participant, Tianjin)
One day I’m wearing Chanel high-quality fashion, with CD Poison perfume, 
Omega diamond luxury watch, riding in the newest model Benz. Just when 
I am enjoying these things, suddenly many people came up around me and 
criticized me for “chong-yang-mei-wai” (worshiping Western and adoring 
foreign) and for not supporting domestic products. I’m scared and sweat all 
over and throw away everything immediately. 
(21 year old female survey participant, Shanghai)
As soon as the man started his Ferrari, his clothes were blown off. 
(male survey participant, Shanghai)
Such imagined transformations are no doubt at odds with the promotional goals of 
Western brand producers.
Western brand fantasies enlivened by the redemptive narrative manifested in 
dreams that represented a replacement strategy. That is, while asked to write a 
dream about a Western brand, participants offered imaginings of Chinese national 
brands that succeeded in the global market, leading to a more esteemed self, bol-
stered by China’s leading economic position in the world economy. Imaginings 
included not only carrying Chinese domestic brands into foreign markets, like 
flags marking territorial expansion, but also more honored treatment by Western 
corporations, who reduced their prices and improved their quality to cater to more 
discriminating Chinese consumers. Here pride emerges as excelling on capitalist 
terms in the global market, with no concern for the preservation of an authentic 
cultural heritage. Here too, imagined identity transformations are at odds with 
Western promotional objectives, as consumers seek different transformations – 
collective rather than individual. They also seek a different means of transforming 
the self – elevation of China’s brands to global stature. 
We might consider whether and how this imagined future China, one where 
China-made brands thrive globally and elevate the standing of China and its peo-
ple, disrupts the processing of Western brand promotions. Does this desired set-
ting thwart all processing of Western brand promotions? Or does it merely thwart 
processing of their fantasy-piquing content? If we apply Martin’s (2004) model, 
two possibilities seem likely. First, Chinese consumers’ preferred imagined setting 
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is different from that proposed in Western brand promotions; this may lead con-
sumers to ignore Western brands. Second, consumers may attend to the consump-
tion fantasy offered by Western brand producers, but replace it with one that serves 
their imagined future China. Such replacement fantasies may take the form of a 
parody or appropriation of the promotionally cued fantasy, or one that otherwise 
serves to dis-identify the consumer with the Western brand. We sought further 
insights into these questions from our interview data. 
Finally, Western brand fantasies historicized with the narrative in which the 
West is an economic partner gave rise to imaginings of a moderately affluent self 
that was not in conflict with China’s collectivist orientation. All Chinese indi-
viduals were envisioned as more materially affluent. Dreams entailed imagined 
transformations compatible with those promoted in Western brand advertisements 
(Wang 2000). They also entailed those that, if engaged as “replacement” fantasies 
(Martin 2004), would undermine Western brand promotions by shaping meanings 
different from those intended by the producers. Fantasies of dramatically altering 
Western brands to suit local tastes would be such a case, such as adding sweeteners 
or orange flavors to Coca-Cola. Here again, we question whether by asking our 
Chinese consumers to provide a dream of a Western brand we accessed fantasies 
that otherwise would not be commonly evoked. Chinese consumers who hold a 
partnership view of Western brands may not view them as exotic “other” capable 
of dramatically transforming the self, thereby reducing the identity motivation for 
enlivening consumption fantasies. We sought additional insights into this question 
from our interview data. 
The influence of national narratives of East–West relations on the 
processing of Western brand promotions
Our interview data offered insights into how consumption fantasies enlivened by 
national narratives may operate in everyday life to influence brand decisions and 
processing of Western brand promotions. Considering our interview participants 
as cases, these reveal multiple profiles characterized by distinctive patterns of 
nationalist discourses, consumption practices, the identity meanings attached to 
Western brands, propensity to attend to Western brand advertisements, and pro-
pensity to fantasize from them. We suggest that participants’ national narrative 
discourses are indicative of mental rehearsal of these narratives. Given this, we 
offer insights into how imaginings drawn from these narratives precondition con-
sumers’ responses to Western brand promotions that seek to pique the imagina-
tion, and offer four cases to illustrate.
The West as experiential venue, Western brands as instruments 
of freedom
Several interview participants possessed a profile seemingly shaped by discourses 
of the West as experiential venue and Western brands as instruments of freedom. 
We illustrate with the case of Ms Roma. 
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I often read the “Fashion” and “Ella” magazines. They often promote some 
new items. When they do, I’ll cut the colored page and look to buy them when 
I go shopping . . . I don’t plan very much. Like setting a maximum amount of 
money . . . (laughs) I never think about prices . . . .Cosmetics, I switch a lot, 
mostly foreign brands. Now I’m using Lan-kou (Lancôme). Before that I used 
Bei-jia-en, American brand Ya-shi-lan-dai (Estee Lauder) . . . The glasses 
I wear, Calvin Klein . . . They are available at Sai-te [Japanese operated 
department store] and Tai-ping-yang [Atlantic Ocean] Department Store . . . 
I use Swatch a lot . . . everybody knows it’s made in Switzerland . . . Because 
[being overweight] I can’t buy too many clothes, (laughs) I still have to spend 
my money. For shoes . . . it’s probably an Italian brand, most of my leather 
shoes are this brand [Jade Peace] . . . I like Lancel the most, it’s for bags, a 
French brand. I think the brand’s style fits me very well. . . . Lancôme [has 
the best Western brand name] “Lan” for “Lan-hua” (magnolia or orchid 
flower), “kou” for “Dou-kou-nian-hua” (early teens of a girl-refering to 
beautiful age) . . . its advertisements are usually around a petal. When we are 
talking about it now, I feel as if I can see it. 
Ms Roma, a 30 year old Beijing resident who works as a director and editor for 
a local news organization, could well be presumed to be the editor of interna-
tional news stories or popular business books in the West that report the escalating 
demand of the Chinese consumer. Consider the similarity of her reported con-
sumption practices with the earlier excerpt from Garner’s (2005) The Rise of the 
Chinese Consumer. 
Changes in consumer habits have now rendered some old stereotypes rather 
dated, especially where it concerns China’s rising upper-middle class in the 
first-tier cities. Sophistication has become more important and taste among 
the upper-middle class is increasingly converging towards that of the Western 
consumer, especially as many international magazines are publishing local 
editions in China (fashion magazines and even Elle Décor) . . . 
(Garner 2005, 84) 
Ms Roma acquires an abundance of Western brands at a level fantasized by some 
of our study’s student participants, as China’s future professional class. The brands 
she acquires are primarily from categories of conspicuous consumption: cosmet-
ics, apparel, shoes, jewelry, and accessories. She reports feeling liberated in hav-
ing choices and an opportunity to find styles that are compatible with her own. A 
student of Western cultural practices, she studies Western fashion magazines for 
instructions on Western brand purchases. She saves and savors their visual imag-
ery. In our discussions she is an unabashed consumerist, who claims that when 
shopping for Western brands she “never think(s) about price”. For Ms Roma, 
Western brands are a source of identity enhancement. Her practice of switching 
Western brands within product categories and acquiring these in several varieties, 
suggests an attraction to the transformational promises of new, exotic Western 
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brands. During the interview, when talking about specific Western brands, Ms 
Roma spontaneously imagines them. She uses both the phonetic sound-meaning 
of the Chinese ci [word] of the brand name to mentally picture the brand, and 
visualizes imagery from Western brand ads she has seen.
Exhibiting Deng’s promoted erasures of political debates (Liu 2004) through-
out the interview, Ms Roma never speaks of political ideology and its relation-
ship to Western brands. Near the end of the session, when questioned on this, she 
declares that personal comfort with the brand is the only salient criterion. From 
this profile, we suggest that the national narrative of gaige kaifang, and govern-
ment discourses of China as a vast market for Western brands, disseminated while 
China was vying for WTO membership, alleviate identity conflicts of Western 
brand consumption with nationalism and socialism. Fantasies of individualism 
and material luxury as forms of play and escape are encouraged by this narrative, 
rehearsals of which (entailing a “quest for moderate affluence”) pave the way 
for receptiveness to Western brand visual stimuli. As a result, consumers seeking 
identity enhancement are predisposed to focus attention on Western brand visual 
stimuli (Martin 2004), and further, to fantasize the positive identity transforma-
tions presented in Western brand promotions. 
The West as imperialist oppressor, Western brands as instruments of 
domination
Our second profile, comprising participants whose discourses reflected the narra-
tive of the West as imperialist oppressor, is illustrated with the case of Ms Nice, a 
40 year old Beijing resident and manager for a foreign company. 
Actually before we renovated this apartment we bought everything of domes-
tic brands . . . Actually we are very patriotic . . . .We bought this TV this one 
time because we needed a big one, and our domestic brands don’t have this. 
And its color and size fit this place. Thus we had to buy theirs [a foreign 
brand]. The same is with cars. The quality of our domestic brand cars is poor. 
The cars always have problems. Before I had a [domestic car]. When it’s hot 
in summer, you couldn’t start it, or it quit while running. This may not sound 
so good, but anything linked to domestic, their quality will not be good. Now I 
have a Japanese Nissan. . . . Many domestic brands just don’t work. My efforts 
do not fall short of my patriotism, but my satisfaction does. You spend a lot of 
money but domestic brands always make you uncomfortable. There is nothing 
you can do about it. Finally we decided to buy imported goods. Why do so 
many people buy famous brands? The quality is there . . . There are famous 
domestic brands too, for example Hai-er air conditioner. 
Unlike Ms Roma, early in the interview and without prompting, Ms Nice associ-
ated patriotism with loyalty to domestic brands. Although she does not avoid all 
Western brands, it is noteworthy that, in contrast to Ms Roma, she does not pur-
chase them in luxury or personal care/appearance categories. Ms Nice’s Western 
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brand acquisitions are only electronic/mechanical goods, which constitute a large 
financial commitment (her television and automobile). For these, she is compelled 
to offer justifications. These suggest a theme of bittersweet liberation in which 
Western brands free her from the exhausting, restraining effects on everyday life 
wrought by unreliable domestic brands. Ms Nice laments that her patriotism is not 
rewarded with satisfaction when buying domestic brands. 
Ms Nice’s conflict was echoed by many survey participants who responded 
to the multiple sentence-completion items in ways that reflected a desire to buy 
national brands in the face of their beliefs that these did not offer quality compa-
rable to Western brands.
[If all foreign brands disappeared from the Chinese market, I would . . .] feel 
happy because Chinese can have a good market for our own products; but 
meanwhile I’m afraid that the stuff I buy will not have guaranteed quality.
(survey participant, no demographic data, Shanghai)
[Foreign brands always . . .] offer good service and their product quality is 
good. 
  [The greatest disadvantage of foreign brands . . .] is that they hurt domestic 
brands. 
(21 year old male survey participant, Shanghai)
[Foreign brands always . . .] have good quality and expensive price.
  [The more foreign brands I have . . .] there will be fewer domestic brands.
(23 year old female survey participant, Shanghai)
[Then more foreign brands I have . . .] the more I want to cheer for national 
industry.
(19 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
[The more foreign brands I have . . .] the higher I feel my status is. [Dream] I 
will dream that Chinese brands become all the rage in the country and foreign 
brands no longer have the supreme power. 
(23 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
At no point during the interview does Ms Nice speak spontaneously of shop-
ping for Western brands, as did Ms Roma. Nor does she imagine foreign brands. 
She neither visualizes the brand name meaning nor recalls the visual imagery 
of Western brand advertisements. In line with Martin’s (2004) suggestions, Ms 
Nice does seek active participation in an imagined setting. She imagines China 
as a society that shares collectivist concerns and a desire to assert this through 
domestic brand choice (see also Cayla and Eckhardt 2008). Her desire to be in this 
imagined setting places her outside the identity frame offered by Western brand 
producers (Wang 2000). 
From this profile we suggest mental rehearsals of the national narrative of the 
West as oppressor may inhibit imaginative processing of Western brand visual 
promotions in two ways. First, it may pre-empt focus on Western brand visual 
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stimuli, as it places the consumer in an opposing imagined setting in which the 
imagined settings depicted in many Western ads of a leisurely, cosmopolitan life 
(Wang 2000) offer little allure. Further, participation in these commercially cued 
imagined settings would pose identity conflicts, and thus offer benefits of neither 
escape nor play as facilitating fantasizing (Martin’s 2004). Imaginative processing 
of Western brand promotions may also be inhibited by the narrative of Western 
brands as instruments of Western domination conjured to shape “replacement” 
fantasies (Martin 2004). These replacements would counter the imaginings of 
positive identity transformations which commercial producers of Western brands 
attempt to incite (Wang 2000), perhaps rendering the advertisements themselves 
difficult to recall. 
We returned to our projective survey data (the dreams) to inquire further into 
why participants with profiles similar to Ms Nice do not imagine Western brands 
or spontaneously recall advertisements for them. The following responses reflect 
our theories of the use of replacement fantasies.
[The more foreign brand products I have], the more I pursue them. [Dream] 
Have never had this kind of dream. I think if I were to dream, it will be about 
a brand that is created by me and transferred to China. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
Replacement dreams in some instances reflect a narrative that begins with the pos-
itive transformation promoted by Western brand producers (for example dreams 
of enhanced or extraordinary athletic performances following the acquisition of 
Western brand sports equipment). Yet a “replacement fantasy” takes place in that 
the ultimate outcome of consumption is one that harms the self or identity. 
[The more foreign brand products I have] the more I feel that China’s national 
industry should learn from those foreign companies. I actually very much 
support domestic products, but deep in my heart don’t feel comfortable when 
buying. [Dream] One day, I’m wearing a pair of Nike shoes and playing bas-
ketball with friends. Because of the shoes, I played very actively on the court, 
very engaged, and that makes all my friends stare at my shoes. Later I don’t 
know how, my foot stepped aside and I sprained my ankle. I can’t believe it, 
with Nike shoes on, my foot was injured! 
(21 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
Interpreting the body here as the self or collective self (Tung 1994), the participant 
conveys that the high-performance brand may ultimately create a loss of standing 
among Chinese, who feel that Western brands threaten domestic brands. 
The West as subjugated, conquered Western brands as redemption
As a third profile, several of our interview participants were sensitive to what 
they deemed humiliating or disrespectful practices by Western companies. 
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Ms Sun, a 26 year old pharmaceutical representative residing in Tianjin, serves as 
our example. 
In fact, I didn’t really find anything better than other brands such as Zhong-
hua (China) . . . I couple of years ago, I used to use Piao-rou (Rejoice), Panting 
(Pantene), Sha-xuan (Sassoon), and Li-shi (Lux). But in recent years, I found 
that other, domestic brands, even those not very famous brands have similar
effects, but their prices are much lower. So, I sometimes use those brands . . . 
Since childhood, we progressed from hair washing paste to shampoo, the 
popular brands were Feng-hua (bee flower) . . . Later when Piao-rou and 
Pan-ting entered the market, they immediately took over the domestic market, 
because after you use them, the effect is really good . . . But in recent years, I 
feel all brands are similar . . . except for their fame and ads, there isn’t much 
difference in quality . . . No domestic appliance brand is satisfactory to me . . . I 
use Sony and Aiwa . . . I read an article which suggests that . . . Japanese prod-
ucts made for Europeans are better quality than those made for Asian people. 
After reading it, I was very angry and really didn’t want to buy any Japanese 
products. Why is it that way? . . . Supermarkets such as Jia-le-fu (Carrefour), 
. . . it’s from France . . . there are occasions when the quality is not good, it’s 
really discriminating against Chinese. . . . They know that Chinese consum-
ers are just that, thus they aren’t as strict with some products as they are in 
France. But it still is better than others. If something feels good to use, I would 
be satisfied, whether or not it’s foreign.
Like Ms Nice, Ms Sun acquired both domestic and foreign brands, using assess-
ments of quality to judge the merits. There is, though, a reversal of the prefer-
ence order reported by Ms Nice. Ms Sun, whose discourse seems to be shaped 
by narratives of “erasure of humiliation,” reported early use of better-perform-
ing foreign brands, followed by a switch to domestic brands which over time 
had been able to emulate similar quality at a lower price. Neither conspicuous 
consumption of Western branded luxury goods nor goods used primarily for the 
purpose of individualization pose an identity threat to Ms Sun. She compares 
domestic brand cosmetics and Western brand cosmetics and defends a specific 
Western brand (Red Earth) as offering novel colors which create a more individ-
ual persona. Ms Sun is, however, sensitively aware of specific Western brands 
whose manufacturers treat Chinese disrespectfully. This took various forms, 
one being the discrimination seen in offering products to Chinese consumers 
that were inferior to similarly labeled Western brands sold in the West. Another 
form was that of Western brand producers offering older versions of the brand 
in China while distributing newer versions in Western nations. Ms Sun’s con-
sumption ideology did not involve wholesale boycotting of Western brands, but 
rather selective avoidance of those whose corporate practices were revealed as 
racially/nationally discriminating. 
Ms Sun’s concerns mirror some of the comments of our survey participants 
regarding such discrimination. 
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My friend had a dream that his Sony walkman turned into a Japanese person 
and told him, “You are stupid. I was originally damaged in Japan, and after 
being packaged again, exported to China and was bought by you at a high 
price. You are so nice, ha ha!” My friend woke up with cold sweat all over 
his body.
(20 year old male survey participant, Beijing)
What is thought in dreams is actually the wish to make up what is missing 
in reality. The following are some of my wishes for foreign brands . . . 1. In 
any country, the commodity concept that a brand represents is unchanged. 
There shouldn’t be any quality discrimination based on country or region . . . . 
2. The high cost in delivering high quality should not necessarily be expressed 
by locking into high end consumers. Otherwise it would seem snobbish, and 
Chinese are very disgusted by snobbish petty men. Instead products should 
be developed to fit different consumer groups. 3. The claimed product quality 
should be consistent to the actual quality . . . 
(24 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
Some survey participants expressed a desire for redemption for this disrespectful 
treatment in dreams where Western brands compete for their attention, treating 
them as discerning consumers who demand quality products.
I dream of being in Paris, coming to the square. There is a clear blue sky and 
suddenly a flock of doves in formation fly above me as a crowd of salespeople 
of various famous foreign brands come my way. Everyone of them is shout-
ing to me, “Come! Little girl! Try the newest Nike running shoes and see if 
they are comfortable.” “No, Do not use Nike. Reebok products are better” 
. . . After leaving the square driving a Mercedes which was loaded with vari-
ous famous brand products, I returned home. My face was all smiles!
Returning to the case of Ms Sun, her consumption experiences also offer a striking 
contrast to those of Ms Roma, who embellished her imaginings of Western brands 
by drawing from Western brand icons and advertisements. During the interview, 
Ms Sun does not draw from these to enliven her imagination, but rather comments 
on Western brand advertisements as well-funded manipulative tactics to gener-
ate perceptions of familiarity and fame irrespective of meaningful differences in 
quality. Indeed, not all survey participants who noted that “foreign brands always 
. . .” “have well funded ads,” viewed this as positive. Many, like Ms Sun, saw it as 
potentially deceptive and manipulative. Further, whereas some Chinese consum-
ers admired the pretty packaging of Western brands, others found it a weakness, 
and still others found it deceptive. In the sentence-completion items a few partici-
pants noted that “the greatest weakness of foreign brands is . . .” “too much pack-
aging.” Interview participants also made comments such as “I think the reason 
why foreign brands are so popular is because they have too much advertising, it’s 
like everywhere. Turn on the TV, many are foreign brand commercials” (23 year 
old female interview participant, Beijing).
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Drawing from Ms Sun’s profile, we suggest that mental rehearsal of the national 
narrative of redemption which seeks “erasure of humiliation” does not impede 
consumers’ attentiveness to the visual stimuli of Western brand promotions. 
However, it does seem to thwart fantasies of positive identity transformation 
(Wang 2000) by rendering consumers sensitive to manipulation and discrimina-
tion. Earlier research that activated “skepticism” by having consumers play the 
role of critic found that consumers shift away from imaginative processing and 
towards benefit-based processing (Escalas 2007). We suggest that the redemptive 
narrative with its themes of discriminatory treatment serve to activate skepti-
cism, leading these Chinese consumers to engage in benefit-based processing of 
Western brand promotions rather than imaginative processing (Escalas 2007). 
This finding echoes and elaborates the findings of the 2007 China Brand Report, 
which announces “Today’s Chinese consumers no longer have the mentality to 
look up to foreign brands. Rather, they consider what’s behind a brand name with 
more cognitive thought” (p. 326). The Report’s documentation of discriminatory 
practices by Western producers serves to activate Chinese consumers’ skepticism 
while contributing to a national narrative of redemption from past humiliations at 
the hands of Western nations. 
The West as economic partner, Western brands as instruments 
of economic progress
Finally, our fourth profile represents those who fully embraced the ideology of 
the market economy, whereby Western brands are both partners and rivals that 
spur improvement. Ms Jin, a 28 year old accountant residing in Baoding, is our 
illustrative case. 
Under the presupposition that the quality of both domestic and foreign prod-
ucts are the same, I’ll definitely choose our national brand. But if that con-
dition is not met, it will depend. If our domestic products don’t have good 
quality, buying them does not mean patriotism, but it will even hurt the econ-
omy’s growth in the long run . . . .When you buy computers, you choose Lian-
xiang [Lenovo], you would think it’s a Chinese brand. But as a matter of fact, 
its core technology is foreign with a Chinese shell. I think in these instances 
it does not matter if you choose Chinese or foreign . . . .I think medicine has 
its special characteristics. Chinese medicine, it has to be domestic; Western 
medicine or antibiotics, it has to be foreign . . . In the clothes category, I never 
buy any foreign brands because they are all made in China anyway, only they 
are changed into a Western brand name. China is the number one clothes 
manufacturing country in the world, including many famous Italian brands. 
. . . I like shopping at Yi-jia [IKEA] furniture store. It’s Swedish and its items 
are really very expensive. . . . If something is too expensive, I will go to other 
stores and buy something similar. Brands are not important, the first consid-
eration is price, then quality, and third is brands.
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Ms Jin argues early in our interview that to choose an inferior-quality domestic 
brand does not reflect patriotism at all. She argues that, indeed, to prop up inferior-
quality goods is detrimental to China’s economic growth. 
This theme also was common in sentence-completion statements from our sur-
vey participants. 
[If all foreign brands disappeared from the Chinese market, I would . . .] feel 
sad for my country and nation because competition is good for the growth of 
the domestic industry. 
(survey participant, Baoding)
[If all foreign brands disappeared from the Chinese market, I would . . .] feel 
disappointed and scared because from then on Chinese brands will degener-
ate because of lack of competition. 
(survey participant, Beijing)
[The more foreign brand products I have . . .] the more threat it is to domestic 
products of the same kind, but this kind of competition is beneficial to the 
development of industry. 
(20 year old female survey participant, Beijing)
In subsequent discussions, Ms Jin notes the irrelevance of brands owing to 
increased Chinese–Western partnering in assembly and manufacturing. In par-
ticular she calls attention to clothing brands, noting that even Western brands are 
made in China. The lesser importance of the choice between domestic brands and 
Western brands manufactured in China was expressed in other ways in our survey 
data. Here, one participant echoes Ms Jin’s sentiments that “In the clothes cat-
egory, I never buy foreign brands because they are all made in China anyway, only 
they are changed into a Western brand name.” 
[Dream] Two people went to purchase clothes for interviews. The shopping 
center was filled with famous brands, what brand should they buy? Domestic? 
Imported? Which one? They would walk around first. Wow. Pierre Cardin 
looked so good when trying it on. The prices seemed to be O.K. They came to 
the cashier who told them the price. They were shocked, as it turned out that 
they had overlooked a “0.” Embarrassed they had to flee out of there. Ah, 
maybe we should just go to the market to take a look. They came to a small 
store. The owner who overheard it was clothes for interviewing immediately 
introduced “Look at this one, it looks exactly the same as the Pierre Cardin in 
another store, but the price is far different. Try it on?” Putting it on the effect 
was really good, but it was a counterfeit product. Never mind, that’s it, 3000 
Yuan, “Pierre Cardin”. He gladly went to the interview. What a coincidence! 
The interviewer was wearing the same suit. My goodness, surprisingly, the 
first thing that the interviewer said was “Our tastes are very similar!” He 
was very happy.
(22 year old female survey participant, Tianjin)
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Where foreign versus domestic designations have relevance to Ms Jin is in areas 
where product development is tied to cultural history, for example Chinese medi-
cine or Western antibiotics. She recognizes that foreign brands, if unaffordable, 
can be imitated more cheaply, with satisfactory results. As she sums up, “brands 
are not important.” Ms Jin, and others possessing a similar profile, never mentions 
imagining Western brand advertisements, icons, logos, or phonetic sounds. From 
this profile we suggest that mental rehearsal of the narrative whereby the West is 
deemed partner diminishes the sense of “otherness,” “exoticism,” and transforma-
tional power attributed to Western brands (Wang 2000). Western brands as a mean-
ingful consumption category are diminished, as are preconditions to fantasizing 
about them (Martin 2004). As occurred for those endorsing a redemptive narra-
tive, our interview participants who spoke of Western brands as partners engage in 
benefit-based processing of brand promotions rather than imaginative processing, 
where they become transported in personal narratives of how the brand will change 
their lives. It would seem that, for these participants, awareness of manufacturing 
partnering led to skepticism regarding the source-quality arguments advanced by 
others who held Western brands to be of better quality. In turn, this skepticism 
thwarts imaginative processing while encouraging benefit-based processing. The 
ambivalence toward national versus Western brand categories exhibited by these 
participants does not, however, mean that they see brand choice as apolitical, as 
they remain aware of the nationalistic meanings attached to brand choices by other 
consumers. 
Discussion
Our findings suggest refinements and extensions to Martin’s (2004) theory. First, 
we found that consumers use historical cultural narratives to enliven their fanta-
sies. This history was a repository for creative imaginings which hold meanings 
that are both compatible with and in contrast to those disseminated by Western 
brand producers. We also found that the enlivenment of consumption fantasies 
need not require visual aids, as the concept “Western brands” is linked in memory 
to the material objects they represent. In our research, which did not cue com-
mercial sources of meaning, individuals’ consumption fantasies were revealed 
as drawing from various discourses and depictions of Western brands, including 
those disseminated by non-Western brand producers of local national culture, both 
commercial entities and the governing body. These varied representations com-
prise the stock from which individuals may either embellish commercial images of 
Western brands or replace them with their own imagination (Martin 2004).
Martin’s (2004) theory does not link such use of a historically embellishing strat-
egy with resources provided by national or cultural narratives. In Martin’s (2004) 
game context, participants shaped their own narratives piecemeal, from one turn 
at play to the next. Their historical contextualizations drew from familiar scenes 
in science fiction books and films in the fantasy genre, an example of which 
would be Lord of the Rings. Yet, Martin’s (2004) work does connect with those of 
other consumer culture theorists who recognize the value of cultural narratives 
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in shaping consumption fantasies. These studies carried out in Western contexts 
reveal that cultural narratives embody salient identity meanings, providing not only 
content for enlivening consumption fantasies, but also the motivation for doing so 
(Arnould and Price 1993; Arnould, Price, and Tierney 1998; Peñaloza 2001). When 
a cultural narrative is accessible, however, imaginings may draw from this as a 
script, much like Martin’s participants drew from novel and film scripts. 
We also found that national narratives used by our Chinese participants emerged 
as organizing scripts, which guided the use of other strategies for shaping fantasy 
(Martin 2004). A given strategy, such as multiplying Western brands (Martin 2004), 
could render a pleasant fantasy via a mental image of an abundant leisurely life, or 
an unpleasant fantasy of domination via widespread instantiation of Western cul-
ture. As guided by the narrative, consumers relied on specific strategies to express 
consumption ideologies symbolically. As well as drawing on cultural narratives, 
consumers are at the same time engaging in an embellishment strategy whereby 
they imbue the consumption object with a history: that is, they “historicize” it 
(Martin 2004, 145).
Martin’s (2004) theoretical antecedent – the desire to participate in an imagined 
setting – applies not only to magic games. As noted by political science scholars 
and consumer culture theorists, through their responses to Western brands indi-
viduals can imagine themselves part of an imagined global community (Arnett 
2002), an imagined regional community (the Asia-Pacific; Cayla and Eckhardt 
2008), or an imagined nation-state (Arnett 2002). An imagined China is conceived 
differently by different individuals in ways shaped by cultural narratives, which 
have multiplied since the economic reforms of the 1970s (Cayla and Eckhardt 
2008; Gries 2004). These narratives, which draw selectively from China’s history, 
guided some participants’ consumption fantasies. 
National narratives are creative resources for contextualizing Western brand 
consumption fantasies with historical settings and meanings, leading to different 
propensities to fantasize about Western brands. Whereas some narratives lead to 
imaginative processing which is advantageous to Western brand producers, others 
lead consumers to conjure replacement fantasies or to carefully scrutinize promo-
tional content by way of benefit-based rather than imaginative processing (Escales 
2007).
Beyond the desire for escapism and play (Martin 2004), individuals’ compul-
sion to fulfill identity projects provides motivation to enliven and historicize fan-
tasies of consumption. Our participants enlivened their consumption fantasies 
by engaging national narratives of East–West relations – that is, how China as a 
nation-state is related to national powers of the imagined West. These fantasies 
embodied ideals for enacting Chinese nationality via consumption practices. Our 
findings suggest that, because national narratives shape individuals’ identity proj-
ects (Mick and Buhl 1992) and comprise the extended self (Belk 1988), they offer 
both motivation and content for enlivening consumption fantasies (Arnould, Price, 
and Tierney 1998; Mick and Buhl 1992). Contrary to the simplistic notion that 
nationalism or patriotism is asserted via protectionism and domestic brand loyalty 
(Pecotich and Rosenthal 2001), our analysis reveals a more complex meaning. 
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Nationalist narratives include forms which encourage international exchange and 
Western brand consumption in the “spirit of nationalism” to promote the economy 
of a nation-state and elevate the living standard of its citizens. With prescriptions 
ranging from boycotting to selective screening out to indulgence, these narratives 
reflect the complex ideological scene in China (Liu 2004). In individuals’ fantasies 
of Western brands, China’s revolutionary legacy and the various ways it has been 
framed in nationalist discourses permeate Chinese consumers’ imaginings.
In fantasizing, individuals imagine transformative outcomes of consumption 
experiences (Arnould and Price 1993; Belk et al 2003). We found that the form of the 
imagined transformation was guided by the choice of narrative (Arnould, Price, and 
Tierney 1998). In our global context of Western branded consumption, narratives 
prompted transformation such that once individuals engaged a cultural narrative to 
embellish a thought, they became caught up in it, often imagining themselves as 
actors who evolved within the narrative (Escalas 2007; Wang and Calder 2006). 
Consumption fantasies can be not only pleasant but also unpleasant, for exam-
ple victimization narratives that drew from collective memories of cultural loss, 
including losses that predated the imaginers’ lives. Individuals also enlivened con-
sumption fantasies with hypothetical scenarios of cultural demise at the hands of 
oppressive Western brands, reflecting geopolitical concerns regarding the global 
economy. The imagined transformations drawn from these narratives were of dis-
paragement and lost identity. Thus, whereas earlier works highlighted consumers’ 
use of cultural narratives to enliven fantasies that reinforce the value of com-
mercial offerings, our work suggests that some narratives challenge the goals of 
Western brand producers. 
Our findings show that nationalist narratives may influence consumers’ pro-
cessing of Western brand visual stimuli in four ways. First, they may reinforce 
attempts to pique the consumer’s imagination, as in the case Ms Roma, whose 
discourses drew from a narrative of the West as offering freedom. Here, by rep-
resenting a compatible imagined setting (Martin 2004) and eliminating identity 
conflicts, this narrative paves the way for pleasurable escapism (Martin 2004) and 
encourages consumers to imaginatively process brand promotions that play to this 
theme (Escalas 2007; Wang and Calder 2006). 
Second, imaginings drawn from nationalist narratives may counter Western 
brand fantasies by supplying opposing imagined settings and replacement fanta-
sies that undermine the effectiveness of visual stimuli. This emerged as the likely 
effect of the narrative portraying the West as imperialist oppressor and calling for 
loyalty to domestic brands. Earlier research suggests that the downside of getting 
consumers to process brand advertisements narratively is that they will be trans-
ported too far in their autobiographical memories (Escalas 2007). Proposed rem-
edies involve creating tighter linkages of the brand with self-narratives (Escalas 
2007). Remedies tied to promoting rehearsal and imagining of self-narratives 
may be more challenging or less effective in cultures where collective interests 
are valued. Drawing from Martin’s (2004) theory of “replacement” fantasies, we 
suggest that counter-fantasies are an additional threat to brand ads that promote 
narrative processing. Among Chinese consumers, elicited autobiographical mem-
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ories may be linked to collective memories of the nation-state, the “iron bowl,” 
and the recent dismantling of the “iron bowl” as a result of economic transforma-
tion (Croll 2006). 
Third, imaginings enlivened by nationalist narratives may heighten skepticism 
regarding Western brands. Our participants’ comments drawing on a redemptive 
narrative showed that they felt Chinese consumers were seen as gullible and treated 
unfairly relative to consumers in the West. Heightened skepticism associated with 
rehearsing this nationalist narrative promoted benefit-based rather than imagina-
tive processing of brand advertisements (Escalas 2007). Finally, narratives such as 
the West as partner may neutralize the “otherness” of foreign brands to the extent 
that they impede the fantasies of identity transformation that brand producers seek 
to encourage (Wang 2000). 
Future research might increase our understanding of this interplay. Reader-
response studies of specific Western brand advertisements may offer some insights 
(Mick and Buhl 1992). Future research might also consider marketers’ efforts 
to counteract consumers’ engagement with particular nationalist narratives that 
might result in unpleasant imaginings. Further, it would be interesting to see how 
advertisements that attempt to evoke one narrative can be undermined by elements 
that inadvertently activate others. Returning to the advertisement described in the 
Introduction, Kentucky Fried Chicken created an advertisement depicting a host of 
hungry Chinese soldiers who received and then devoured boxes of KFC chicken. 
This imposes a historical context in which the United States and China are allies. 
Even though the theme was intended to represent friendliness and alliance, other 
elements in the ad seemed to activate a sense of humiliation, such that overall the 
advertisement would have a damaging effect on the Chinese people’s image. 
Future research might consider whether such commercially imposed contexts 
pre-empt others that consumers might more readily imagine. If Western brand fan-
tasies are conducive to the formation of marketplace rituals, a comparison made by 
McCreery (1995) seems relevant. Highlighting that rituals are often challenged by 
the lures of advertising, he observes that whereas “ritual accesses a settled world in 
which cultural categories are fixed, where cultural principles never change,” “ads 
assume a world in which . . . media-based messages propose transformations in 
relationships between persons and goods” (1995, 326). Here, the historical context 
attempts to represent the KFC brand as a gift to an ally, which might challenge a 
ritualized fantasy of Western brands as the weaponry of an opponent. 
In summary, individuals may engage nationalist narratives to enliven their 
consumption fantasies of Western brands. In so doing, individuals assert cultur-
ally shaped consumption ideologies, and in the process bolster national aspects 
of their identity. This process may either reinforce or undermine the imaginative 
processing that guides the design of Western brand advertisements. Although vari-
ous institutions (both commercial and the nation-state) disseminate narratives that 
map out alignments of nationalism with competing prescriptions for responding 
to foreign brands, these positions are not shaped solely by a ruling elite: indi-
vidual consumers may choose their own narratives when imagining marketplace 
offerings, and in doing so shape cultural consumption ideologies.
7 Citizen-consumers in an age 
of globalization
Chinese consumers use Western brands to assert their version of national iden-
tity. This emerged from findings that Chinese form meanings for Western brands, 
drawing from select historical national narratives of East–West relations: the West 
as experiential venue and Western brands as instruments of freedom; the West 
as oppressor and Western brands as instruments of domination; the West as sub-
jugated and Western brands, by their own subjugation, as symbolically erasing 
China’s past humiliations; and, the West as partner, such that Western brands are 
instruments of economic progress (Gries 2004). Our theory elaborates processes 
by which Western brands are shaped by macro-level sociohistorical forces to moti-
vate consumers’ responses to them as acts of nation-making (Gerth 2003, 2008). 
Further, we theorize the different ways in which national narratives of interna-
tional relationships can intervene in individual processing of Western brand pro-
motions that seek to pique consumers’ imaginations. 
Our theory of the use of Western brands in Chinese nation-making aligns with 
broader academic discourses of “citizen-consumers” which recognize that indi-
viduals’ actions are increasingly guided by civic concerns (Trentmann 2007, 147). 
As observed by Trentmann (2007), the notion of citizen-consumers represents a 
conjoining of concepts during the last decade which in academic tradition and pub-
lic discourses were placed in opposition. This oppositional relationship emerged 
through discourses of a modern world that enticed people towards individualistic 
consumerist pursuits and away from civic interests. More recently, global brands 
from Western nations, rather than material goods in general, are vilified as re-
ducing people’s engagement in the collective public interest (Klein 2003). Owing 
to their large capital bases and political influence, Western brands are observed to 
dominate public spaces and the media, leaving no realm free to voice public con-
cerns that are outside the market interest (Klein 2003). Trentmann’s (2007) work 
calls attention to the nature of this oppositional relationship between citizenship 
and consumption. As he argues, the conception of citizenship and consumption 
is tied to a particular historical shaping of civic-mindedness, whereby citizens 
were deemed independent arms-bearing men, rooted to the land and living an 
organic communal identity (Trentmann 2007). The shift in Western research over 
the past decade towards the civic potential of consumption is attributable to mul-
tiple movements noted by Trentmann (2007). First, the spread of neoliberalism 
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spanning the latter part of the 20th century and the start of the 21st, which had 
the effect of privatizing territory that previously belonged to the public domain 
(Trentmann 2007). In developed Western nations, particularly the United States 
and the United Kingdom, the spread of neoliberalism was manifested in the priva-
tization of education, utilities, and the military – whereby these former state-run 
operations were handed over to commercial entities or otherwise expected to oper-
ate as profit centers (Giroux 2005; Singer 2003; Stromquist 2002). This has given 
rise to social movements, some of which appropriate the neoliberal discourses of 
“consumer choice” to advocate for more voice and participation in these institu-
tions (Rosen 2003). Certainly, in post-reform China privatization has been a more 
sweeping experience, changing the once government-supplied housing, educa-
tion, healthcare, jobs, manufacturing facilities, retirement plans, vacation/holiday 
sites, and other aspects of everyday life (Croll 2006). 
A second impetus to this increased attention to the civic potential of consump-
tion has been advanced through gender studies calling attention to the agency 
of women in influencing public affairs through consumption (Trentmann 2007). 
Others call attention to the promotions of public and private institutions seeking to 
engage women as civic-minded consumers capable of cultivating in their children 
the patriotic consumption of national goods (Gerth 2003, 2008). Historical studies 
also recognize consumer boycotts as a form of civic action for colonized people 
(Trentmann 2007).
Together these streams of historically oriented research recognize consumption 
as a sphere of political action. Such studies have often been anchored in national-
ism and imperialism, whereby consumers’ support for domestic brands is used to 
assert patriotism (Gerth 2003, 2008; Trentmann 2007). More recently, consumer 
culture researchers have recognized that transnational corporations do not hold 
a monopoly on the institutional shaping of brand meanings and have enhanced 
our understanding of state influence on the meanings of consumer goods (Zhao 
and Belk 2008). National governments are active in creating identity frames for 
their citizens, which in some countries include ideals for responding to branded 
consumer goods (Belk, Ger, Askegaard 2003). We extended theorizing by 
recognizing that national brand choices are not the only ones used to assert patrio-
tism or nationalism. Rather, for some, consuming Western brands was consis-
tent with a national project of asserting China’s status in the global economy, 
elevating the status of its consumers, and supporting its entry into the World Trade 
Organization. 
Our work contributes to studies of citizen-consumers, filling knowledge gaps 
noted by Trentmann (2007), who calls attention to the need for an understanding 
of how shifts in the notions of citizenship and consumption are appropriated by 
institutions and individuals in their daily lives. 
. . . there remains a gulf between the study of behavior, values and sym-
bols, and the study of institutions broadly defined. Law, regulatory regimes, 
national and transnational processes of governance – these deserve greater 
attention in the study of consumer cultures. Finally, there is a gap between 
Citizen-consumers in an age of globalization  123
micro and macro levels of understanding consumers as citizens. The long 
and rich literature on citizenship has been oriented towards the public side of 
norms and practices [that elides the everyday workings of politics that might 
be revealed by study of consumer practice] . . . Following practice reveals 
consumption as a series of evolving processes. Consumption is about doing 
things, purpose and accomplishment as well as symbols and communication: 
it is about fulfilling certain tasks . . . It is the practice that shapes public life, 
rather than the goods themselves or their symbolic value. . . . Consumption 
practices depend on external conditions, including policy and infrastructures, 
but consumers, through their practices, also help to shape these systems . . . 
Consumers through their everyday practices, consciously or unconsciously 
leave their mark on these larger social systems.
(Trentmann 2007, 155) 
Our research shows that the social processes of citizen-consumer practice 
emerge out of national traditions and the reconstructions of national cultural heri-
tage and cannot be uncoupled. This book reveals how Chinese people attempt 
to leave their mark on a larger social system by responding to Western branded 
products in various ways to realize their imaginings of the future China. They are 
attempting to brand the “new China” in the same way that governing administra-
tions in China are actively involved in “country brandings” (Wang 2008, 2). We 
note that many of the branded products of the West discussed by our Chinese 
participants also refer to corporate brands, for example Coca-Cola, Jeans West, 
KFC, Nike, and Mercedes. That is, products comprising the corporation’s port-
folio have been branded through icons, labels, and promotional campaigns that 
attempt to infuse them with the identity of the corporate brand. Corporate brand 
identity is built from communications that articulate who the company is and what 
it stands for that distinguish it from other organizations (Schultz and Hatch 2006). 
The values and beliefs of the corporation shape the brand identity and serve as the 
basis for securing consumers’ affinities toward, identification with, and emotional 
attachments to the brand. Our findings suggest that the more specific, distinctive, 
or niche-oriented identity and lifestyle positions that Western corporations seek to 
cultivate through their branded products may to some extent become conflated in 
the eyes of Chinese consumers, for whom the brand’s association with “the West” 
is its most distinguishing feature. Yet, as our analysis highlights, the meanings of 
“West” in relation to nationalism are multiple and competing, and require an in-
depth knowledge of specific consumer groups.
Looking to the future of brand research in China, we note that other studies of 
citizen-consumers take global brands and the transnational corporations that pro-
duce them as focal, and examine citizen activism asserted through the consump-
tion of brands whose producers practice fair trade, reject sweatshop products, and 
otherwise engage in corporate practices that reflect sensitivity to or participation 
in global human rights causes (Klein 2003; Trentmann 2007). Development-ori-
ented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have begun to engage significantly 
with the market and consumer culture. NGOs now target consumers with goods 
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that compete with global brands in the realms of clothing, jewelry, gifts, music 
festivals, and travel venues, yet by distinguishing themselves from these global 
offerings they present themselves as “humankind” brands (http: //www.youtube.
com/watch?v=eQK6ODxDfDY). This positioning is a double-mission one: in pos-
iting a human race that encompasses the global community, it presents a challenge 
to national identity with a collective identity that supersedes it. Thus, it poses a 
challenge to the commercial brands of for-profit organizations (whether domestic 
or foreign) that seek to tap into nationalistic sentiments. The “humankind” rhetoric 
of NGOs also references their particular mandates to eradicate poverty, protect the 
environment, and guarantee human rights. Thus, their branded goods claiming to 
accomplish these missions while satisfying consumers’ needs and desires position 
them as ethical relative to those of corporations that rarely link to such values, 
except in cases where they partner with NGOs in social marketing programs. We 
suggest that the future of brands in China as a domain for asserting citizenship 
will likely continue to be dichotomized in terms of competition between Western 
and China-made (Gerth 2003, 2008). Global NGOs, however, may shift the terms 
of brand competition from price, quality, and technological sophistication to the 
relative benefits they offer society.
Appendix: Outdoor advertisements 
of Western brands in China
Image 1. Outdoor advertisements of Western brands are a prominent part of China’s con-
sumption-scape. As depicted here, many Western brand advertisements play up 
their exoticness through the use of Western Caucasian models.
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Image 2. Clothing brand Hugo Boss highlights Western otherness through use of Cauca-
sian models in a Beijing store front.
Image 3. Burberry similarly plays up its Western culture origins through youthful Cau-
casian models in outdoor advertising in Wangfujing, a major shopping street of 
Beijng. 
Image 4. Levi’s conveys foreign-ness through both models and use of English terms such 
as “lady.” 
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Image 5. Even Caucasian children are used as models in this advertisement for Paclan-
tis, which sells children’s clothing and plays up Western-ness, despite its Asia-
Pacifi c origins. Paclantis, founded in 2002, has survived the years of market 
competition.  This brand, created by a business man from Taiwan, is “pacifi c-
atlantic” → Paclantis, though the translated name PaiKeLanDi is used on all 
marketing activities. The translated name gives people a subtle implication that 
this is a western brand. Not surprisingly, the image of a white boy is used on its 
ad/poster.  
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Image 6 and 7. Western sports brands, such as Nike, also convey Western otherness 
through use of internationally famous sports celebrities.
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Image 8. Armani engages globally known Asian actors/actresses to suggest its brand’s 
global fame while at the same time localizing its appeal. Here the fi lm stars of 
the 2005 release “House of Flying Daggers” Zhang Ziyi and  Takeshi Kaneshiro 
are featured.  
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Image 9. Western shoe brand, Hush Puppy, uses an Asian model to localize its appeal 
while using the English language slogan “50 years of casual style” to designate 
foreignness. The slogan references the brand’s history of casual style that pre-
dates China’s economic reforms.
Image 10. Contrasting Nike’s use of Western athletes in advertisements, here Adidas local-
izes its appeal through use of both an Asian model and a martial arts context.  
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Image 11 and 12. Kissing in public is considered as belonging uniquely to Western cul-
ture and lifestyle. A London-based Western brand features kissing on 
its billboard affi xed to a multi-story store building that sells specifi cally 
expensive “internationally famous brands.”
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Image 13 and 14. Some efforts of Western brands to localize their offerings are more ex-
plicit.  Unlike the tray liners in the United States, the tray liner in the 
Beijing KFC contains information/tips on how to exercise wisely. Parts 
of the KFC tray insert read: “Exercise reasonably and frequently” and 
“We have changed for China and created new fast food. To have a foot-
hold in China, we strive for endless innovation, and delicious and safe 
food that is good and fast while balancing nutrition for a healthy life.” 
Other information offers instructions on how to exercise. The coffee 
cup reads in English “Relax in KFC,” conveying its localization, in 
contrast to the “fast-food” notion of the West.
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